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ABSTRACT 
 
 This paper explores the motivations for Russian voting behavior in the United Nations 
Security Council from 1995-2012. Specifically, why does Russia vote with the West in many situations, 
but not in others? What motivated Russia to veto three Western-backed resolutions in the ongoing 
Syrian conflict? These are not arbitrary votes—Russia invests considerable energy in both explaining 
and justifying its voting decisions in the Security Council. Thus, even if one believes that Security 
Council resolutions do not significantly affect state behavior (a claim that international relations 
research increasingly disputes), such voting decisions still matter because Russia deems them 
important.  
I contend that Russia’s concern for 1) international stability and 2) state sovereignty norms 
drives Russia’s voting patterns in the Security Council. The evidence for the subsequent analysis 
comes from 1095 Security Council resolutions and vetoed draft resolutions as well as their 
accompanying United Nations press releases. Both the statistical analysis and the qualitative case 
analyses found that a consistently conservative interpretation of Security Council jurisdiction and the 
promotion of state sovereignty norms influenced Russian voting. I also find that Russia views the 
entirety of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) making up the former Soviet Union as 
part of Russia’s sovereign sphere. I test these hypotheses against hypotheses predicting an expansion-
motivated Russia and a status-seeking Russia, but neither alternative viewpoint receives the same 
empirical support that a defensive Russia receives. Finally, the findings in this paper have a number of 
implications. First, the paper finds that Russia has internalized a strict legalist approach to Security 
Council affairs. Therefore, the Western diplomatic approach for compromise should not focus on 
Russian interests, but should rather engage Russia through the compatibility of legal principles. 
Second, the paper emphasizes the lack of normative consensus and highlights the importance of 
further codification of legitimate international legal behavior. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 By October 4, 2011, brutal violence in Syria had already taken the lives of an 
estimated 3,000 civilians.1 Despite the high toll in human life, the international community 
had not taken any meaningful action through the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 
the international organization assigned to maintain international peace and security.2 Finally, 
an October 4th vote intended to authorize sanctions against Bashar al-Assad in response to 
his attacks against his own populace, was vetoed by two members of the Security Council: 
Russia and China. By January 2013, the estimated death toll has risen to 60,000 people, many 
of whom were civilians.3 By January 2013, the UN has still not authorized any action other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Citing figures produced by Mark Lyall Grant, representating the United Kingdom at the United Nations 
during a discussion on United Nations Security Council Draft resolution S/2011/612. 
2 United Nations Charter. (June 1945). http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ 
3 Sterling, Joe and Salma Abdelaziz. “U.N.'s Syria death toll jumps dramatically to 60,000-plus.” CNN. 3 
January 2013. 
Mund-2 
than a non-violent observer mission aimed to monitor a temporary ceasefire4, and Russia 
and China had vetoed two more Security Council resolutions authorizing more forceful 
measures against the Syrian regime.5  
Contrast this behavior to another Security Council vote taken six months prior. On 
February 28, 2011, the Security Council unanimously adopted sanctions against Libya after 
the deaths of about 233 civilians.6 In Libya, Security Council action led to a military 
intervention.7 In Syria, Russia and China have given no inclination of changing their position 
to allow any Security Council intervention. These two high-profile cases reflect a broader 
puzzle posed by this seemingly inconsistent voting: what motivates this voting behavior in 
the Security Council? Russian behavior in these cases is particularly puzzling: as a major 
power on the world stage with a stated interest in promoting humanitarian rights,8 how can 
Russia justify its steadfast opposition to the protection of basic human rights abroad? This 
puzzle fit into a wider research question exploring: what motivated Russian voting behavior 
in the Security Council between 1995-2012?9   
The analysis of Russian voting motivations in the Security Council is not an isolated 
thought exercise, but rather has very important implications. First, scholars have increasingly 
found that Security Council activity affects state behavior. As Erik Voeten explains, Russia 
(and China’s) refusal to sanction military activity threatened the legitimacy of the Second 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 UNSC Security Council Resolution 2059 
5 UNSC draft resolutions S/2012/77 and S/2012/538. 
6 Whitson, Sarah. “Libya: Governments Should Demand End to Unlawful Killings:: Death Toll Up to at Least 
233 Over Four Days.” Human Rights Watch 20 February 2011.  
7 Jones, Bruce D. “Libya and the Responsibilities of Power.” Survival 53.3 (2011) 
8 See, for example, the UN Press Release for UNSC resolution 1672, where Russia states that “There was no 
doubt that violations of international norms, including international humanitarian law, should not go 
unpunished.” 
9 Originally, I had suspected that I would have to narrow down the question to specifically focus on resolutions 
related to threats to international peace and security and use of force. However, since the authorization of the 
use of force is the one of the primary responsibilities of the UNSC, such a distinction proved unnecessary.  
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Iraq War and significantly increased costs to continuing with the operation.10 Thus, because 
the Security Council has the power to greatly influence state cost-benefit calculations, the 
UNSC also matters to policymakers. Moreover, the Security Council deals with matters very 
important to state leadership: questions of international stability and interstate aggression.11 
As such, the failure to reach a compromise on Security Council resolutions results in major 
foreign policy repercussions. For example, some argue that the ongoing failure to find 
common ground on the conflict in Syria has led to an overall strained relationship between 
the United States and Russia, which has resulted in provocative legislation on issues ranging 
from bilateral trade to child adoption.12 Therefore, the salience of the voting content also 
makes the understanding of Security Council voting behavior an important endeavor.  
However, even if the Security Council votes were not important by themselves, the 
fact that Russia cares about its voting behavior makes it important. Russia makes the effort 
to seriously engage in Security Council deliberations, and takes care to justify its voting 
decisions.13 Moreover, the weight that Russia places on abstentions that do not tangibly 
affect a resolution’s outcome, as well as the length to which other states will go to court 
Russian support both speak to the importance that states place on Security Council voting.14  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Voeten, Erik. “The Political Origins of the UN Security Council’s Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force.” 
International Organization 59.3 (2005): 527-557. Also see Hurd in Edward C. Luck, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and 
Ian Hurd, “Stayin’ Alive: The Rumors of the UN’s Death Have Been Exaggerated,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 
2003); Claude Jr., Inis L. “Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations.” 
International Organization, 20.3 (1966): 367-379, Thompson, Alexander. “Coercion through IOs: The Security 
Council and Logic of Information Transmission.” International Organization 60(2006): pp 1-34. 
11 The Security Council specifically focuses on situations of threats to international peace and stability, which 
also draw the greatest amount of attention from political science scholarship (and the international media). 
12 Palmer, Doug. “Obama signs trade, human rights bill that angers Moscow.” Reuters. 14 December 2012. 
13 The voting deliberations that occur on record are published in UN Press releases accompanying Security 
Council resolutions, and are used extensively as empirical evidence within this paper’s research. 
14 See for example, the strong emphasis placed on consensus in the UN Press Releases of Security Council 
resolutions 1086, 1284, and 2023.  
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Moreover, there is an ongoing debate amongst scholars and policymakers alike over 
whether the United States should expect a cooperative or combative Russian foreign policy.15 
Much of this debate stems from opaque Russian decision-making that generates numerous 
alleged motivations behind Russia’s foreign policy behavior. Therefore, an analysis of 
Russia’s Security Council voting behavior also offers an informed perspective into the 
greater decision-making mindset for Russia’s foreign policy leadership. Thus, the systematic 
study of motivations behind Russian voting provides valuable insights not just by enabling a 
greater understanding of an important area of international politics, but also provides a 
valuable medium for understanding the motivations and psyche of Russia’s greater foreign 
policy.  
 I take a multi-pronged approach in assessing the motivations behind Russian voting 
in the Security Council.16 First, I identify three distinct theoretical perspectives from which to 
approach Russian voting behavior: 1) a defensive Russia 2) an expansionist Russia 3) Russia 
as a status seeker. Next, I develop my general theory, which falls under the ‘defensive realist’ 
theoretical perspective. I argue that Russian voting behavior may be primarily explained as 
an attempt to maintain international stability and preserve state sovereignty. I also develop 
the rival theories of an offensive realist Russia and a prestige-seeking Russia. I generate ten 
testable hypotheses that fall under these three theoretical categories. Each hypothesis 
postulates motivations for Russian voting behavior.  
Next, I analyze the range of 1095 Security Council resolutions from 1995-2012 from 
a quantitative standpoint, focusing on draft resolutions that produced negative votes, i.e. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The disagreement between Janusz Bugajski and Andrei Tsygankov over Russian foreign policy intentions 
epitomizes the scholarly divide, and the debate between Barack Obama and Mitt Romney over the U.S. foreign 
policy stance towards Russia during the 2012 elections highlighted the similar lack of consensus among 
politicians and policymakers. See Romney, Mitt. “Bowing to the Kremlin: Why Obama's "hot mic" diplomacy 
is endangering America.” Foreign Policy. 27 March 2012; Anishchuk, Alexei. “UPDATE 1-Medvedev says 
Romney's anti-Russia comment smacks of Hollywood.” Reuters. 27 March 2012. 
16 I owe a special thank you to Dr. Deirdre Martinez for helping me design this research approach. 
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where there were vetoes and abstentions. The gathered empirical Security Council data was 
then subjected to holistic statistical analyses. Thereafter, I analyzed the relative merit of each 
hypothesis in light of the statistical results. Finally, I employed specific case studies for a 
number of those resolutions, for which the UN press statements and Russian voting 
justifications provided an additional layer of insight.  
Taken holistically, the empirical data most strongly supports the thesis that Russia’s 
voting in the Security Council is motivated by its desire to retain a favorable status quo: 
rather than seeking conflict with the United States or searching for greater prestige abroad, 
Russia is fundamentally motivated by the desire to protect what it already has. Russia sees 
both the maintenance of a stable international environment and the protection of state 
sovereignty norms as in its interest, and has internalized both principles to construct a strict 
interpretation of the Security Council’s legal jurisdiction. These findings were robustly 
supported by both the qualitative and quantitative analyses. Moreover, the data also 
demonstrated a secondary finding that Russia considers the CIS states to fall under its 
sovereign sphere of influence, and votes accordingly. In contrast, the data did not provide 
strong support for either the notion of an expansionist Russia nor for a prestige-motivated 
Russia. Finally, I conclude with a recapitulation of the major findings and an exploration of 
some of the practical implications of these research outcomes.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Russia’s behavior in the international system after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
poses an intriguing puzzle, and it is of little surprise that many scholars have attempted to 
explain Russian behavior. However, I have yet to find a systematic study of Russian voting 
behavior in the Security Council and hope to fill that gap in the literature. Thus far, I have 
only seen Security Council voting mentioned as secondary comments while engaged with 
Mund-6 
more general questions of foreign policy. For example, both Tsyagankov and Monaghan 
identify the importance of the supremacy of the Security Council for maintaining norms 
against the use of force and retaining Russian leadership, but neither are directly engaged 
with Russian UNSC voting behavior.17  Moreover, many authors mention the importance of 
the Security Council to Russian foreign policy, but do not attempt to systematically explain 
Russian voting behavior within the Security Council.18 Therefore, because Russian behavior 
in the Security Council is also part of Russia’s general foreign policy approach, the essay 
reviews the extant work on Russian foreign policy.  
Overall, scholars tend to agree on the general periodization of Russian foreign policy. 
In a nutshell, Russia’s behavior towards the international community and the West in 
particular has varied from extremely cooperative, as exemplified at the very outset of the 
beginning of modern Russia, (1991-1994) all the way across the scale to the more 
confrontational approach seen post-2008. While scholars disagree on the causal factors and 
the explanatory reasons for this phenomenon, there is a general consensus that, if one looks 
at Russia’s foreign policy in 1991 and 2008, in the latter period one finds a much more 
hostile and confrontational Russian leadership.19 While scholars and pundits make many 
arguments, both implicit and explicit, to explain Russian foreign policy, one does find 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Tsygankov, Andrei P. Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in International Relations. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2012A. p.122; Monaghan, Andrew. “‘Calmly critical’: Evolving Russian 
views of US hegemony.” Journal of Strategic Studies 29.6(2006): 987-1013; Monaghan, Andrew. “An Enemy at 
the Gates or from Victory to Victory? Russian Foreign Policy.” International Affairs 84.4 (2008): 717–733. 
18 McFarlane, S. Neil. “The ‘R’ in BRIC: Is Russia an Emerging Power?” International Affairs 82.1(2006): 41-
57); Rozman, Gilbert. “Russian Repositioning in Northeast Asia: Putin’s Impact and Current Prospects.” 
Russia’s Prospects in Asia ed. Stephen J. Blank Strategic Studies Institute, 2010. 63-89; Coggins, Bridget. 
“Friends in High Places: International Politics and the Emergence of State Secessionism.” International 
Organizations 65.3(2011): 433-467; Baranovsky, Vladimir. “Humanitarian Intervention: Russian Perspectives.” 
Pugwash Occasional Papers (2001): 12-38; Deng, Yong. “Remolding great power politics: China's strategic 
partnerships with Russia, the European Union, and India.” Journal of Strategic Studies 3.4-5 (2007): 863-903; 
and Lynch, Allen. “The Realism of Russia’s Foreign Policy.” Europe-Asia Studies 53.1 (2001): 7-31. 
19 See, for example, Tsygankov (2012A); Thorun, Christian. Explaining Change in Russian Foreign Policy: The 
Role of Ideas in Post-Soviet Russia’s Conduct Towards the West. New York: Palgrave MacMillan Press, 2009; 
Welch Larson, Deborah and Alexei Shevchenko. “Status Seekers: Russian and Chinese Responses to US 
Primacy.” International Security 34.4 (2010): 63–95. 
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patterns in these foreign policy explanations. While it is tempting to classify these arguments 
under the 4 primary schools of political science thought concerning state motivations and 
behavior (realism, neo-liberal institutionalism, constructivism, and domestic politics), most 
arguments contain elements of multiple schools’ ideologies. Instead, I try to group these 
arguments around shared common elements.  
BALANCE OF POWER 
The first group of explanations claims that Russia’s behavior in the international 
arena is based off of geostrategic power-balancing calculations. Many of these explanations 
start with the structural assumption that the fall of the Soviet Union resulted in a unipolar 
environment with United States hegemony.20 Due to this power imbalance, Russia fears 
U.S.-led unilateralism and therefore actively works to balance against the United States, 
pushing for greater multipolarity.21 This balance of power argument emerges most directly 
from the neo-realist framework, first fully articulated in Kenneth Waltz’s seminal work, 
Theory of International Politics.22 Such a geostrategic balancing approach expects to see Russia 
oppose state action primarily when they feel that such an action threatens Russian security or 
challenges Russian relative power.23 Craig Nation identifies such a balancing tactic in Russia’s 
alliance with China. Nation describes the Chinese-Russian relationship as “mutually 
beneficial, yet plagued with mistrust.”24 Therefore, while Russian foreign policy engages 
China as a current ally to offset American power, Russia similarly has an interest in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See, for example, Monteiro, Nuno. “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful.” International 
Security, 36.3(Winter 2011/12), pp. 9–40; on how the international system became unipolar. 
21 Pape, Robert A. “Soft Balancing Against the United States.” International Security, 30.1 (Summer 2005), pp. 7–
45 
22 Waltz, Kenneth. Theory of International Politics. Random House, 1979. 
23 Other scholars such as Duncan Snidal who see relative power as less critical to state security concerns would 
instead expect to see states balancing based off of absolute power gains calculations. See Snidal, Duncan. 
“Relative Gains and The Pattern of International Cooperation.” Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The 
Contemporary Debate ed. David Baldwin. New York: Columbia University Press, 170-209. 
24 Nation, R. Craig. “Russia in East Asia: Aspirations and Limitations.” Russia’s Prospects in Asia ed. Stephen J. 
Blank. Strategic Studies Institute, 2010. 29-62. 
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preventing China’s rise to power. As realists would predict, Russia has become increasingly 
fearful of becoming a junior partner in that relationship, and would sever their alliance if 
they concluded that such an alignment is not in their best interest.25 In short, such an 
approach expects Russia to behave in a way to offset its most severe threats to the greatest 
extent possible.  
SPHERES OF INFLUENCE 
It is therefore unsurprising to see that this balance of power explanation bleeds into 
explanations focusing on Russia’s ‘spheres of influence.’ The spheres of influence 
explanations of foreign policy make the important distinction that country’s interests are not 
universal across the spectrum. Neil McFarlane succinctly explains this ‘spheres of influence’ 
approach: “Russia’s relations with the hegemonic power are complex, and appear to be 
based on a realistic understanding of the preponderance of American power and also the 
hierarchy of American policy interests.” According to McFarlane, Russian policy behavior 
can be understood under three spheres of influence, which in turn reflect varying levels of 
threat. The first sphere of influence is the Russian heartland, which Russia considers its 
‘domestic security interests’ and which Russia considers non-negotiable. The third sphere of 
influence is those matters of vital interest to the United States, which Russia will concede 
without a fight. It is this second sphere, McFarlane argues, where neither the United States 
nor Russia has vital interests, that Russia competes for influence.26 For example, McFarlane 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 For specific readings on the developing Chinese-Russian relationship, Ferguson, Chaka. “The Strategic Use 
of Soft Balancing: The Normative Dimensions of the Chinese–Russian ‘Strategic Partnership.’” Journal of 
Strategic Studies 35.2 (2012): 197-222; Rozman (2010); Larson and Shevchenko (2010), Goh, Evelyn. “Great 
Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies.” International 
Security, 32.3 (Winter 2007/08), pp. 113–157. 
26 McFarlane (2006). 
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identifies Iran (prior to Iran’s dash to nuclear weapons) as one of the player in this ‘second 
sphere.’27  
Similarly, Christopher Layne does not expect Russia to expect any success in a direct 
challenge to United States structural hegemony. As such, Layne instead argues that one 
expects to see ‘leash-slipping’, as Russia tries to carve out an independent foreign policy 
within the greater hegemonic context.28 Andrew Hurrell builds on this idea of an 
independent sphere and postulates, “the need to maintain regional power and to prevent its 
further erosion has been a central feature of Russian foreign policy.”29 In Hurrell’s view, 
Russia’s greatest challenge is the maintenance of its projection of power, and its foreign 
policy is premised on the fact that foreign policy decisions must promote an expansion of 
Russian’s influence, particularly within its own regional sphere. Larson and Shevchenko 
point to Russia’s manipulation of oil and gas supply to in its region as a way to “exert 
influence over the post-Soviet space.”30  
CULTURAL CLASH 
 A third group of explanations for Russia’s non-cooperative foreign policy, 
particularly towards the West, is grounded in cultural explanations. One of the most 
commonly cited articles on cultural differences leading to international conflict is Samuel 
Huntington’s article on the ‘clash of civilizations’.31 Huntington argues that the political 
predominance of Western liberal states has not translated into the internalization of Western 
cultural norms and values, and these normative dissonances will lead to conflict along the 
lines of cultural divide. Huntington explicitly identifies Russia as a state where this internal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 McFarlane (2006), p. 53. 
28 Layne, Christopher. “The Unipolar Vision Revisited: The Coming End of the United States’ Unipolar 
Movement.” International Security, 31.2 (Fall 2006), pp. 7–41 
29 Hurrell, Andrew. “Hegemony, Liberalism, and global order: what space for would-be powers?” International 
Affairs 82, I (2006) 1-19 
30 Larson and Shevchenko (2010), p. 65. 
31 Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilizations." Foreign Affairs. 72 (1992): 22. 
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cultural clash continues to have a major impact on Russian foreign policy behavior. The 
question, as Huntington states, is how Russia constitutes itself in the “historical debate over 
Westernization versus Russification.”32 In Huntington’s words, the debate is between 
behaving like a liberal democracy (West) or similar to a traditional, authoritarian, nationalist 
state (Russia).33 Huntington’s article was written in 1992. However, if it were extrapolated to 
explain Russia’s behavior in the past few years, Huntington would argue that an increasingly 
‘Russian’ cultural viewpoint has led to conflictual foreign policy vis-à-vis the West.34  
While Huntington’s theory predicts certain structural ramifications in international 
relations, the ‘clash of civilizations’ theory does not directly account for foreign policy 
behavior itself. Larson and Shevchenko help provide the link from foreign policy behavior 
to international conflict by identifying the threats that “outsiders…with differing values and 
interests” pose to cooperation with the liberal Western community.35 Specifically, different 
foundational assumptions about state behavior and the international structure could certainly 
lead to misunderstandings and cooperation problems. Moreover, a sense of difference also 
often breeds distrust, as demonstrated by a number of psychological studies examining in-
group dynamics.36 Gilbert Rozman highlights this point by examining the ways in which the 
United States and Russia stand to gain from bilateral agreements are however not reached 
due to “reflexive Russian demonization of the United States.”37 The only reason that 
cooperation did succeed in the early 1990s, Mary Sarote argues, was because of Gorbachev’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Huntington (1992), pg. 43 
33 Huntington (1992) pg. 44. 
34 See also Wendt, Alexander, Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999.p. 354 for a more in-depth examination on the ways that cultural differences may lead to conflict.  
35 Larson and Shevchenko (2010), p. 64. 
36 Wohlforth, William. “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War.” World Politics 61.1 (2009): 
28-57. 
37 Rozman (2010).  
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decision to make cooperative agreements that that ‘horrified’ other Russian leaders.38 The 
chief implication in this literature for the purposes of this essay concerns the culture 
dissonance on questions of the standards of democratic legitimacy. Specifically, Larson and 
Shevchenko discuss the difference between Western accusations of a “retreat from 
democracy” as opposed to Russia’s insistence upon the right to a “sovereign democracy.”39 
While the ‘cultural clash’ does not play a central role in many of the major scholarly theories 
of Russian foreign policy, a significant proportion of scholarship does ground their theories 
in the assumption of a distinct Russian cultural construction. 
 EURASIAN IDENTITY 
The Eurasianist40 approach offers one example of a cultural clash that results in a 
specific foreign policy behavior. An Eurasianist approach assumes a constructed Russian 
identity which includes the attempt to organize all of the greater Eurasian bloc under direct 
Russian leadership.41 When referring to Eurasia as a geographic location, this essay 
approximates the loose definition of Eurasia as the ‘post-Soviet space’42 as specifically 
referring to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), an association of 11 Eastern 
European, Caucasian, and Central Asian states interacting based on the principle of 
sovereign equality.43 
In effect, Russian Eurasianism attempts to distinguish the “unique Russian 
experience from the more narrow ‘European’ experience.”44 As Boris Yeltsin describes the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Sarote, Mary Elise. “Perpetuating U.S. Preeminence: The 1990 Deals to ‘Bribe the Soviets Out’ and Move 
NATO In.” International Security, 35.1 (Summer 2010), pp. 110–137. 
39 Larson and Shevchenko (2010) 
40 My own term. 
41 Bugajski, Janusz. Expanding Eurasia: Russia’s European Ambitions. Center for Strategic and International 
Studies Press, 2008. 
42 Bugajski (2008) 
43 At least nominally. Interstate Statistical Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Also see 
Tsygankov (2012A) pp. 177-188.  
44 Bugajski (2008), p.9 
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cultural myth45 driving Russian Eurasianism; “Russia is a unique country with its own 
interests and its own logic of development. From the historical point of view, Russia is a 
successor of the Rus, Moscow’s Czarism, the Russian Empire and of the USSR. From the 
geopolitical perspective, Russia is in the unique position of being in Eurasia.”46 Such an 
approach has led Russia to define its unique Eurasian character as a combination of 
European and Eastern values.47 Practically, these combined values has led Russian 
Exceptionalists to view Russia as both a ‘civilized’ European country as well as a ‘rising’ 
Eastern state.  According to Christian Thorun, Russian leadership formulated and 
internalized such an Eurasianist identity in the years between 1994 and 2000.48 
 GREAT POWER IDENTITY 
 One of the greatest challenges for the Russian people at the end of the Cold War was 
coming to terms with the reality that their national status had plummeted from one of the 
world’s two greatest super-powers to a second-tier country with its economy in shambles. 
This grandiose historical context, many scholars argue, plays a critical role in explaining the 
construction of Russian national identity that informs Russian foreign policy decisions. This 
approach is steeply grounded in constructivist thought—it contends that Russian national 
identity-constructs leads it to consider international recognition as a world leader to be a top 
national priority. In short, proponents of ‘national pride’ explanations argue that Russia's 
actions are largely motivated by its desire to regain what it perceives as its proper place on 
the world stage. While many authors ground their argument in similar prestige-based 
foundations, other scholars combine this identity constructive theory with other elements of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 For more on myths of expansion, see Snyder, Jack. Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International 
Ambition. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991. 
46Yeltsin’s 1996 Address to the Federal Assembly, as cited in Thorun, (2009) p.35 
47 Thorun (2009) p.34 
48 Thorun (2009) p.35 
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international relations theory to produce a wide variety of theoretical interpretations and 
conclusions.  
Some scholars directly postulate that status recognition drives Russian foreign policy 
behavior. Larson and Shevchenko argue that in the early 1990s, when Russia took a 
cooperative approach towards the West, the Western states did not accord the Russian 
leadership the level of respect that Russia felt it deserved.49 Under the Larson/Shevchenko 
hypothesis, this lack of respect and greater humiliation led to Russian efforts to reconsider 
their cooperative policy towards the West and instead strive towards status recognition as a 
strong rival power. Wohlforth identifies this same drive for status recognition, but argues 
that relative power concerns motivate prestigious status aspirations.50 This quest for status 
recognition, Larson and Shevchenko argue, results in a Russian effort to establish its 
distinctiveness versus the West that encourages cultural independence. Significantly, Russia 
emphasizes the Westphalian notion of ‘sovereign democracy’ as a means to develop a path 
to democratic governance free of Western pressures.51 This ‘independence approach’ stresses 
Russia’s unique cultural and historical identity and allows the Russian state to develop as 
‘separate but equal’ entity on par with the United States.  
Andrei Tsygankov takes a slightly different spin on Russia’s drive for Great Power 
status by focusing on perceptions of ‘honor’ as the primary force explaining Western-
Russian relations.52 Tsygankov consciously combines realism and constructivism in his 
honor-based approach;  
“the proposed honor-based theory of foreign policy combines insights from both 
constructivism and realism and fits with the recently introduced realist-constructivist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Larson and Shevchenko (2010). 
50 Wohlforth (2009). 
51 Larson and Shevchenko (2010) 
52 Tsygankov, (2012A)  
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approach. The approach retains the constructivist commitment to viewing the world as a 
social interaction, not a natural necessity, but it also argues against transcending power in 
international politics.”53  
In other words, recognizing that neither realism nor constructivism adequately 
explain Russian foreign policy behavior, Tsygankov chooses to follow an emerging trend 
combining both paradigms. In this theory, the definition of honor combines national pride 
and concern for international prestige. In this honor-based theory, the key to understanding 
Russia’s foreign policy behavior lies in Russia’s split identity between its self-construction as 
a European country and as a distinct great power.54 In this formulation, Russia cooperates 
with the West when it perceives the West to be according Russia with the great power 
respect that Russia deserves, a hypothesis which resonates strongly with constructivist 
theories. However, Tsygankov offers far more ‘realist’ determinants of Russian foreign 
policy behavior in situations where the West humiliates Russia through a failure to 
acknowledge Russian prestige.55 If Russia feels confident about its capabilities vis-à-vis the 
West, it will challenge the West and pursue an aggressive foreign policy behavior. If Russia 
does not feel internally confident in its ability to challenge the West, then it will resort to a 
defensive policy of isolationism. Therefore, Tsygankov’s theory explains cooperative foreign 
policy in the early 1990s as reflective of a Russian government that felt its status sufficiently 
recognized by the West and a turn to an increasingly expansionist Russian state that comes 
from augmented power capabilities as the first decade of the next millennium progressed.56 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53  Tsygankov (2012A) p. 268. 
54 Tsygankov (2012A) p. 6. 
55 Tsygankov (2012A) p. 44. 
56 Two other similar Great Power Identity theories have recently gained prominence in the literature. Christian 
Thorun incorporates great power status in his theoretical analysis. For Thorun, Russia retained a ‘self-
perception of its great-power status consistently from 1992 to 2007.’ Thorun postulates that the Russian 
leadership’s constantly evolving ideological worldview and vacillating levels of material capabilities has led 
Russian leaders to pursue differing strategic policies at different times.  
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In all, some of the most recent and comprehensive scholarship on Russian foreign 
policy behavior has tended to combine realist calculations set in an ideational context. 
Above, the theories have centered on constructed great power identities that inform Russian 
foreign policy interests. However, there is another strain of thought that focuses on the 
power of ideas in shaping the international community through the legal legitimacy 
mechanism.  In the words of one prominent scholar, “Power and legitimacy are not 
antithetical, but complements.”57 
 INSTITUTIONALIST LEGALISM 
 Another group of explanations focuses on Russian accordance with the laws in 
international institutions, particularly in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). This 
approach expects Russian foreign policy to strictly adhere to Russia’s perception of legal 
guidelines dictating state behavior in the international community. Russian leadership itself 
often couches its behavior in language engaging with questions of legality in the international 
system.58 In particular, Russia focuses on the United Nations Charter as the foundation for 
international law, and looks to the UNSC as the world arbiter and guardian of international 
law. If one believes Russian rhetoric, then there is good reason to think that Russia has 
internalized the norms dictating acceptable international behavior in the international system 
and adjusts its policies accordingly.59Other scholars, such as Andrew Monaghan, believe that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Anne Clunan offers an explanation of an identitive foreign policy based on a pragmatic construction of 
national self-esteem. While Thorun sees Russia’s great-power identity as a driver behind foreign policy 
behavior, Clunan sees the strong national pride as a result of foreign policy behavior. Under Clunan’s 
‘aspirational constructivist’ approach, political elites offer a wide variety of possible conceptualizations of 
Russian identity, and the Russian leadership only internalizes the self-image that best fits from both a pragmatic 
political and historical standpoint as the Russian national interest. Thus, both of these authors, like Tsygankov, 
identify Russia’s Great Power identity as highly influential in the formation of Russian foreign policy. Clunan, 
Clunan, Anne L. The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence: Aspirations, Identity, and Security Interests. 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009; and Thorun (2009) 
57 Claude (1966) 
58 “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation.” President of Russia: 2008. 
59 For internalization of legal norms on state behavior, see, for example, Koh, Harold Honglu, “The 1998 
Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home,” Houston Law Review, 35.2 (1998), pp.623-680. 
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Russia has latched on to the UNSC out of weakness. By fastening themselves to legal 
preeminence of the Security Council, Monaghan argues, Russia preserves one of its primary 
sources of international influence—its permanent veto-wielding seat on the Security 
Council.60 
 This approach, however, has been met with significant cynicism and even flat-out 
rejection. Some scholars, such as Mary Elise Sarote, argue that there is no legal consistency 
in the UNSC. Such scholars would be much more inclined to take John Mearsheimer’s 
perspective that institutions simply reflect power relationships61 and agree with Michael 
Glennon’s observation that the Security Council serves as a forum for geopolitical forces.62 
Russia’s behavior, these cynics contend, operates based on Russian geopolitical interests, and 
Russian legalist arguments are post-hoc claims intended as a justificatory veneer. 
Furthermore, other critics go even farther and deny Russian integration in international law. 
Maxmillian Terhalle, for example, contends that Russia has failed to socialize into 
international law completely.63 In this vein, Russia’s different perspective on the international 
legal system would lead it to act with no regard to established international law. Finally, 
Russian challenges to what Russia perceives as Western attempts to conform international 
law to non-consensus ‘universalized norms’ bring other scholars to question the very 
assumption of any consensus on international rules of law.64 Therefore, the strong claim 
holds that Russia’s behavior has no real reflection on its engagement with established 
international law and even questions whether a consensus on international law exists. 	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NORMS AND IDEAS   
Scholarly theories have emerged which consider norms and ideas to carry as much 
political clout as military and economic power. Because these approaches view accepted 
norms as directly influencing state behavior, theorists assume that states factor norms and 
ideas as vital elements of their security interests. Under this logic, because normative 
frameworks and value-systems compete on the world stage for international acceptance, 
states have critical security interests in embedding their normative interpretation into the 
internalized psyche of the international community.65  
 This essay considers norms and ideas on par with power and security gains, 
following in the Wendtian school of thought that recognizes the role that human nature and 
ideational factors play in the constitution of state preferences and interests.66 One chief 
difference between this constructive-identity foundation and many of the traditional 
approaches67is that the constructive-identity school does not assume preferences.68 
Therefore, this identitive leeway enables a deeper perspective into state motivations and 
preferences. However, this perspective only makes no prior assumptions about state 
behavior prior to initial interaction. Practically, however, each state has had formative 
interactions. Therefore, nearly all of the assumptions used in the realist and neoliberal 
institutionalist school are subsumed under this identitive formulation—both grand theories 
simply predict that all states construct their identities in similar ways and therefore have 
similar behavioral patterns.69 In other words, one should be able to reach the same 
conclusions taking a constructed world with realist-constructed states as one would in a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” 
International Organization 52.4 (1998): 887-917. 
66 Wendt, (1999) Ch. 3, p. 115. 
67 Such as neo-realism or neo-liberal institutionalism 
68 Wendt (1999) Ch. 3, p. 96-108. 
69 Wendt (1999) Ch. 3. 
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parallel world examined under a realist formula. As such, the Wendtian (or social 
constructivist) approach allows for the greatest inclusivity and allows this essay to test the 
greatest range of hypotheses. It was for these reasons of robust applicability that the 
following theories treat military power, economic might, and normative ideas as all 
potentially influential factors in determining state behavior. While one potential critique 
might argue that a normative approach provides significant theoretical baggage with little 
increased leverage (i.e. decreased parsimony), I believe that the expanded ability to test a 
range plausible idea-based theories justifies such an approach.   
 According to constructivist theory, the transference and internalization of norms and 
ideas take place through interactions.70 Therefore it logically follows that institutions, which 
are defined as “a set of principles, rules, or norms that define appropriate behavior in a given 
setting,” serve as an incubator for the development of norms and ideas.71 For states, these 
interactions take place through international institutions. Specifically, Inis Claude and others 
identify the United Nations as the international institution with the greatest normative 
impact, and serves a legitimization function for norms and ideas.72 Therefore, state actions 
accepted as legitimate by the United Nations strengthen the norms motivating that action. 
On the other hand, state actions that attract international condemnation challenge the 
acceptance and legitimacy of the norms and ideas motivating that action.73 When norms have 
been fully internalized, they are institutionalized as international law.74 As such, one can 
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easily conceptualize the United Nations Security Council—charged as the final arbiter of 
international peace and security—as a battlefield where states fight for acceptance and 
legitimization of their cultural norms, values, and ideas as well as their material interests.75  
 This normative-based approach conceptualizes the UNSC as a chief battleground in 
a war of ideas, with different world approaches vying for international consensus and 
crystallization into international customary law.76 Conflicts in norms and values often 
manifest themselves through the legal and justificatory discourse that surrounds UNSC 
member states’ explanations for their actions. These justifications establish international 
norms, which in turn dictate acceptable state behavior in the international system.77 Finally, it 
bears reiterating that this concern with norms is neither simply rhetorical nor pedantic. As 
Chaka Ferguson writes, “In a hegemonic system, norms can be as threatening to states as 
armies and navies and affect whether states attain their interests.”78 
 ADVANCING THE SCHOLARSHIP 
 This essay hopes to advance the scholarship aimed at understanding Russian foreign 
policy behavior by examining Russia’s decisions through the lens of international 
institutions. Analyzing voting behavior from an institutional perspective has the merit of 
engaging with the Russian leadership’s pursuit of national interests while also accounting for 
the constraints that other states place on Russian behavior. Russia’s voting decisions do not 
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take place in a vacuum; rather, these decisions reflect a combination of both the construction 
of Russian interests as well as an engagement with Russia’s inter-state relationships at an 
international level.  Moreover, Russian voting behavior in the UNSC should provide an ideal 
platform for understanding Russian motivations because of both the centrality of the UNSC 
to questions of state security and the special normative weight79 wielded by UN 
organizations. Specifically, states pay close attention to the UNSC because of the UNSC’s 
tangible impact on defining legitimate acts of aggression and galvanizing international 
military coalitions.80  
By taking a structured and rigorous examination of Russian voting behavior in the 
UNSC , the author hopes to identify robust theoretical explanations for Russian voting 
behavior that serve the dual purpose of providing a thorough understanding of the 
motivations behind Russian voting behavior in the UNSC as well as produce useful 
theoretical insights for interpreting Russian foreign policy behavior as a whole. 
GENERAL THEORY 
The above section discusses the extant literature on Russian foreign policy behavior 
and explains the value of an institutions-oriented approach. The section below turns 
theoretical, focusing on a number of potential motivations for Russian voting behavior 
within the UNSC. These potential incentives fall into three distinct theoretical 
conceptualizations of Russia’s foreign policy approach: 1) defensive realism 2) offensive 
realism 3) status seeking. These three theoretical perspectives translate into three rival 
theories attempting to explain Russian behavior within international institutions. Below, I 
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sketch these three approaches defining different Russian worldviews: 1) a defensive Russia 2) 
an expansionist Russia 3) Russia as a status seeker. 
DEFENSIVE REALISM 
 The theoretical roots of a ‘defensive Russia’ stem from defensive realism. Defensive 
realists argue that states do not necessarily have any aggressive designs against other states, 
but are often forced into conflict with other states as a result of the anarchic system of 
international relations. Robert Jervis’s work examining the challenges to cooperation in 
international relations is representative of the defensive realist approach.81 Jervis argues that 
even well-meaning states may fall into conflict through uncertainty in international 
relations.82  
I argue that Russia’s voting behavior in the Security Council is primarily steeped in a 
defensive foreign policy outlook. Russia views the Security Council as a tool to help maintain 
a world of international relations that protects Russian interests. Thus, this paper’s central 
argument is grounded in defensive realism; that Russia has two overarching goals aimed 
defending current Russian holdings: 1) promotion of international stability 2) protection of 
state sovereignty. Below, I develop the general thesis argument.  
First, Russia genuinely seeks to promote international stability through the Security 
Council. The horrors of the First and Second World Wars convinced Russia that it is in their 
interest to avoid large-scale international conflict.83 Moreover, because Russia seeks to 
preserve the status quo, Russia has incentives to delegitimize all interstate violence. With the 
reduction in Russia’s relative capabilities following the Cold War, conflict becomes even less 
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in non-cooperation despite the fact that both states would rather cooperate than not cooperate.  
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attractive, as a status quo Russia has disproportionately large assets relative to its capabilities. 
Specifically, legitimate interstate violence has the potential to alter the balance of power and 
also affect the nature of the international system.84 Russia’s desire to preserve the current 
international system leads to a vested interest in a Security Council organization dedicated to 
maintaining stability in the international system.85 Thus, Russia views the Security Council as 
a vitally important international organization to prevent widespread international conflict. 
Russia demonstrates its commitment to the Security Council’s mission through its 
willingness to authorize force in situations that it feels threaten international peace and 
security, such as in Burundi in 1996.86 
However, Russia believes in many cases international intervention can exacerbate the 
instability arising from violent conflicts.87 Therefore, Russia will be careful to avoid 
authorizing unnecessary interventions that jeopardize international stability. I argue that this 
dual recognition for the importance of international interventions in maintaining stability 
combined with the potential for unnecessary interventions to create unwarranted instability 
leads Russia to create a strict legal definition where intervention is only justified as a last 
resort. The clearest example of Russia’s explanation of its perspective on the instability 
wrought about by intervention comes from a UN press release on a Russian-introduced 
draft resolution condemning NATO military activity in Kosovo.88 Russia’s representative 
claimed, “The use of force not only destabilized the situation in the Balkans and the region 
as a whole, but undermined today's system of modern-day international relations.”89 In 	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specific, the current international system operates under norm of states as the individual 
actors in the international system, as opposed to trends that seek to put individuals within 
states as the primary driver of international relations.90 In this case, one clearly sees Russia’s 
belief that external intervention, when used improperly on behalf of non-state individuals, 
severely threatens not only international stability, but also the foundational norms under 
which states currently operate. Therefore, Russia advocates strict legal adherence to the 
limited jurisdiction of the UN Charter doctrine in order to simultaneously allow for a strong 
UNSC that maintains international stability while also safeguarding against abuse of the 
international mandate.  In short, this legal definition revolves over whether or not the crisis 
poses a threat to international peace and stability, and if it does not, whether or not the 
parties to the conflict have agreed to intervention.91 
Second, Russia also has another incentive to limit needless international 
intervention—concern for state sovereignty.92 By promoting state sovereignty norms, Russia 
also promotes its own place in the international arena. State sovereignty is an ultra-
conservative idea—it cements the current state actors as the only legitimate players in the 
international arena.93 As such, it crystallizes the current distribution of powers and prevents 
territorial redistribution contrary to Russian interests. Even more importantly, the sovereign 
state-centric system delegitimizes non-state actors’ attempts for self-determination, an 
important role for a Russia facing the threat of several separatist groups.94 Therefore, state 
sovereignty ensures the retention of a state-centric international system that secures Russian 
interests. 	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Besides its state-centric focus, state sovereignty also protects Russia’s interests 
through its normative emphasis on the sovereign inviolability of internal state affairs.95 In 
other words, state sovereignty allows for countries to conduct their governments free from 
external interference. Thus, the state sovereignty norm protects Russia from international 
critiques on its human rights standards, thus allowing Russia more options through which it 
may achieve its policy agenda at home and abroad.96 In fact, Putin promoted the notion of 
‘sovereign democracy’ in an attempt to directly connect state sovereignty norms with 
Russia’s right to govern its domestic populace without international obstruction.97 
In particular, this norm places the ultimate responsibility for the welfare of the state 
citizenry with the state’s government, rather than with the international community. From 
the standpoint of international stability, Russia does not see internal conflicts within 
sovereign borders as posing a threat to stability. For example, in the ongoing civil war in 
Syria, Russia has explicitly stated that, “Furthermore, events [in Syria] posed no threat to 
international peace and security.”98 Therefore, in the interests of international stability and 
retaining the status quo, Russia adopts the position that the best way to solve an 
international conflict is to stay out.99 If the international community is going to get involved 
in a conflict, then the intervention must increase international stability.  
Given Russia’s separatist threats, Russia also uses the state sovereignty principle to 
crack down on ethnic minority groups without the fear of serious international 
repercussions, thus maintaining the territorial status quo.100 Not only does Russia promote 	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the state sovereignty norm; it promotes sovereignty as supreme over newer norms such as 
humanitarian intervention, which would lead to state instability and potential changes to the 
international status quo.101 Therefore, this theory of Russia as a defensive power predicts a 
conservative Russia concerned with maintaining the status quo.  
OFFENSIVE REALISM 
Another theoretical approach to international relations would predict more 
aggressive, expansionist foreign policy behavior. This approach, known as offensive realism, 
views state actors as power-maximizers seeking to promote their own interests at the 
expense of other states. The seminal work of offensive realist thought is John Mearsheimer’s 
Tragedy of Great Power Politics.102 Mearsheimer argues that due to relative gains concerns, states 
will not only try to increase their own power, but they will also attempt to diminish the 
power of other states through any means available.103  Thus, such an approach would expect 
aggressive state behavior with the intent of maximizing its relative power. 
Offensive realist theory has specific implications for Russian voting behavior. This 
theoretical approach is grounded in the idea that Russia is unsatisfied with its current share 
of power, and has designs on extending its sphere of influence through expansion. 
Moreover, such an approach imagines a Russia intensely concerned with the relative balance 
of power and in a zero sum world where Western gains translate into Russian losses. 
Therefore, this theoretical approach conceives of a Russia whose Security Council votes are 
an extension of its realpolitik. Such an approach would expect Russia to be consistently 
pushing for Soviet irredentism and beyond. Moreover, because offensive realism views the 
Security Council as simply another tool in Russia’s grand strategy, the Security Council as an 
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institution would not have independent significance for Russia, and Russia would only obey 
international law when it was expedient. The biggest constraint on Soviet expansion would 
be Russia’s relative power vis-à-vis the other members of the international community. This 
approach would also expect Russia to align itself strategically with other rising powers, 
regardless of concerns of international legitimacy.104 Most critically for this essay, however, 
an offensive Russia will seek to hem in the U.S., and use whatever power it has at its 
disposal—including the use of the Security Council—in order to limit United States power 
expansion and avoid U.S. hegemony.105 Therefore, this offensive realist theory of an 
aggressive, expansionist Russia predicts Security Council behavior that expands Russian 
power and influence, is willing to change the international status quo, and is indifferent to 
international legal norms—nearly opposite predictions to my primary theoretical argument 
of Russia as a defensive state.   
STATUS SEEKING 
 The third approach expects Russia to use the Security Council to advance its Great 
Power status. This viewpoint places less emphasis on direct power concerns and more 
weight on questions of international prestige. Two authors who make prominent arguments 
about the role of prestige in state behavior are William Wohlforth and Robert Gilpin.106 Both 
authors argue that power is linked to prestige, and therefore states seek prestige and respect 
from the international community. Specifically, both Wohlforth and Gilpin argue that 
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international prestige leads to less conflict, as the international community recognizes 
prestigious states as possessing significant levels of relative power.107 
Russia’s powerful position as one of five permanent members of the Security 
Council gives it a strong platform from which it can remind the international community of 
its prestigious great power status. Here, one expects Russia to work more cooperatively with 
states that respect its great power status, and will make an effort to highlight its national 
prestige through Security Council behavior when Russia does not feel sufficiently respected. 
Moreover, as a great power, Russia will seek diplomatic alliances with other great powers in a 
desire to feel part of the international ‘in-group.’ A status-seeking Russia will also place great 
weight on the level to which its own perspective is respected and taken into account. 
Similarly, a status-seeking Russia will strive for the international community to respect 
Russian cultural distinctiveness as distinct civilization with unique legitimacy. Therefore, this 
third approach expects Russia to use the Security Council as tool for promoting its 
international status. While the prestige-based motivation marks this theory as distinct, this 
theory of Russia as a status seeker has elements that do not directly conflict with a defensive 
Russia. The status seeker hypothesis predicts that a result of prestige would be a decrease in 
conflict—one of the primary goals of a defensive Russia.108  
HYPOTHESES 
 Below, I outline a number of hypotheses predicting Russian voting behavior. The 
first three hypotheses result from the defensive realist school, and are consistent with my 
primary theoretical argument. The next three hypotheses come from the offensive realist 	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viewpoint, and provide a direct challenge to my thesis argument. The last four hypotheses 
stem from the status seeker viewpoint, which—while foundationally distinct—has elements 
compatible with both offensive and defensive realism.  
DEFENSIVE RUSSIA 
Three hypotheses fall under the perspective of a defensive Russia. First, H1 describes 
a legalist approach that allows Russia to develop a strictly conservative view of Security 
Council jurisdiction, hence enabling Russia to retain its influence and preserve the status 
quo.109 Second, H2 expects Russia to uphold state sovereignty norms. The state sovereignty 
principle maintains the current status quo, thus protecting harmful changes to Russian 
interests. Finally, H3 predicts that Russia will protect its influence in its self-proclaimed 
sovereign sphere among the post-Soviet CIS states. From Russia’s perspective, this 
protection of their sphere of influence is defensively motivated and targeted at preserving 
Russia’s traditional power influence. Each of these three hypotheses are more fully 
developed in the following section. 
STICKLERS FOR THE LAW 
This theoretical approach highlights Russia’s close engagement with the UNSC as 
the sole authority on questions relating to use of force and Russia’s strict interpretation of 
the UNSC legal mandate. By designating a strict legal mandate of jurisdiction for the UNSC, 
Russia has the ability to defend the international status quo on legal grounds. Specifically on 
questions of sovereignty, humanitarian intervention, and use of force, Russia bases its 
behavior around a classic ‘liberal’ interpretation of the UN Charter. Russia fully supports the 
Kantian interpretation that “interference by foreign powers would infringe on the rights of 
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an independent people struggling with its internal disease; hence, it would itself be an 
offense and would render the autonomy of all states insecure.”110 In other words, a “basic 
postulate of liberal international theory holds that states have the right to be free from 
foreign intervention.”111 If one believes their explicit foreign policy doctrine, “Russia 
advocates full universality of the generally recognized norms of international law both in 
their understanding and application.”112 In other words, Russia strictly pursues and condones 
only foreign policy activities that fall strictly within the guidelines of international law. 
Moreover, Russia takes the strict liberal Kantian perspective respecting state sovereignty and 
protecting against external intervention, which Russia claims undergirds the foundation of 
the United Nations Charter.  
To bolster its point, Russia emphasizes that the UN Charter clearly outlines that the 
UN “is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members,”113 unless granted 
direct authorization by the Security Council.114 This legalist distinction plays a vital role in 
understanding Russian motivations in the Security Council. Such an approach advocates that 
Russia genuinely supports the role of the Security Council and believes in the UN Charter. 
Specifically, Russia recognizes the critical role of maintaining a Security Council body 
comprised of the world’s most powerful nations in order to secure a stable world order. 
However, from Russia’s perspective, the legal goal of the Security Council is to maintain 
world order and prevent international conflict.115 The jurisdiction of this mandate, from the 
Russian perspective, is extremely limited. Unless a state actor poses a serious threat to 	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international peace and security, and a Security Council intervention would stabilize and not 
exacerbate that threat to international stability, then Russia does not believe that there are 
any legal grounds for the violation of state sovereignty.116 As such, the only legal recourse 
open to the Security Council117 is the pursuit of negotiated diplomacy on the basis of state 
consent. 
Therefore, in situations of external intervention, one should expect Russia to 
proceed with extreme caution. According to Russia, in order to qualify as a justified situation 
for international intervention, either the conflicting parties must consent to external 
intervention forces or wage a conflict that poses a real threat to international peace and 
security.118 As Baranovsky articulates, 
“In strictly legal terms, Russia continues to argue that the non-use of force, as formulated in 
the UN Charter, has an imperative character. The Charter stipulates directly and 
unambiguously that the only two exceptions concern the right of states to individual or 
collective self-defense (article 51) and to actions aimed at maintaining international peace, 
with the Security Council being the only body entitled to decide upon appropriate means, 
including the use of force (article 42).”119 
 From this one may expect the following prediction:  
H1: Russia will be more likely to oppose or abstain on a UNSC resolution when the resolution 
supports international intervention without the consent of the fighting parties or a threat to international peace 
and security. 
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Here, one would expect resolutions concerning international intervention to prove a 
useful tool for assessing the strength of this hypothesis. Due to the primary requirement of 
the UN Security Council’s charter to necessitate scenarios threatening international peace, 
one should expect Chapter VII resolutions, which invoke the Security Council’s 
authorization, to play an important role in establishing a legal basis for activity. Moreover, 
because the legal framework requires negotiated consent to cases not threatening 
international peace as well as for provisional diplomatic measures for threats to peace,120 one 
should also expect state consent to play an important role in the voting process. Therefore, 
due to legal concerns, one may expect Russia to oppose resolutions121 if they are adopted 
under Chapter VII but lack significant violent threats or if the parties to the conflict have 
not consented to UN intervention. On the other hand, a lack of these legalistic voting 
behaviors would seriously challenge the viability of H1.  
Moreover, qualitative evidence providing justifications for voting behavior on legal 
terms in specific resolutions would also lend support for H1. However, such a qualitative 
assessment cannot stand on its own. The provided reasoning can only directly vouch for the 
consistency of Russia’s explanation for their voting motivation. However, without a more 
quantitative, holistic affirmation of Russia’s legal behavior, such explanations may prove to 
be more of a legal justificatory cover rather than a reflection of a sincere resolve to uphold 
international law.  Finally, on the qualitative side, if the evidence provides examples of cases 
where Russia believes that a resolution violates international law, but is convinced to avoid 
casting a negative vote due to side-payments and political expediency, then this theory will 
be effectively falsified.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 United Nations Charter Article 40. 
121 Here, as for the rest of the essay unless specifically noted, opposition is used to entail either a veto or an 
abstention. 
Mund-32 
DEFINING SOVEREIGNTY NORMS122 
 Scholars overwhelmingly accept that Russia’s interpretation of international law and 
the UN Charter is not universally accepted by other states in the international system.123 In 
particular, Martha Finnemore points out that changing norms of intervention have led to a 
conflict between humanitarian intervention and respect for state sovereignty.124 However, 
this norm-shift has not been universal, and different states value the relative legal weight and 
significance of each norm to varying degrees.125 Moreover, each country vies to 
institutionalize its normative outlook on the international system and cement its own 
perspective into international law. In many ways, this battle for the relative legitimacy of 
these contradicting norms is fought among the permanent members of the UNSC, with the 
more conservative China and Russia pitted against the progressive U.S., U.K, and France. As 
Gilbert Rozman explains,  
“Both states [China and Russia] oppose allowing U.S. power and Western values to gain a 
dominant global position. The two also share a firm commitment to leave the UN Security 
Council with the sole authority to address questions or the use of force beyond one’s 
national borders.”126 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 The reason why this section is differentiated from the section above on Russian legalist behavior is because 
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hands, looks at state sovereignty not as an absolute fact, but rather as a mutable norm that Russia attempts to 
influence through its voting behavior in the UN Security Council. 
123  See for example, Lake, David A. “The New Sovereignty in International Relations.” International Studies 
Review 5.3. (2003) pp. 303–323. 
124 Finnemore, Martha. The Purpose of Intervention. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003. 52 – 
84. See also Risse, Thomas. “Let’s Argue!: Communicative Action in World Politics,” International  
Organization 54.1 (2000), 1-39; See also Jackson and Rosberg (1984) pp. 13. “The doctrine of States’ rights—that 
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125 Adam Roberts (2003) 
126 Rozman (2010) 
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Therefore, Russia and China maintain steadfast opposition to any infringement upon the 
state sovereignty principle, arguing that the “right-to-protect” principle promoted by the 
West violates international law and is symptomatic of U.S. expansionism.127 Russia argues 
that the Western states have structured a hypocritical system that allows NATO to pursue its 
political interests under the guise of humanitarian intervention.128 Through a haphazard 
implementation of a humanitarian intervention principle that bypasses the UNSC, the West 
tries to expand its political reach and avoid Russian and Chinese vetoes, which exist in the 
UNSC as safeguards designed specifically to prevent such unilateral aggression. For example, 
Russia found the justification for NATO intervention in Kosovo as a unique case to be ‘a lie’ 
and was outraged by the ad hoc application of sovereignty rules.129 
 Moreover, one should also keep in mind that Russia has other less noble incentives 
for promoting the dominance of the state sovereignty principle and UNSC framework than 
simply because it is the legally agreed-upon international law. Russia has three politically 
motivated reasons for promoting sovereignty over humanitarian norms: 1) maintaining the 
state-centric status quo 2) shielding Russian treatment of own ethnic minorities 3) preventing 
expansion-driven humanitarian causes.  
First, Russia, as with the other great powers, has incentive to promote the status 
quo.130 Since the time of the establishment of the U.N. Charter, Russia’s relative power in the 
international power hierarchy has fallen precipitously. Therefore, it is unsurprising that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Hurrell (2006); Jones (2011); Roberts (2003). For more on the Western countries’ normative push as a 
whole, see De Nevers, Renee. “NATO’s International Security Role in the Terrorist Era.” International Security, 
31.4 (Spring 2007), pp. 34–66 
128 For more on questions of unevenly applied sovereignty principles, see Stephen D. Krasner (1999). 
Moreover, for more on the international community’s recognition of failed states, see Jackson and Rosberg, 
(1984) 
129 Interfax. “Putin calls lies claims Kosovo case is unique,” Trend. 14, February, 2008. See also Terhalle, 
Maximillian. (2011); Coggins, Bridget. (2011)  
130 Coggins (2011); Paul, T. V., “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,” International Security, 30.1 
(Summer 2005), pp. 46–71; Westra (2010) 
Mund-34 
Russia favors institutional principles that reflect a previous, more favorable era of Russian 
dominance. The five permanent members of the UNSC reflected the most powerful states in 
the international system at the end of World War II.131 If the 5 most powerful states were 
recalculated today, it is unlikely that Russia would still retain a permanent membership on 
the UNSC and its critical veto power. For example, judging by contributions to the 
International Monetary Fund, a signal of prestige and influence in the international 
community, Russia ranks ninth in contributions and voting influence (Figure 1). 
132 
Figure 1: Countries’ quotas in IMF 
Therefore, simply due to the fact that the Russians have undue influence in the 
Security Council, one would expect Russia to staunchly promote the sole utilization of the 
UNSC, an institution with a favorable (if outdated) power balance. Andrew Hurrell 
encapsulates this sentiment: “The need to maintain regional power and to prevent its further 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 With the notable exception of Germany and Japan. 
132 “Countries’ quotas in IMF,” International Monetary Fund. (2009). See also, ”IMF Members’ Voting Power. 
Itnternational Monetary Fund. (2009); International Monetary Fund. “IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power, 
and IMF Board of Governors.” 31 March, 2013.  
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erosion has been a central feature of Russian foreign policy.”133 The problem for Russia, 
however, is that as humanitarian intervention has become a more dominant norm, it has 
eroded power away from the state-based Security Council system, and has empowered states 
to ignore the United Nations Security Council on the grounds of answering to a higher 
calling—the protection of fundamental human rights.134  
 As Thomas Risse puts it, 
“The debate about humanitarian intervention, for example, concerns understandings of two 
conflicting and constitutive norms of international society: sovereignty as a state property 
and human rights as a property of individuals.” (22)135 
In other words, while sovereignty operates on a state level, where each state is considered as 
a unitary state actor, then the UN may operate smoothly through state representation.136 
However, once rights are considered on the individual human level, then the state model is 
no longer sufficient, and issues must take into account the views of individuals citizens. As 
such, the state can no longer operate as a reliable representative; now, even if a state is 
content with the status quo, there still may be threats to peace and security if individuals 
within the state believe that their human rights are being compromised. It was this change in 
definition of threat to the peace that allowed NATO to ignore international law only 
authorizing such intervention in cases of interstate aggression and intervene in places like 
Kosovo.137 In a state-sovereignty based system, this intervention was illegal. However, 
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NATO “nevertheless declared that it felt bound to act by a higher law of morality”—the law 
of individual humanitarian rights.138 
Second, the state sovereignty principle favors two types of states: a) states with 
questionable human rights practices and b) states facing separatist threats. Russia meets both 
qualifications.139 As Neil MacFarlane writes, “[Russia’s] internal difficulties and its 
vulnerability to criticism in terms of international human rights and governance norms push 
it towards profoundly conservative definition of sovereignty and the rights of states within 
their domestic jurisdiction.”140 By cloaking its behavior behind unassailable state sovereignty, 
Russia adopts a stance on human rights that allows it free reign to legally defend any 
treatment of its domestic population as cultural relativism.141 In particular, the ‘state 
sovereignty’ justification robs Muslim separatists in Chechnya and elsewhere of a legitimate 
claim to external support.142 By setting the precedent of giving no ground to self-
determination efforts, Russia not only justifies its treatment of the Chechens, it also sends a 
message to the other ethnic minorities in the greater Russian federation.143 This in turn 
allows Russia to build its entire definition of the legitimate use of force around the 
differentiation of interstate and intrastate violence. For example, in Chechnya, 
“After three years of ‘hesitation’ with respect to the breakaway republic [Chechnya], Moscow 
decided to use force, exactly as NATO did in Yugoslavia, but with the convincing 
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justification that it was applying such force to its own territory, that is, without violating the 
international law.”144 
State sovereignty turns gross human rights violations ‘unacceptable’ to ‘regrettable,’ 
and, as referenced above, and only authorizes intervention in interstate conflicts. Therefore, 
Russian support of state sovereignty helps promote its political interests while ‘”parading as 
the standard-bearer for international law and the promoter of multilateralism.”145 
Third, Russia opposes violations of state sovereignty because of the potential for the 
rise of humanitarian intervention norms to lead to an excuse to violate state sovereignty.  
“In the Foreign Policy Concept this approach was elaborated further: ‘Concepts such as 
humanitarian intervention and limited sovereignty’ are promoted in order ‘to justify 
unilateral forceful actions circumventing the UN Security Council’, which is why attempts to 
make such concepts internationally acceptable should be rejected.”146 
This reason for opposing the dominance of humanitarian norms is reminiscent of Russian 
fears under geostrategic realism.147 Even if the United States does not have an expansionist 
myth148 or power-maximizing intentions, the rise of humanitarian intervention norms 
provides an excuse for state aggression. For example, had Saddam Hussein’s Iraq had 
territorial designs on the Kuwaiti government in 2013, all Saddam would have to do to 
justify his invasion would be to ground it in language of individual rights and recast his 
mission as a ‘humanitarian intervention.’ While this example offers some degree of 
overstatement, Russia would argue that the core principle still stands—legitimizing 
interventions on humanitarian grounds undermines the non-aggression principles of the UN 
charter.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Baranovsky (2001) 
145 Bugajski (2008). 153. 
146 Baranovsky (2001) 
147 Explained further in H4. 
148 Snyder (1991). 
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Therefore, the UNSC provides Russia with an important means of contesting and 
even attempting to reestablish generally accepted interpretations of international law.  Russia 
uses the discourse in the Security Council in order to construct a UNSC mandate in favor of 
reinforcing the state sovereignty principle and legitimizing intervention only through the 
UNSC authorization.149 This approach would expect to see Russia’s votes align most often 
with the Western countries’ votes when the normative implications under consideration are 
consistent with Russia’s interpretation of international law stressing state sovereignty 
norms.150 On the other hand, when Russia sees resolutions as threatening norms of 
sovereignty, they will veto those resolutions. 
All of this background theory may be formally stated as a simple hypothesis,  
H2: Russia will be more likely to veto or abstain on a UNSC resolution when it marginalizes the 
norms promoting the state sovereignty principle.  
In order to test the validity of H2, one must allow for the symbolic significance of 
votes cast in the UNSC on international norms.151 Within those parameters, when 
resolutions support state sovereignty, one would expect Russia to support those resolutions. 
On the other hand, those resolutions that undermine sovereignty principles and norms 
should see a higher likelihood of Russian opposition.152 The measurement of H2 arise from a 
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whether or not Russia made an effort to justify their voting behavior. Such attempts to 
justify voting behavior offer a clear way of trying to influence the Security Council from a 
normative standpoint by setting guidelines for appropriate behavior. Nonetheless, one must 
also remember that Russia may not necessarily agree with the majority of the international 
community as to what constitutes a violation of sovereignty. Therefore, any measurement 
determining whether a violation of sovereignty took place should use a loose definition on 
the violation of sovereignty to account for the possibility of Russian definitional leniency.153 
If the evidence does not show Russian attempts to defend their position on cases with a 
violation of sovereignty then such evidence would severely challenge this hypothesis. 
Moreover, if Russia proves in any way less likely to oppose votes that invoked a violation of 
sovereignty, then this hypothesis would be effectively falsified. 
SOVEREIGN SPHERE OF INFLUENCE 
The final hypothesis falling under the defensive realist school concerns a sovereign 
Russian sphere of influence. This approach would predict that Russia will be more likely to 
oppose resolutions when the issue at hand pertains to an area in Russia’s geostrategic sphere 
of concern, rather than, for example, cases in sub-Saharan Africa. Geostrategic theory will 
assume that Russia will consider territories closer to their nation to be more of a security 
concern.154 As such, “Some [scholars] have posited a Russian Monroe Doctrine for these 
states, meaning that they are under Russia's sphere of influence.”155  
Moreover, while realist concerns may undergird Russia’s insistence on a security-
maximizing approach within a Russian sphere of influence, it is Russia’s Eurasian identity 	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that has defined Russian preferences (and therefore the parameters of vital security interests) 
within that sphere. Allen Lynch directly draws the connection between Russian security 
interests and Russian identity: “The expansion of NATO threatens not so much Russia's 
material interests as Russia's fragile post-Soviet international identity.”156  In other words, 
NATO expansion threatens Russian geostrategic security interests because Russia’s identity 
includes the post-Soviet space as part of Russia’s international identity. 
In particular, Russia’s conception of a greater Eurasia has led Russia to try  to 
maintain a firm influence in the CIS states. Andrew Monaghan identifies the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) of the former Soviet Union as “the dominant priority in Russian 
foreign policy since the early 1990s.”157 Within this Russian sphere, scholars have 
emphasized a realist determination to maintain Russian sovereign integrity by whatever 
means necessary. This hypothesis lies at the border of offensive and defensive realism due to 
the fact that the international community does not agree on the status quo in the post-Soviet 
sphere. 
Janusz Bugajski represents the Western perspective, which views the post Soviet 
states as fully sovereign and independent of Russian influence. As Bugajski writes, “Russia 
demonstrates authoritarian statism that employs the gamut of means to exert influence over 
its less powerful neighbors in the formation of a Eurasian state.”158 In other words, under 
Bugajski’s interpretation of Russian Eurasianism, Russia takes an aggressive, offensive 
foreign policy approach to solidify the creation of greater Eurasia, an approach highly 
reminiscent of Huntington’s ‘traditional, authoritarian, and nationalist’ state.159  
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Russia, however, would strongly disagree with Bugajski’s characterization. Russian 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov sums up the Russian position quite well: “The CIS space has 
turned into a sphere for geopolitical ‘games,’…Stop trying to keep Russia inside its “regional 
shell.”160 Russia feels a historic connection to the post-Soviet CIS states, and does not agree 
that collapse of the Soviet Union has severed Moscow’s influence in the greater regional 
sphere. Thus, police action undertaken within the CIS body is Russia’s sovereign right, and 
Russia seeks to simply maintain their influence in the CIS region. Therefore, while Russia 
considers any expansion within Eurasia as legitimate pursuits of nationalist self-expression, 
its Western counterparts see such activity as expansionist and threatening behavior. 
However, this essay characterizes Russia’s activities in its self-designated sphere of influence, 
the CIS region, as a defensive action. This classification should not be interpreted as an 
endorsement of the Russian perspective. Rather, because the paper seeks to understand 
Russian voting motivations, it makes sense to adopt a Russian-colored lens when viewing its 
activity in the international community.  
Nevertheless, if there are indeed conflicting viewpoints over the CIS region, one 
should find voting dissonance between Russia and the West on these issue areas.161  
H3: Russia will be more likely to veto or abstain on a UNSC resolution concerning one of the 
Eurasian (CIS) states in Russia’s sphere of influence. 
Russia’s Eurasian perspective will lead its leadership to consider the Eurasian area as 
a closely linked satellite to the Russian homeland and as partners in the greater Eurasian 
sphere, while the West will consider these states to have independent foreign policy 
doctrines and therefore view them as beleaguered states under attack by Russian 	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encroachment. Therefore, one would expect disagreement in UNSC resolutions. Resolutions 
concerning the Eurasian sphere would infringe upon Russian security interests, and should 
result in Russian opposition. On the other hand, when resolutions either reinforce Russian 
supremacy in the Eurasian sphere or do not concern the Eurasia at all, then they should not 
threaten Russian security interests and therefore one would expect less Russian opposition.  
Nonetheless, not all Eurasianists believe that the Eurasian conceptualization of 
identity has led to a greater foreign policy. In fact, Natalia Morozova argues that while 
Russian Eurasianism has led to a strict protection of Eurasia’s territorial integrity, Russia has 
been unable to cohere this Eurasian identity into a workable foreign policy.162 
EXPANSIONIST RUSSIA 
 The next three hypotheses challenge the notion of a defensive Russia. H4 predicts 
that Russia will oppose the United States in order to block U.S. interests and promote a 
favorable balance of power.163 This concern with relative gains and active promotion of 
national interests falls in line with offensive realist thought.  H5 expects Russia to more 
actively pursue its own interests (aggressive or otherwise) when Russia has a stronger military 
capacity. Such an approach views institutions as less constraining, so Russia would be more 
inclined to expect U.S. retaliation if Russia defies U.S. interests. Thus, if Russia expects a 
U.S. retaliatory response, Russia will only risk defying the more powerful state when it feels 
secure in its ability to defend itself. H6 postulates that Russia will make the strategic 
determination to ally with China and develop a more favorable balance of power. Such an 
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attempt to alter the balance of power in order to further Russia’s own influence falls solidly 
within the tent of offensive realism. Next, each hypothesis is explored in more detail   
GEOSTRATEGIC POLITICKING 
One popular explanation for Russian voting behavior in the Security Council stems 
from the realist school of thought, and claims that Russia’s voting is based off of 
geostrategic calculations. In particular, Russia fears United States’ hegemonic unilateralism 
and therefore actively works to balance against the United States, pushing for greater 
multipolarity and expanding Russian influence. On a simple level, this theory predicts that 
the Russians would oppose Security Council action primarily when they feel that such 
actions challenge Russian power or threaten to tip the international balance of power farther 
towards the United States.164 From this statement, one may draw the testable conclusion that 
the greater Russia’s perception of UNSC votes reflecting United States hegemony, the more 
reluctant Russia would be to vote along with the United States. Specifically, Russia may 
perceive votes that grant authority to the United States and its allies to intervene in the 
internal affairs of another state as symptomatic of the United States’ hegemonic 
expansionism.165 For example, Russia perceived the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003 as 
expansionary and representative of greater U.S. strides towards hegemonic activity.166 
Therefore, Russia opposed U.N. Security Council resolutions that granted authority for U.S.-
led forces to pursue perceived expansionary objectives in Iraq.  
To state this hypothesis formally:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Christopher Layne argues that one would expect to see leash-slipping, as Russia tries to carve out an 
independent foreign policy within the greater hegemonic context. When taken outside of a hegemonic context, 
one expects Russia to oppose any resolution that tilts the relative balance of power away from Russia. (Layne 
2006) 
165 This relates to the soft balancing literature. See Pape (2005); McFarlane (2006); Lake, David A.  “The New 
American Empire?” International Studies Perspectives 9 (2008): 281–289.  
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 H4: Russia will be more likely to veto or abstain on a UNSC resolution when it believes that the 
resolution would advance U.S. hegemony.167 
In order to assess whether a resolution seeks to advance Western hegemony, I use 
external interventions as a proxy. Namely, when resolutions would allow the international 
community to violate state sovereignty through intervention, I consider those cases of 
‘perceived Western hegemony.’ Moreover, Russia should also be strongly opposed to 
resolutions allowing for United States-led intervention. When the U.S. leads an intervention 
force outside of direct U.N. supervision, this hypothesis would expect Russia to assume that 
the United States is undertaking power-maximizing behavior at its expense. An advocate of 
this hypothesis would expect Russian opposition, and that in cases of Russian support, 
Russia must be convinced that the intervention is somehow an exception and does not 
threaten its interests. Therefore, the presence of Russian opposition to both interventions in 
general as well as U.S.-led activity is critical to the validity of this hypothesis. The presence of 
Russian-initiated resolutions that actively promote Russian interests abroad would also 
strongly support this hypothesis. 
Two other factors may support or challenge the hypothesis, but do not play a critical 
role. First, if the resolution is accepted under the binding Chapter VII of the Security 
Council, then the resolution empowers the UN Security Council members at the expense of 
the targeted states. Therefore, one might expect Russia to be more inclined to oppose 
resolutions that are adopted under Chapter VII of the Security Council Charter. Unless an 
intervention specifically promotes Russian interests, than one would expect Russia to avoid 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 One could also make the argument that voting against U.S. hegemony could be motivated be defensive 
concerns. However, this hypothesis includes cases where Russia has no tangible interest at stake, in which case 
Russia would only oppose if it were interested in actively balancing U.S. hegemony, regardless of whether or 
not the proposed action affects Russian interests. If so, then this would involve a concern with relative power 
and fall within an expansionist perspective. On the other hand, the spheres of influence hypothesis solely 
concerns areas in which Western expansion would threaten Russian interests, and is therefore classified as 
‘defensive.’ 
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authorizing Chapter VII that may allow other member states to legitimately pursue their 
national interests, thereby putting Russia at a relative disadvantage. Moreover, the presence 
of resolutions that reaffirm state sovereignty might serve as a counterweight to reassure 
Russia of U.S. good intent. However, given that geostrategic realists would put much more 
weight on the limited capacity that such a clause has on materially affecting state behavior, 
one would not expect the inclusion of sovereignty to significantly affect Russian voting 
behavior.  
 Of note, one limitation of this study is that if Russia truly felt that U.S. hegemonic 
expansionism posed an immediate and urgent threat to Russian security interests, then 
Russia would do more than just oppose a Security Council resolution—they would take 
military action! Indeed, this inability to track actual military responses could challenge this 
model in a serious way. However, in the given period of 1995-2012, Russia has not had any 
military confrontations with the West.168 In this regard, the West has been strategic in who it 
embraces under its EU and NATO umbrella. While countries like Georgia have wanted to 
receive full Western status, the lack of full Western acceptance has allowed the West to stay 
out of military confrontations with Russia over states like Georgia, and have allowed them to 
simply issue statements of disapproval instead.169 Therefore, while this concern is 
theoretically valid, it does not pose a challenge to the actually tested data. Moreover, such 
data may miss situations where Russia responds with military threats that do not escalate to 
war, such as the Russian naval installation in the Syrian port of Tartarus to deter 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 There is the possible exception of Russian violence against Georgia. Some have argued that Russian military 
activity was a direct response to a Georgian pro-Western, pro-NATO stance. See Reinsalu, Urmas. “Georgian 
Democracy and Russian Meddling: The Kremlin Seems to Be Trying a New Approach to Obstructing Its 
Neighbor’s Path to NATO Membership.” Wall Street Journal Online (September 12, 2012) “Moscow Says NATO 
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international intervention.170  However, in such scenarios that do not escalate to immediate 
conflict, one would expect Russia to couple its military activity with a rigorous diplomatic 
effort.171 Russia’s diplomatic effort would include voting activities through the UN, so these 
questions of military threat should not pose an additional empirical concern. 
RELATIVE POWER 
One may also derive a second hypothesis of Russian voting behavior in the Security 
Council from the ‘geostrategic politicking’ view of Russian foreign policy. This second 
hypothesis expects that the more powerful Russia is relative to the United States, the less 
concerned Russia will be about United States retaliation and the more likely Russia will be to 
publicly confront the United States. As mentioned above, both Tsyangakov and Thorun 
make realist-constructivist arguments suggesting that Russian foreign policy is largely 
constrained by their relative power vis-à-vis the Western powers.172 Similarly, ‘pure’ realists 
such as Glennon who see the UNSC as a mere reflection of geopolitics would also expect 
Russia to have a greater ability to reject resolutions reflecting Western foreign policy interests 
and to promote their own.173 Thus, the greater Russia’s relative power, the more likely that 
Russia will assert an independent voting behavior in the security council and veto UNSC 
resolutions that promote Western interests. Therefore, we may deduce the following 
hypothesis: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 See BCC News Staff, “Why Russia is Standing Behind Syria’s Assad,” BBC News (June 15, 2012); Katz, 
Mark. “Moscow’s Marines Head for Syria.” Foreign Policy (July 10, 2012) 
171 Particularly if one agrees with Carl Von Clausewitz’s assessment that “war is an extension of politics by 
other means.” Von Clausewitz, War as an Instrument of Policy. (1832)  
172 Tsyangakov (2012); Thorun (2009) 
173 Glennon (2003). Bolton (2008) disagrees, arguing that the United Nations Security Council itself can be used 
to project power. “In New York, paralysed by the prospect of a Russian veto, the UN Security Council, that 
Temple of the High-Minded, was as useless as it was during the Cold War. In fairness to Russia, it at least still 
seems to understand how to exercise power in the Council, which some other Permanent Members often 
appear to have forgotten.” 
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 H5: Russia will be more likely to veto or abstain on a UNSC resolution when it is relatively more 
secure vis-à-vis the U.S.   
In terms of analyzing the data, one must establish the metrics for measuring Russian 
relative power and the implications of each type of vote at the Security Council. When 
Russia is strong relative to the West, one should expect to see them vote more often against 
resolutions. The reasoning here is that if Russia is materially strong, then they will have the 
confidence to pursue their own interests without being stopped by the overwhelming 
American strength that forces a weak Russia to vote in alignment with American geopolitical 
interests.174 On the other hand, if Russia is materially weak, then in the situations where 
Russia might like to oppose, Russia may be so weak that it dares not even symbolically 
oppose the West and United States’ interests. 
This hypothesis differs from the others in terms of possible metrics. While the 
metrics for the other hypotheses came out of the resolutions themselves, in this case, the 
data for relative security did not come from the resolutions. Instead, this hypothesis used 
outside measurements such as widely accessible indices of military or economic strength in 
order to judge its empirical validity.   
 Finally, I note that the hypotheses above do not contain all possible conclusions of 
Russian voting behavior from a geostrategic realist perspective—in fact, the indeterminacy 
of the realist school of thought is one of the stronger critiques leveled against Waltzian 
realism.175 However, below I mention a few other arguments with realist undercurrents.  
One might also argue that Russia would oppose resolutions that not only threaten its 
own interests, but also those that may allow NATO countries to expand Western spheres of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 McFarlane (2006). In particular, given Russia’s traditional position opposing the authorization of external 
interventions and the violation of state sovereignty, it is safe to expect that as a baseline, there will be some 
situations brought to the Security Council which Russia does not think necessitates UNSC action. 
175 Waltz (1979), Thorun (2009) 
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influence in other regions by sparking relative gains concerns.176 Additionally, Russia’s fear of 
what it sees as U.S. expansionism may give Russian foreign policy a vested interest in quietly 
supporting rogue states that stand in opposition to American powers and interests as a 
balancing tactic.177 This relative gains challenge may spur Russia’s active engagement with 
more normalized non-Western powers, which would be indicative of a more active 
balancing. H8 addresses some of these questions by looking at the impact of the 
involvement of prestigious (including non-Western) states on Russian voting behavior. 
RUSSIA-CHINA ALLIANCE 
Alternatively, one may also predict an expansionist Russia to forge strategic 
relationships with rising, non-Western powers. As such, one may use Russia’s relationship to 
the non-Western permanent member of the Security Council, China, as a metric for 
measuring Russia’s relationship with rising, non-Western countries. The United States and its 
Western allies have traditionally dominated the Security Council, and the preponderant 
power of the United States has ensured that the language of introduced resolutions nearly 
always reflects Western values and interests.178 When China vetoes or abstains on a 
resolution condemning state behavior, then China’s negative vote may be representative of 
rising non-Western countries’ opposition to the condemnation. If so, then Russia’s desire to 
maintain strong strategic relationships with non-Western states may lead Russia to follow 
China’s voting behavior. Therefore, tracking Russia’s votes on resolutions where China votes 
negatively will help signal the extent to which Russia desires to maintain strong relationships 
with rising non-Western states. Therefore, with regard to the non-Western states, one would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 For more information on relative gains concerns, see John Mearsheimer (1995) and Joseph Grieco, 
“Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism.” Neorealism 
and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate ed. David Baldwin. New York: Columbia University Press, 170-
209 
177 Rozman (2010); Gilpin (1981) 
178 Prantl (2005). The major outliers are those resolutions surrounding the Arab-Israeli conflict, which the 
United States consistently vetoes. 
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expect Russia to vote all condemning resolutions along with China. Therefore, the policy 
implication would imply: 
H6: Russia will be most likely to abstain on UNSC resolutions where China abstains or vetoes. 
In situations where China breaks from the West, one expects Russia to do so as well. 
Such a theory has a particularly challenging time explaining situations where Russia breaks 
rank with the Security Council but China does not, or where China abstains or vetoes and 
Russia does not. A significant number of exceptions would lead one to suspect that Russia’s 
voting behavior in the UNSC is not in fact motivated by this desire to catch the rising tide of 
a shift to non-Western powers.  
RUSSIA AS A STATUS SEEKER 
 Finally, the last four hypotheses fall under the category of prestige-oriented status 
seeking. First, H7 posits that Russia will place great weight on having its normative 
perspective taken into account during Security Council discussions. Such inclusion plays an 
important role in validating Russia’s identity as a prestigious, influential state. Next, H8 
proposes that Russia seeks out relationships with prominent states in a search for the self-
validation of its own identity. H9 argues that Russia will seek recognition in an attempt to 
promote a relational government order as a legitimate alternative to traditional liberal 
democracy. Finally, H10 provides the primary status seeker argument—that Russia will be 
more likely to cooperate with the West when it is given the respect and prestige that Russia 
feels it deserves. 
NORMATIVE COMPROMISE 
One must keep in mind that Russia’s campaign to affect international sovereignty 
norms occurs within a greater context of political discourse.179 As Edward Luck, Anne-Marie 	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Slaughter, and Ian Hurd argue, the UNSC acts primarily as a forum for political 
bargaining.180 As with other disagreements of interests and power, the states in the UNSC 
bargain and negotiate over the accepted norms in the international system. Because the great 
power states in the UNSC have strategic incentives to coordinate and maintain a unified 
front,181 one expects states to attempt to find an acceptable medium of normative 
compromise.182 As such, the level of normative compromise rather than the actual 
implication of the norm may more directly determine voting behavior. This leads to another 
hypothesis: 
H7: Russia will be more likely to veto or abstain on a UNSC resolution when the West refuses to 
compromise on normative questions.  
In order to assess the strength of H7, I must gauge the level of normative 
cooperation taking place. While such metrics are difficult to quantify as more than an 
estimated approximation, I attempt to glean the relevant information based on the 
discussion reports in the Security Council and the accompanying press releases. Moreover, in 
terms of expected results, when the Security Council adopts resolutions with a negotiated 
consensus and normative implications acceptable to the Russian party, then one should 
expect Russian support. On the other hand, when West fails to satisfy the minimal Russian 
negotiating positions, one would expect Russia to feel disrespected, thereby resulting in 
increased Russian voting opposition.  
Moreover, in such cases of normative opposition, one expects Russia to also justify 
its voting behavior to ensure that the international community understands Russia’s 
opposition to a specific resolution within a larger normative signaling framework lending 
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legitimacy to those justificatory arguments. Finally, Russian assent does not always 
correspond to Russian normative assent. In such situations, Russia should still want to 
provide its own counterweight through which they can promote their own normative 
viewpoints.183 
 PRESTIGIOUS STATES 
Next, a Eurasian identity may lead Russia to pursue close diplomatic relationships 
with a wide array of prestigious states. Under this hypothesis, Eurasia’s unique position 
bridging the West and East encourages Russian leaders to not only seek normalization with 
Western states, but also leads those leaders to reach out more intensively to prestigious non-
Western states.184 Russia’s ability to transcend the West and non-West cultural divide plays a 
critical part in the Eurasian construction. As such, an ingrained Eurasian cultural identity 
would result in the pursuit of strong relationships with significant non-Western states. In 
particular, the relationships with prominent states in the international community solidify the 
social conceptions critical to the maintenance of a Eurasian identity.185 By maintaining 
alliances with prestigious states of multiple cultures, Russia is able validate its own 
prestigious self-conception as a uniquely positioned state in the international community. 
Therefore, as a self-proclaimed guardian of both the East and West, Russia would want not 
to support resolutions condemning behavior of the states with which they hope to forge 
relationships.  
H8: Russia will be more likely to veto or abstain on a UNSC resolution when it condemns a 
prestigious Western or non-Western government’s behavior. 
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185 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), p.906 
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Therefore, this hypothesis would predict that Russia carefully considers how its 
voting behavior in the Security Council impacts its relationships with the ‘prominent 
countries.’ In particular, resolutions that condemn government behavior could prove 
informative for examining Russia’s concern with the relationship of the offending state in 
question. In such cases, one would expect that in resolutions condemning the behavior of a 
powerful state, Russia would not support the resolution. However, this metric may not 
directly assess Russia’s concerns for the various relationships because a number of external 
factors may influence whether Russia decides to vote against a friendly country. For 
example, such an assessment does not control for the severity of the offending country’s 
violations, and the level of threat posed to international peace and security. Nonetheless, one 
may respond by saying that few enough activities are so clear-cut to require an 
uncompromising response worth jeopardizing the diplomatic relationships and therefore this 
critique doesn’t hold weight. In all, due to the focus in H8 on level of prestige, it fits best 
with the status seeker viewpoint. 
LEGITIMATE DEMOCRATIC BEHAVIOR  
Another culturally based status explanation stems from the argument that Russia has 
a differing perception of what constitutes legitimate state behavior.  For the Russian 
government, legitimate democratic behavior must meet the primary requirement that the 
country’s populace must be provided with collective goods.186 Moreover, because Russia 
applies this standard of popular provision as the basis for legitimacy in its own country, one 
might reasonably expect for Russia to hold the greater international community to the same 
standards. If Russian culture does construe legitimate democratic regimes as those that 
successfully provide goods to their citizens, then Russia’s definition differs greatly from the 	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Western definition. In his work on Afghanistan, Jan Angstrom identifies these two different 
perceptions of state legitimacy as liberal and relational legitimacy.187  
Most Western states define legitimate democratic behavior based off of a liberal 
understanding, which focuses on the state’s ability to protect individual rights. If a state can 
provide basic rights to each individual in society, then the state has accomplished its mission. 
On the other hand, Russia takes the perspective that state validity should be based upon 
relational legitimacy, or based on its successful implementation of societal order. Rudra Sil 
and Cheng Chen emphasize that Russia has a relational standard for government 
legitimacy—that the Russian people recognize the government as legitimate as long as it 
provides public goods and services to the population.188 In essence, this cultural-based 
hypothesis contends that Russian culture operates off of relational legitimacy. In contrast, a 
standard liberal perspective would argue such a state based on the implementation of order 
to be illegitimate. In a Western conceptualization of statehood, “states that coerce their 
citizens or foreign residents lack moral legitimacy.”189 Thus, due to the fact that Russia is 
trying to gain international acceptance of an alternate legitimate form of government, H9 fit 
best under Russia as a status seeker. After all, the more prestigious a state, the more likely 
other states will accept that state’s behavior as normatively acceptable.  
In response to Western criticism, Russian has reframed its relational perspective 
through claims of ‘sovereign democracy,” which it contrasts to “rampant democracy.”190 As 
explained by Larson and Shevchenko, 
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“Sovereign democracy maintains that Russia will determine its own path to democracy, free from 
foreign interference or normative pressures. In other words, there is more than one definition of 
democracy, and Russia is following the way best suited to its history and culture.”191  
From the Russian perspective, a forceful implementation of democracy as 
exemplified by the United States in countries like Iraq is extraordinarily counterproductive 
for both the advancement of democracy as well as the advancement of international 
stability.192  From this perspective, it is easy to see how such fundamental differences in 
perspectives on legitimacy could lead to a clash with the foreign policies of Western 
countries. Such a clash in perspective of acceptable state behavior may result in insoluble 
disagreements resulting in UNSC negative votes.193  
H9: Russia will be more likely to vote against UNSC resolutions that deny the legitimacy of a 
relational state perspective.  
Practically, this denial of relational legitimacy mirrors an earlier hypothesis expecting 
a defense of sovereignty norms. H2 expected Russia to promote the state sovereignty 
principle. Essentially, the sovereignty principle protects states operating through relational 
legitimacy from international criticism. The sovereignty principle implements the liberal 
philosophy at the international level—that each state in the international system has the right 
as individual to structure its state as it wants without external intervention.194 Therefore, in 
an international community with strong sovereignty norms society, internal state behavior is 
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legitimate whether or not it is based on a liberal or relational structured society. As such, if 
Russia acts to maintain the state sovereignty norm, Russia also simultaneously defends its 
right to operate a ‘sovereign democracy’ based on relational principles within its borders. If 
so, this hypothesis must manage to separate Russia’s desire to promote state sovereignty 
norms and its desire to promote norms of relational legitimacy. Therefore, the challenge will 
be to identify resolutions that address questions of relational versus liberal legitimacy without 
directly involving questions of sovereignty. The resolutions that should prove most 
insightful are those that discuss questions of the universality of individual rights. From a 
relational perspective, the application of rights should come on a state level, and therefore 
not be subject to the mandate of the international community. As such, one would expect 
Russia to oppose resolutions that promote the international accountability of government 
behavior to individual citizens. 
 A RESPECTED POWER 
Finally, ‘national pride’ explanations explain Russian behavior in the UNSC by 
exploring the construction of Russian identity. Proponents of ‘national pride’ explanations 
argue that Russia's actions are largely motivated by its desire to regain what it considers to be 
its proper place on the world stage.195 This approach is deeply grounded in constructivist 
thought—it contends that Russian national identity-constructs lead it to consider 
international recognition as a world leader to be a top national priority.196 
 However, realist thinkers such as William Wohlforth have also promoted a similar 
theory, arguing that Russia strives to regain international prestige due to its impact on 
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relative power concerns.197 Robert Gilpin explains the connection between prestige and 
power more clearly,  
“In international relations, prestige is the functional equivalent of the role of authority in 
domestic politics…Authority (or prestige) is ‘the probability that a command with a given 
specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons.’ Thus, both power and prestige 
function to ensure that the lesser states in the system will obey the commands of the 
dominant state or states…in short, numerous factors, including respect and common 
interest, underlie the prestige of a state and the legitimacy of its rule.”198  
In other words, prestige translates into state power critical for international 
credibility and negotiating leverage.199 Russian behavior that seems to reinforce this drive for 
prestige includes Russia’s attempt to revive its political standing by engaging with the 
West—trying to incorporate itself as part of greater Europe—and also by its alignment with 
the rising BIC (Brazil, India, and China) powers.200 In particular, Russia leadership has felt 
slighted at its treatment by the United States since the end of the Cold War and sees the 
NATO alliance's creep eastwards as a direct threat to Russian national security interests and 
a violation of past good faith agreements.201 Therefore, one would expect Russia to behave 
in a fashion that draws attention to its power status. In the UNSC, this would manifest itself 
through opposition to draft resolutions, where Russia’s dissent forces other countries to 
‘take it seriously.’  
Ian Johnstone’s insight regarding international consensus helps clarify why a 
disrespected Russia would result in less cooperative environment within the Security 
Council:   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 Wohlforth (2009) 
198 Gilpin (1981) p. 30.  
199 Thomas Schelling. Arms and Influence. Yale University Press. 1969. See Dahl’s definition of state power. 
Robert Dahl, “Power,” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 12(1968) 405-415. 
200McFarlane (2006) 
201 For a direct analysis of NATO’s eastward expansion, see Sarote (2010) 
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“Legal interpretation-especially at the international level where the lines between nonlaw, 
soft law, and hard law are blurry-is fundamentally a search for intersubjective meaning rather 
than a quest for single right answers.”202 
In other words, the international community has to work together to agree on how 
to interpret certain events. On a basic level, in order to take action, the members of the 
Security Council have to come to a consensus that a particular situation poses a threat to 
international peace.203 When Russia is less respected, then Russia’s views will less likely be 
taken into account. Therefore, the final product of these resolutions will likely be 
unsatisfying to Russian interpretations. In such situations, it is unsurprising that Russia 
breaks rank with the other members in to order to demonstrate its relevance.204 Therefore,  
H10: Russia will be more likely to veto resolutions when they feel that the Western states fail to 
acknowledge Russia’s great power status and treat Russia in a matter that ignores Russian power. 
Moreover, evidence for this hypothesis could also include the clear identification of 
voting situations where Russia casts a negative vote to ‘make a statement of relevance.’ On 
the other hand, when Russia is considered an equal player and feels genuinely respected by 
its Western counterparts, then one would expect Russia to vote in favor of the resolution.205 
However, such information is very challenging to find empirically. Instead, the assessment of 
Russian prestige is more easily categorized on a larger scale. Therefore, levels of respect can 
be extrapolated as a general periodizations within the given time period.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 Johnstone (2008) 
203 Terhalle (2011) notes that “China and Russia have not accepted the Western interpretation for a 
considerable amount of time (in public international law terminology they are ‘persistent objectors.’” The 
problem with Terhalle’s assessment, however, is that Russia and China do vote in favor of a vast majority of 
Security Council resolutions. 
204 Because of the strong incentives for great power consensus in support of the status quo, such statements of 
relevance force the other Great Power states to engage with Russian concerns more seriously, thereby treating 
Russia with greater respect. 
205 The latter will be tested in the qualitative analysis. 
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Finally, while Clunan’s aspirational constructivism offers another potential 
theoretical framework, (state leaders choose the best fit from a series of floating identities)206 
in practice, testing such an approach would border on tautology, and therefore, I refrain 
from examining her argument in greater detail. 
No. Hypothesis Russia is more likely to vote negatively when… 
H1 Legal Orthodoxy The resolution does not fit within the UNSC mandate 
H2 Protection of Sovereignty Norms The resolution undermines international sovereignty norms 
H3 Sphere of Influence Resolutions target countries in Russia’s sphere of influence 
H4 U.S. Hegemony United States undertakes unilateral interventions 
H5 Relative Power Russia is relatively more secure against the US 
H6 Chinese Leadership China votes negatively 
H7 Normative Compromise Security Council members refuse to compromise on 
normative questions 
H8 Prestigious State Resolutions condemn prestigious states 
H9 Democratic Legitimacy The international community does not accept the legitimacy 
of relational democratic rule 
H10 Respected Power The international community does not respect Russia as a 
great power state 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
OVERVIEW OF METHODOLOGY 
 In order to assess the relative strength of the various hypotheses, I focused on the 
source of the question at hand—Russian votes in the Security Council. Using data from the 
United Nations,207 I examined the 1095 draft resolutions discussed by the United Nations 
Security Council between September 22, 1995 to December 20, 2012. [Appendix I] This time 
period serves to provide strong analytical leverage for understanding the voting behavior of 
the modern Russian Federation. I then coded these resolutions for a number of variables 
based off of the hypotheses generated from the theoretical discussion. Next, I used the 
STATA statistical package to run a number of preliminary cross-tabulations tests to identify 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 Clunan (2009) 
207 The United Nations Security Council Resolutions. https://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/scact.htm 
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which hypotheses generated positive association.208 Afterwards, I ran probit regression tests 
to further parse out the information. Finally, after I explain the quantitative results, I include 
a qualitative section synthesizing the statistical findings with evidence based from specific 
noteworthy resolutions.  
 Furthermore, before developing the methodology, it is important to clarify one more 
theoretical point. The tested hypotheses discuss ‘negative votes’, which refer to either an 
abstention or a veto. Such an approach is justified by the fact that Russian voting 
justifications demonstrate that Russia considers its abstentions to be negative votes. For 
example, on resolution 1284 discussing a weapons monitoring mission for Iraq, Russia 
abstained on the resolution. However, their voting justification made it clear that they 
considered their vote a ‘no’: “The fact that the Russian Federation was not blocking the 
imperfect resolution should not be taken to mean that it was obliged to go along with a 
forceful implementation of it.”209 Hence, one sees that Russia does not consider an 
abstention vote supportive of the resolution. Moreover, due to the fact that many potential 
veto-type situations are handled outside of the Security Council,210 any veto or abstention 
cast in the Security Council has some symbolic significance, and thus may be considered 
under a similar voting logic.211 Moreover, both Russia and China, the two permanent 
member states with the highest numbers of abstentions and vetoes, vote in favor of 
resolutions over 95% of the time. Therefore, because both vetoes and abstention as so rare 
in the Security Council, both votes and abstentions take on a similar demonstration of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 I’d like to give a special thank you to Professor Weisiger and Julie Berez for introducing me to a crash 
course in STATA 101 and helping me develop the STATA script for the more advanced statistical coding. 
209 Press Release for UN Security Council resolution 1284. 
210 To cite just three examples, the counterfactual cases of Russian vetoes in Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, and Iraq will 
be discussed later throughout the course of this paper.   
211 See for example, the significance of negative votes in the Security Council in Thompson (2006) and 
Chapman, Terrence. Securing Approval: Domestic Politics and Multilateral Authorization for War. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2011. 
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opposition to introduced resolutions, and the hypotheses treat the states’ voting behavior as 
such.212   
Additionally, in order to address the concern that abstentions and not vetoes were 
driving the findings, one should note that many of the salient examples used in the 
qualitative section were vetoes. In fact, every major hypothesis used examples of vetoed 
draft resolutions or threatened vetoes213 as primary sources of evidence.214  For example, a 
1999 veto on Kosovo proved plays a significant role in the discussion of NATO aggression 
in H4, and a 2000 veto on Myanmar plays an important role in establishing the importance 
of state sovereignty over humanitarian norms, as argued in H2.215 
There were also practical reasons for the grouped classification of vetoes and 
abstentions. Of the 1095 coded resolutions, only eight were Russian vetoes, and only 
another 36216 were abstentions. In other words, only 4% of the total coded resolutions 
included any type of negative Russian vote. Therefore, when working with the data, it made 
sense to work with Russian negative votes (vetoes and abstentions) as opposed to just 
Russian vetoes—otherwise the sample size was just too small.217 I thus generated a 
dichotomous dependent variable, which took a value of 0 when Russia voted in favor of a 
resolution and 1 when it abstained or voted against. 
I chose the data range of September 22, 1995 to December 20, 2012 for practical 
reasons. From a research perspective, the UN voting data, specifically the UN press releases, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 This decision will be discussed in further detail in the data collection section and evidence for this 
theoretical decision will be reinforced in the section discussing qualitative empirical evidence.  
213 i.e. cases in which the resolution was withdrawn to a threat of a Security Council veto. 
214 H1, H2, H4, H8, H9 and H10 all included vetoes or threats of vetoes in the qualitative evidence piece. The 
‘major’ hypothesis driving the logic of the three theoretical perspectives were H4 (expansionist Russia), H1& 
H2 (defensive Russia) and H10 (Russia as a status seeker). 
215 Press Release for UN Security Council draft resolution S/1999/328 (Kosovo) and S/2000/14 (Myanmar).  
216 Including two abstentions from earlier in 1995 that were coded from the period prior to September 22. 
217 Nonetheless, due to the fact that that there may be different logics behind vetoes and abstentions, I also 
examine the vetoes from a qualitative standpoint to ensure that the causal voting logics are not being solely 
driven by the abstention data. 
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on which my research relied did not extend before September 22, 1995, so that specific date 
provided a pragmatic cut-off point. Due to the fact that I have chosen to examine an 
ongoing phenomenon, I needed to draw an end date for my research material even though 
the Security Council has continued to cast votes in 2013.  The end of 2012 offered a good 
cut-off option by incorporating all but two months of data and also coincides with the New 
Years recess in the Security Council. Because the Security Council does not meet in the last 
week of December or during the first week of January, the Security Council tries to squeeze 
all outstanding important resolutions in at the end of the calendar year, thereby ensuring that 
such a cut-off date will not miss any important resolutions under consideration.  
These cutoff decisions also have grounded analytical foundations. The Russian 
Federation was not created until late 1991. From 1991-1994, the Russians were still reeling 
from the collapse of the Soviet Union and desperately struggling to reorder the remains of 
the Soviet empire. As such, during the transition years of 1991-1994, modern Russia’s post-
Cold War identity was still developing, and less relevant to understanding modern Russia’s 
voting behavior.218  
DATA COLLECTION219 
 The coding process began by transcribing some basic information about the 
resolution onto a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. [Appendix II] First, I included the resolution 
number.220 Each Security Council resolution, when approved, gains a unique resolution 
number. However, vetoed draft resolutions do not receive a resolution number. Therefore, 
for the vetoes, I instead inputted the draft resolution number, maintaining the United 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 Tsygankov (2012A) and Thorun (2009) categorize Russian foreign policy behavior as ‘accommodating’ 
towards the United States during Gorbachev’s short-lived attempt at liberal normalization.  
219 For more information about my coded dataset, please refer to Appendix III 
220 Rather than inputting each number individually, I created an “x-1” function, where each box’s value was 1 
less than the value of the box directly above. 
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Nations’ formatting (S/YEAR/SEQUENTIAL ITEM).221 Next, the year and date of the 
resolution was inputted under the ‘Year’ and ‘Date’ columns, respectively. Next, a topic title 
was inserted for each resolution. As a general rule, the topic title was taken as presented on 
the UN webpage. However, consistency took precedence over direct translation. For 
example,  the United Nations page would alternate between labeling resolutions on Iraq as 
“Iraq”, “Iraq-Kuwait”, and “the situation in Iraq-Kuwait.” I grouped all these resolutions 
under the same heading of “Iraq.” The one exception to this rule regarded cases of Israel, 
Lebanon, and Syria, which I all coded as Middle East. These cases consisted of three topics: 
1) Israel-Palestine 2) The UNDOF observer force situated on the Israel-Syria border 3) 
UNIFIL peacekeeping force on the Israel-Lebanon border. While the rest of the variables 
were coded distinctively, the all three cases fell under the same topic heading. The reasoning 
for this methodological decision was that all three issues remained unchanged throughout 
the examined time period. However, a separate topic heading existed for ‘Lebanon,’ which 
did not include the UNIFIL peacekeeping force, but rather exclusively focused on the UN 
investigation into the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Harari.  
 Next, I looked at the given press release for the resolution in question. If there were 
a veto or abstention by Russia or China, I would code a ‘1’ in the relevant column, else I 
would code ‘0’. I coded the votes for China as well as for Russia because of H6, which 
predicted a correlation between both countries’ voting behavior. The ‘Notes’ column was 
used to convey a qualitative sense of the resolution’s intent and implications and was not 
used in the statistical analysis. The justification column, on the other hand, played an 
important role in providing qualitative evidence towards the various hypotheses. In any 
situation where Russia made a public statement to justify or explain their voting behavior, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 For example, S/2012/538 refers to the 538th discussed topic in the Security Council in 2012. For more 
information, visit http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/.  
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these justifications were recorded in this column. The justifications were also incorporated 
on a quantitative level by providing insight as to whether or not Russia felt the need to voice 
their opinions on a given set of issues.  
 Next, the research evaluated variables valuable in assessing substantive elements of 
the individual resolutions. First, in line with H4, which postulates the importance of 
perceived hegemonic activity by the United States, I assessed whether the resolution 
supported or authorized intervention. (Titled ‘Intervention or No’) If there was intervention 
present, the resolution was coded as a ‘1’, otherwise, it was coded as a ‘0’. For some 
resolutions, it was not immediately obvious whether or not they constituted cases of 
intervention. As a general rule, the classification depended on the presence of an armed 
external military force in the country. Therefore, observer missions such as those in Syria 
and in Croatia were not coded as interventions and therefore received a ‘0’. On the other 
hand, peacekeeping missions with a military component, such as in Lebanon or in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, were counted as cases of intervention and were coded 
with a ‘1’. Non-military actions, such as the imposition of economic sanctions, were not 
considered acts of intervention. The exception to this general coding rule was those cases 
that authorized international tribunals under binding resolutions. These few exceptions did 
directly constitute a significant intervention despite the lack of a military component, and 
were therefore coded as such.  
Next, I checked for the invocation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
(Variable=‘Chapter VII’) Chapter VII grants the UN Security Council with the responsibility 
to determine whether international activities pose a threat to international peace and security, 
and even more importantly, authorizes the Security Council to take measures “to maintain or 
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restore international peace and security.222 With Russia’s concern for international stability 
and state sovereignty,223 whether or not Security Council resolutions are adopted under the 
UN Charter’s Chapter VII might matter a lot to Russian leadership. Similarly, I searched for 
a reference to the UN Charter’s Chapter VIII, which authorizes regional security 
arrangements with the Security Council’s sanction.224 In both cases, if there was a reference, 
the variable was coded as ‘1’; else, the variable was coded as ‘0’. Because references to 
Chapter VII and Chapter VIII might serve as indicators for U.S. hegemonic ambitions, these 
two variables were included in response to H4. 
 In order to control for symbolic resolutions, a column detailing ‘Specific Policy 
Implications’ established whether the resolution promoted resulted in some actionable 
change, (coded as ‘3’) or whether the action had no direct policy implication (coded as ‘0’).225 
For example, a resolution solely condemning terrorist violence would not have specific 
policy implications. If Russia was motivated by fear of U.S. hegemony, then Russia would be 
less likely to oppose resolutions without a tangible policy implication. Another column 
looked specifically at whether the resolution had policy implications for U.S. action beyond 
the framework of the Security Council, (called ‘Alternately specifically US outside of UN’) 
such as the U.S.-led multinational forces in Afghanistan. More specifically, policy 
implications meant that the US may take actionable interventive measures outside of a UN-
led mission. Therefore, the difference would be between the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) that was U.S. led, and the United Nations Assistance Mission in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 United Nations Charter, Chapter VII, Article 39. For more information about role of Chapter VII as a 
binding resolution, see Security Council Report. “Special Research Report No. 1: Security Council Action 
Under Chapter VII: Myths and Realities.” 23 June 2008.  
223 For example, see (Coggins 2011), Westra (2010) 
224 United Nations Charter, Chapter VIII, Article 53. 
225 This variable was coded as ‘3’ instead of as ‘1’ because initially there were four possible coding options. 
However, as the coding developed, I realized that the best way to code this variable was through a binary 
coding of yes/no to policy implication, and I eliminated the middle two options. 
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Afghanistan (UNAMA) that was U.N. led. While the leadership differed, it is important to 
note that the UN Security Council sanctioned both missions. The purpose of this “action 
outside the UN” variable also looked at H4, but from the other direction: rather than 
looking at cases without specific actionable policy implications, this variable assessed 
whether Russia was more likely to veto resolutions that authorized the United States free 
reign outside of UN control.  
H5 predicts that Russia will oppose more resolutions when they feel more secure vis-
à-vis the United States. To test this hypothesis, I needed a measure of Russia’s perceived 
sense of security.  In terms of H5, I did not code anything directly from the UN resolutions 
themselves other than to count the number of negative Russian votes in a given year. H5 
looks holistically at whether a Russian sense of security translated to bolder (more negative 
voting) in the Security Council. In order to get a measurable standard of this perceived sense 
of security, I drew from two primary sources. First, I drew from indices measuring Russian 
military strength compiled by the Correlates of War (CoW) project, with a particular 
utilization of their ‘CINC’ variable, which provides a holistic score of general state strength 
from 1995 to 2007.226 In order to assess relative Russian strength versus the United States, I 
also included the United Staets ‘CINC’ scores, and calculated the relative score from the 
quotient of the Russian CINC score divided by the sum of the Russian and US score in a 
given year. Second, I also used data from the World Bank recording Russia’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) from 1995 to 2011 as a means of measuring Russia’s economic 
strength.227 I then merged both the CoW data and the World Bank data onto my 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major 
Power War, 1820-1965." in Bruce Russett (ed) Peace, War, and Numbers, Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-48. The CoW 
Database only extends until 2007, thereby prematurely limiting our data.  
227 World Bank Data. Accessed through Google Public Data Explorer. 
https://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=ny_gdp_mktp_cd&idim=country:
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spreadsheet, applying the appropriate value for each variable based on each resolution’s 
given year.   
 Next, in order to assess the plausibility of voting as law-abiding behavior, I examined 
the effects of state consent and the presence of significant violence (hypothesized as critical 
factors in H1), I coded each resolution for both factors.228 Because Russia (at least officially) 
cares strongly for the legal requirements of consent in cases that do not pose a threat to 
international peace and security, Russia will need a case for which there is either consent or a 
threat to international peace and security, in order to vote for a resolution. For the state 
‘consent?’ column, each variable received ‘0’ if there was no consent,  ‘1’ if the state 
consented, and in the few cases where the consent was unclear, the resolution was coded as 
‘2’.  (‘2’s were recoded as 0 for the purposes of statistical analysis.)  
However, an important note here is that I didn’t distinguish between those situations 
where the states readily gave consent and where states gave ‘forced’ consent. My reasoning 
behind not making such a distinction was two-fold. 1) Discerning the exact level of 
diplomatic ‘arm-twisting’ that occurred in each case would have been extremely difficult and 
would have resulted in a high degree of arbitrary assignment 2) From the Russian 
perspective, the question at hand is whether or not the state gave official consent. Because 
the theoretical background here draws from theories stressing Russian legalist concerns, the 
manner by which state consent is derived becomes substantially less important. Therefore, 
all cases of authorized peacekeeping and observer missions operated under the basis of state 
consent, even if the consent was begrudgingly given at times.  
One other special case worth noting was those resolutions concerning the oil-for-
food programme in Iraq. While technically, this resolution extended the amount of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
RUS&dl=en&hl=en&q=russian%20gdp. Accessed 25 February 2013.  
228 The third important factor, intervention, had already been coded for in H4. 
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humanitarian aid given to Iraqi civilians, something which the Iraqi government was in favor 
of, this program operated under the greater framework of international sanctions against 
Saddam Hussein’s regime. Therefore, given the greater context under which these oil-for-
food resolutions were passed, I coded these resolutions as passing without Iraqi consent.   
 The other hypothesized factor in H1 spurring voting opposition to intervention was 
the lack of significant ongoing conflict in that country (variable=‘significant ongoing 
violence’). When coding significant ongoing violence, the goal was to discern whether or not 
the country was experiencing violence that threatened government stability. If there had 
been significant levels of violence at the time of the resolution, then the variable would be 
coded ‘1’, otherwise, the variable would be coded as ‘0’ for no significant violence. 
Moreover, the coding tended to follow the general trends of violence within the country 
rather than focus on the immediate date of the resolution. For example, if there was no 
violence reported in the Democratic Republic of Congo on March 30, but there had been 
incidents of violence in February and early March, then such a case would be coded as 
significant ongoing violence. The exception to such a rule would be if there had been a treaty 
or peace agreement recently negotiated that coincided with an immediate cessation to all 
violence—in which case, the clear break with the past would result in a unique variable 
coding.  
However, for the few cases that experienced sporadic levels of violence during this 
study’s time period, such as Lebanon, the coding was largely based on an examination of the 
Security Council resolution. For those resolutions passed during a period of significant 
violence, the Security Council made a point of condemning the violence and encouraging a 
peaceful settlement to the dispute. Therefore, in such cases of uncertainty, a lack of a 
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reference to any violent activity was a robust way of confirming that there was no significant 
ongoing violence during the time of the given resolution.229  
 Next, I established another variable in order to assess H2, which predicted that 
violations of the sovereignty norms would lead to negative Russian votes. Because the voting 
record did not easily lend itself to a direct assessment of sovereignty norms, I instead coded 
whether or not a violation of sovereignty (as understood by the Russians) had taken place. In 
order to more fully look at the normative aspect, the Russian justifications column provides 
a qualitative control on violations on sovereignty that are portrayed as unique exceptions. 
However, when approaching the violation of state sovereignty, one must understand that the 
set of actions that infringe on state sovereignty is not immediately obvious. Moreover, 
Russia’s general predilection towards supporting state sovereignty gives researchers greater 
reason to believe that Russia may have a broader definition of state sovereignty than the 
international norm.  Therefore, the coding rules took into account this level of ambiguity as 
to murky Russian guidelines of what constitutes a violation of state sovereignty by sub-
coding this ‘violate state sovereignty’ variable into seven possible value entries.  
 For each case, the first paragraph of the press release statement for each resolution 
had the policy thrust of that resolution. Based on that information, I determined which 
category the resolution best fell under. If no violation of sovereignty had taken place, then a 
value of ‘0’ was reported under the column. For example, a resolution lifting a ban on 
Liberian diamonds would be coded as a ‘0’. Furthermore, I code non-military observer 
missions as not constituting a violation of sovereignty because these monitoring missions did 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 Finally, I recognize that the Uppsala Conflict Database provides precise levels of violence in each country 
on an annual basis, given the time constraints and the duality of the variable, the Uppsala database was not 
employed. Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia: www.ucdp.uu.se/database, Uppsala 
University. 
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not have permission to affect the reality on the ground and infringe upon state activity.230 
The decision to code these observer missions as a ‘0’ was also an attempt to maintain 
consistency; these missions had already been coded as ‘0’ for intervention, indicating that no 
intervention had taken place. Next, the variable received a value of ‘1’ if the resolution either 
applied or continued sanctions against a state. While the imposition of sanctions has not 
traditionally been considered a violation of sovereignty, Russia’s sensitivity in the field of 
sovereign governance justified this categorization. In particular, sanctions impinge upon 
sovereignty by constituting an attempt to modify a state’s behavior by the international 
community. The next category, with a value of ‘2’, included the ‘standard’ violation of 
sovereignty—military intervention. The authorization of a military force often came in 
response to rising violence that posed a threat to international peace and security. For 
example, the resolutions authorizing the NATO-led IFOR force in the Balkans, or 
intervention in Libya, offer examples of sovereignty violation through external military 
intervention. However, if that this intervention came with consent by state governments, and 
operated as a peacekeeping mission, then the resolution was coded as ‘3’ for this category. 
However, this peacekeeping umbrella encapsulates a wide range, spanning from Haiti’s pleas 
for peacekeeping troops to begrudging Sudanese authorization for a peacekeeping force. The 
UNSC general practice was to authorize peacekeeping mandates for no more than one year, 
so the same peacekeeping resolutions would continually receive an authorization for an 
extended mission. One extreme example is UNIFIL in Lebanon, which was continuously 
extended throughout the dataset’s time period and continues to be reauthorized in 2013.231  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230 These observer missions could also only be established with state consent.  
231 While the UNIFIL mission continues into 2013, as of March 1, the UNSC has not yet passed any 
resolutions extending the mandate during this year.   
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Next, if the resolution demanded specific policy action by a state government, this 
was classified as a type ‘4’ violation of sovereignty. While these resolutions do not directly 
infringe upon state activity, they do lay out an expectation of state behavior. Therefore, any 
resolution that dictated state policy fell under this category. However, there were a few cases 
where the dictation of policy behavior accompanied another type of sovereignty violation. 
For example, resolution 2048 authorized sanctions against Guinea-Bissau (1) and also called 
for both sides to stop fighting (4). In such situations, the violation of sovereignty was coded 
as ‘1’, because it was both the primary action in the resolution and also because it comprised 
the ‘stronger’ violation of sovereignty.  
Next, I created a separate category for resolutions that authorized UN tribunals. 
Three tribunals fell under this classification: 1) International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 2) International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 3) The 
truth-seeking commission in Lebanon. In all of these cases, the tribunals violated state 
sovereignty by creating an extra-territorial judicial process. When these tribunals’ mandates 
were authorized or extended, then the “Violation of Sovereignty” column received a ‘5’. 
However, resolutions concerning the appointment or reappointment of tribunal judges, 
which did not affect the authorization of the tribunal, were coded as ‘0’ for no violation of 
sovereignty. Finally, in order to create binary variables, each value was redefined as viosovX, 
where X equaled the corresponding value.  
In order to assess H7, which predicts a failure of normative compromise to result in 
negative Russian voting behavior, I created two variables. First, I created a variable 
examining whether the resolution reaffirms the state’s sovereignty (variable=’does wording 
prevent intervention’). The reason for the importance of recognizing a state’s sovereignty 
within a resolution violating that sovereignty is that it proves from a normative standpoint 
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that this Security Council resolution is an exception to the rule.232 As such, I searched every 
resolution for a reference to the relevant state’s sovereignty—if the resolution contained a 
reference to the state’s sovereignty, then I coded a ‘1’. Otherwise, the sovereignty reference 
column received ‘0’.  
Second, I coded for ‘compromise.’ Admittedly, I found compromise to be a difficult 
variable to code, as the extant data reveals severe selection effects. Compromise can take 
place on a number of levels and have a number of different implications. For my dataset, I 
began by assuming that no compromise had taken place. I then read the voting justifications 
in the resolutions’ press releases and looked for references to Russian compromise. If the 
resolution had no reference to compromise, then I coded it as ‘0’.  If the resolution did refer 
to Russian compromise attempts, I further subdivided these references into two categories: 
1) successful compromise 2) inability to find a mutually agreeable solution. If the case 
demonstrated successful compromise, in that one side voted in a way other than it would 
have done otherwise,233 then the variable received a value of ‘1’. Otherwise, if Russia and the 
other Security Council members were unable to find an agreeable middle ground, then I also 
coded the case as ‘0’.234 
The next column created a binary variable to assess the validity of H8, which expects 
Russia to be more likely to vote against resolutions condemning prestigious countries 
(variable=’prestigious country’). The set of prestigious countries was defined as the G-20 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232 Alternatively, one counterargument might state that recognizing the states’ sovereignty and undermining it 
anyway through the Security Council actions may serve to deprive ‘state sovereignty’ of having any political 
substance. Such conscious violations of sovereignty, these opposers would argue, sets precedents for future 
undermining of state sovereignty among similar lines. Nonetheless, by looking at Russian justifications, it 
appears that Russia was primarily concerned with the reaffirmation of state sovereignty. For example, in the 
UN Press Release describing Security Council Resolution 1441, Russia emphasized  that “it was of fundamental 
importance that there was clear confirmation in the resolution that all members respected the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Iraq.” 
233 I.e. A change from a veto to an abstention, abstention to a yes, etc. 
234 The author here would like to note that the challenges with this compromise research design will be 
addressed below in the Statistical Testing section.  
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countries, or the top 20 most influential countries.235 Therefore, every resolution focusing on 
a G-20 country received a value of ‘1’ and those that did not received a value of ‘0’. 
However, after reviewing 1095 resolutions, only three resolutions directly targeted the 
behavior of a G-20 state.236 This finding reinforces scholarly claims that the UNSC Council 
is a pragmatic institution focused on maintain stability, and makes no claims of fair or equal 
application of the law.237 Therefore, while such a finding does lend evidence to the fact that 
diplomacy regarding Great Power policy behavior takes place outside of the UNSC, such a 
hypothesis has minimal applicability for understanding Russian voting behavior within the 
Security Council. The Russian outlier, however, in S/2009/310, does provoke an interesting 
question of why this situation was brought to the Security Council’s attention.  Part of this 
answer likely rests on two facts: 1) the high profile nature of the case put the international 
media spotlight on the UN, and the UNSC felt obliged to take action. 2) Even more 
importantly, the Russian invasion of Georgia the year prior was viewed as largely in 
retaliation for Georgian overtures towards NATO.238 This clash of U.S.-Russian interests 
may have forced the U.S. to bring the issue to the Security Council in order to show 
symbolic support of the pro-Western Georgian government in Tbilisi and not be seen by the 
international community as abandoning Georgia.239 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 Russia G-20. “About G20 Members/Infographics/G-20.” 
http://www.g20.org/infographics/20121201/780989503.html 
236 Resolution 1192, which condemned India and Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation efforts. The other was 
S/2009/310, and attempted to establish a peacekeeping force in Georgia to monitor against Russian aggression. 
Finally, one case, resolution 1067, condemned Cuba in a direct dispute with the United States, and therefore 
fell under this category as well.  
237 Luck, Slaughter, Hurd (2003). 
238 “Moscow Says NATO Hasn't Learned Lessons Of 2008 Georgia War.” (2008) Tsygankov, Andrei. 
“Assessing Cultural and Regime-Based Explanations of Russia’s Foreign Policy. ‘Authoritarian at Heart and 
Expansionist by Habit’?” EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES. 64.4(June 2012), 695–713  
239 This Russia-Georgia relationship will be explored further under the qualitative analysis. 
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 I attempted to broaden the sample data by also including Security Council 
resolutions that affected every member state, including the prestigious states. However, even 
with the expanded dataset, the sample size still remained extremely limited at 24 resolutions. 
H3 predicted that Russia would be more likely to vote against resolutions concerning 
the Russian sphere of influence. I coded H3 by determining whether the targeted state in 
question was a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (‘CIS State’). These 
CIS states make up the former Soviet Union and maintain close economic ties to Russia, 
creating a Eurasian Economic Union.240 Despite the fact that Georgia has now dropped out 
of the CIS, for coding purposes, Georgia was considered a CIS state. The reasoning for 
considering Georgia as a CIS state is three-fold: 1) Georgia was originally a member of the 
CIS 2) Russia still considers Georgia to be part of the Russian home front241 and therefore 
behaves as such 3) the theory behind H3 cares less about with titular delegation of CIS states 
vs. non-CIS states than about the geographic CIS location, within which Georgia falls. 
Therefore, if the resolution discussed a CIS state (or Georgia), the resolution would be 
coded as ‘1’, otherwise, it would receive a ‘0’. 
In order to strengthen the H3 test, I also examined whether the Russian sphere of 
influence encapsulated more than just the proximal CIS sphere. Evidence points to the fact 
that Russia has traditionally considered activity beyond the CIS states still within its sphere 
of vital security interests.242 For example, Russian leadership spent most of the 20th century 
devoting substantial time and resources to controlling the political environment in 
Afghanistan, which the Russians considered critical to their national security.243 Furthermore, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 INTERSTATE STATISTICAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT 
STATES. 
241 Tsygankov (2012B) 
242 Tsygankov (2012A) pp. 31-33 
243 Angstrom (2008), pp. 384-386 
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the conflicts throughout the 1990’s in the former Yugoslav republic, Russia demonstrated 
that it considered the Balkan region to be part of its near abroad and felt a deep affinity for 
the Slavic Serbians.244 Therefore, I coded a second variable titled ‘CIS 
States+Borders+Balkans’ (or CISBB), which included all states that were in the CIS space, 
bordered CIS countries, or were part of the former Yugoslavia. These cases were given a 
value of ‘1’; otherwise, the resolutions were coded as ‘0’ for this last category.  
 For H9, which discusses the differences between relational and liberal legitimacy, I 
was unable to find a simple way to code the resolutions for promoting relational or liberal 
legitimacy for statistical analysis. Thus, no distinct coding category was used to measure the 
strength of H9. However, the material gathered through the qualitative analysis of Russian 
voting justifications should provide greater insight into the strength of this hypothesis.  
 H10, which looks at the impact of reputation and great power status, required one 
additional coded variable for analysis: “respect.” For the coding of this variable, I relied on 
the temporal analysis provided by Christian Thorun.245 Thorun identifies three distinct time 
periods of Russian status perception within our data sample.246 From 1995-2000, Russia felt 
increasingly disrespected and alienated from the Western world.247 From 2001-2004, Russia 
felt more respected by the West as a legitimate security partner in the War on Terror.248 
Finally, from 2005 onwards, Russia has once again felt disrespected by the West and 
disillusioned at prospects of cooperation.249 Admittedly, Thorun’s data ends in 2007, but 
Tsygankov, writing in 2012, provides a nearly identical temporal periodization.250  Thus, 
every resolution that fell within a time period where Russia was disrespected received a ‘0’, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 Monteiro (2011/2012); Lynch, (2001). 
245 Thorun (2009). 
246 Thorun, (2009), Ch. 1.  
247 Ibid 
248 Ibid 
249 Ibid 
250 Tsygankov (2012A), Ch. 4. 
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and when Russia was respected (from 2001-2004) the “respect” variable was coded as a ‘1’.  
Therefore, by examining the proportion of Russian negative votes for each time period, the 
evidence should provide a general sense of whether the hypothesis is on target.  
However, I do recognize the potential challenge posed by the issue of 
counterfactuals—if the West actually respects Russia’s status and national interests, then the 
West will not introduce resolutions they that they know Russia will counter. Therefore, 
Russian negative votes will not be diminished by a lessened need to make a symbolic 
statement, but rather because there are fewer draft resolutions introduced with which they 
disagree. While this critique correctly identifies a separate causal mechanism, both 
mechanisms are triggered by higher levels of Russian prestige and result in lower numbers of 
Russian negative votes. Therefore, while this critique rightly identifies the proportion of 
negative votes in a given period as an imperfect proxy for levels of Russian prestige, this 
proxy still does successfully measure the level of Western respect accorded to the Russian 
delegation.  
Before moving on to the statistical methodology, I would like to recognize that 
during the coding process, I discovered avenues for improvement in future coding exercises. 
First, on the variable for compromise (H7), I would recode the section as to differentiate 
between the situations where there were no attempts at compromise and those situations 
where attempts at compromise were made but were unsuccessful. This recoding would 
improve the clarity of the variables and would allow for an additional test of the relative 
success of attempts at compromise. Second, the Uppsala conflict statistics on violence could 
be used to measure the number of casualties per year and further differentiate between 
different levels of violence taking place. For example, tracing onto each resolution the yearly 
casualty figures for the relevant country would enable the researcher to conduct more in-
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depth tests as to whether there is a more specific numerical cutoff for the number of 
casualties to affect voting behavior, or whether, as Gilligan and Stedman argue, the critical 
level of violence depends upon the region.251Next, I would have coded the extensions of 
peacekeeping missions differently. Due to the fact that peacekeeping missions have to be 
repeatedly reauthorized and extended, these missions take up a disproportionately large 
number of the UNSC resolutions. Moreover, because the extended resolutions are almost 
always identical to the earlier resolutions, the extended resolutions are simple formalities. As 
such, they don’t engender genuine debate over the proposed resolution—those arguments 
and negotiations already took place during the original agreement. While it’s not inherently 
problematic to code these extensions as normal resolutions (as done in this paper), 
differentiating these extensions from original resolutions would have the added benefit of 
clearing the clutter of useless resolutions and lowering the N-sample size, thereby more 
clearly drawing out the significant variables. Finally, further research on the topic may 
consider adding two additional variables: 1) Russian co-sponsorship. Looking at the 
resolutions that Russia cosponsored in the Security Council would be another useful 
measure in ascertaining levels of Russian prestige as well as levels of Russian cooperation. 2) 
Relational legitimacy. This variable, while initially dismissed as too difficult to code, might be 
possible to code by creating three categories: 0) Not applicable 1) Relational legitimacy 2) 
Liberal legitimacy. This would have to be coded from an analysis of the notes and 
justifications columns, just as is already being done. Nevertheless, an official coding would 
help add a level of formality and statistical clarity to the analysis of H9.  
STATISTICAL TESTING 
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Statistical analyses were conducted through the statistical package, STATA. While 
1095 total observations is clearly sufficient for statistical analysis, the relatively small number 
of Russian vetoes and abstentions presents challenges for statistical inference.  
I began by running initial cross-tabulations. The goal here was to isolate the 
hypotheses that had a low p-value, or a low probability that the association between the 
compared variables would have arisen by sheer chance. For the initial run-through, I looked 
for the chi-squared tests that provided me with p-values of .1 or less. While a 10% standard 
error of the mean is twice the generally accepted level of 5%,252 the (Pr= 0.1) cut-off 
provided a close enough correlation to warrant further testing and analysis. Below, I outline 
the tests that I ran for the various hypotheses.  The findings indicated strongest support for 
H1, H2, H6, and H3. As such, the statistical findings provided strong evidence that Russia 
takes a defensively motivated strategic outlook preserving the status quo through its voting 
behavior in the Security Council. Even more importantly, these findings confirm the thesis 
that Russian voting in the Security Council is motivated by a combined desire to maintain 
international stability and preserve state sovereignty norms.  
H1:  FOLLOWING INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 H1 hypothesizes a strict Russian adherence to international law. According to 
Russia’s interpretation of the United Nations Charter, two of the primary determinants for 
legal behavior in the Security Council are the consent of the actors, and the presence of a 
threat to international peace and security. Russia believes that only under Chapter VII, in 
cases threatening international peace and security, does the UNSC have the authorization to 
intervene and combat aggression without the consent of the parties involved.253 Therefore, if 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252 And therefore 10% is typically not considered statistically significant, although some studies have included 
data under a 10% Type I error.  
253 Text from the United Nations Charter, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter, Chapter VII. 
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Chapter VII is not invoked, then one would expect Russia to oppose unless there is consent 
of the parties involved. Moreover, due to Russia’s predisposition to view violent intervention 
as the greatest threat to international peace and stability, Russia will not encourage the use of 
force or violation of sovereignty unless absolutely necessary.254 The statistical evidence lends 
strong support to H1 by finding both the Chapter VII and consent variables to be highly 
significant.  
Initially, I used the ‘significant violence’ as a means to assess current threats to 
international security. Significant violence was coded with the intent to capture which 
resolutions discussed situations that posed a threat to international peace and security. 
However, acts of violence do not necessarily pose a threat to international stability.255 This 
suspicion of the inability of the significant violence variable to measure threats to 
international peace and security was compounded by the fact that while Chapter VII was 
highly significant (Pr=.001), significant ongoing violence was not significant (Pr=.613). 
However, when I ran a cross-tabulation with Chapter VII and Significant Ongoing Violence, 
the two results were very significantly related (Pr=.000), suggesting that both variables may 
play a role in determining whether a resolution poses a threat to international peace. (Figure 
2) 
 
Figure 2: Association between Chapter VII and Significant Ongoing Violence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 See, for example, Coggins (2011) and Weingast (1995).  
255 For example, in resolution 1203, Russia did not agree that the situation in Kosovo posed a threat to 
international peace and security, and would therefore not support the resolution.  
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In order to dispel any ambiguity between the causality and association of the significant 
violence variable, I ran a multivariate probit analysis. The test reinforced the ‘significant 
violence’ variable’s inability to explain negative Russian votes. When examining the driving 
factors behind explaining Russian vetoes, Chapter VII was highly significant (P>|z|=.003), 
while Significant Ongoing Violence was notably insignificant (P>|z|=.761). (Figure 3)
 
Figure 3: Probit analysis of Chapter VII and Significant Violence on Russian Negative Voting 
On the other hand, while Chapter VII was initially coded to help explain U.S. hegemony, its 
significance does strongly indicate that Russia takes notice when a resolution characterizes a 
conflict as a threat to peace and security. Thus, in order to further hone in on the legalistic 
aspect, the analysis must also further explore under what conditions Russia opposes 
characterizing situations as a ‘threat to international peace’ with Chapter VII. First, one 
might expect that Russia would be more inclined to object to the inclusion of Chapter VII in 
resolutions where there is no significant ongoing violence. However, such a test provides a 
statistically insignificant association (Pr=.164). (Figure 4) 
 
Figure 4: Association between Russian negative votes and Chapter VII when Ongoing Violence=0 
On the other hand, when there is significant ongoing violence present, Russia’s likelihood to 
oppose a Chapter VII resolution is statistically significant (Pr=.006). (Figure 5) 
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Figure 5: Association between negative Russian votes and Chapter VII 
Such a finding is initially counter-intuitive, since the results indicate that Russia is more likely 
to vote against a Chapter VII resolution detailing a threat to international peace and security 
when there is violence (and presumably threatening stability) than when there is no violence. 
However, upon further examination, one realizes that Russia’s narrower definition of 
‘a threat to international peace and security’ causes voting friction within the Security 
Council. While other Security Council states may be willing to immediately categorize 
violence as a threat to global peace and security, Russia needs further confirmation that the 
violence does not simply entail internal violence beyond the legal purview of the Security 
Council and actually threatens regional or international peace. If the violence does not spill 
beyond a state’s sovereign borders, then that conflict remains internal and lies beyond the 
Security Council’s jurisdiction. The ongoing violence in Syria provides a classic case of such 
a disconnect between Russia and some of the other members over the distinction of state 
violence and threats to international peace and security.256 Despite the fact that limited 
violence has spilled into Turkey, Russia has steadfastly maintained that the conflict remains 
an internal Syrian conflict and does not threaten international peace.257  On the other hand, 
in cases where the UNSC invokes Chapter VII without the presence of significant ongoing 
violence, the international community faces less of a sense of urgency and has the time to 
negotiate and compromise. Moreover, because these non-violent threats to international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 See Russia’s statement in UN Press Release on Security Council Resolution 1994. “ Underscoring the 
technical nature of the text, he stressed that it did not address the political situation in Syria, which was not on 
the Council’s agenda.  Furthermore, events there posed no threat to international peace and security.” 
257 “UN Condemns Syrian Attack on Turkish Town.” BBC News. 5 October 2012. 
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peace usually develop in a more latent, slowly evolving phase (such as the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons),258 the other members of the Security Council are willing to pursue Russia’s 
preferred approach of negotiated diplomacy. In short, Russia’s narrowly specified legal 
definition of threats to international peace and the appropriate responses lead to problems in 
Security Council resolutions adopted under the Chapter VII clause. However, due to the 
variation in Security Council members’ legal interpretation of significant violence as a threat 
to international peace and security, Russia’s voting behavior tends to clash with other 
members in Chapter VII resolutions with significant ongoing violence.  
The second element to Russia’s legalist approach in H1 is the role of consent from 
the parties in the conflict. According to the theoretical background, Russia should be more 
inclined to diplomatic or negotiated solutions to which each party gives their consent. To a 
large degree, this consent-driven focus stems from Russia’s belief that a lasting peace only 
results through a negotiated solution with the consent of both sides.259 Moreover, the bulk of 
Russian voting behavior on matters of consent derives from their position that UN forces 
may only be dispatched with the consent of the conflicting parties.260 Therefore, in cases 
where a Security Council resolution does not have state support, Russia will be wary of 
giving support. Unless Russia believes that the resolution at hand proves a dire threat to 
international peace and is beyond the point of constructive dialogue, Russia will pursue 
consensus-building measures.261 Thus, it should not be surprising that there is a strongly 
significant association between negative Russian voting and a lack of state consent to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 See, for example, Security Council Resolution 1977, which imposed “binding obligations on all States to 
establish controls preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their means of 
delivery.” (Security Council Press Release accompanying Resolution 1977.) 
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resolution content (Pr=.000). (Figure 6) 
 
Figure 6: Association between negative Russian voting and state consent 
A combination of the consent and threats to international peace variables provides a 
strong association to negative Russian votes and therefore offers strong support to H1.  
However, this consent mechanism operates in two distinct ways. First, Russia will be likely 
to oppose Chapter VII resolutions adopted without consent. Russia’s insistence on 
constructive diplomacy requires a deep engagement with parties involved to defuse threats to 
international stability. The statistical evidence supports this point, by showing that a cross-
tabulation of negative Russian voting patterns and state consent remains highly significant 
(Pr=.000) when only looking at the data sample where resolutions invoke Chapter VII. 
(Figure 7) 
  
Figure 7: Association between negative Russian voting and state consent when Chapter VII=1 
Also, Russia’s tendency to vote negatively on Chapter VII resolutions adopted without 
consent (found through a crosstab between Chapter VII and rusneg only when consent=0) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 See, for example, Russia’s position in UN press statements on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Security 
Council resolutions 1544 and Security Council draft resolution S/2000/1171. 
260 See, for example, Security Council resolution 1706, in which Russia will not support a peacekeeping force in 
Sudan before getting Sudanese governmental approval.  
261 See, for example, Russia’s response in the UN Press Release on Security Council Resolution 1127 on 
Angola. “UNITA had virtually challenged the United Nations and the Council. The international community, 
therefore, had no alternative but to adopt the measures outlined in the draft resolution.” 
Mund-83 
remains significant at a 95% confidence interval (Pr=.043). (Figure 8)
 
Figure 8: Association between negative Russian voting and Chapter VII when state consent=0 
  
Therefore, on issues threatening international peace and security, Russia seems to require a 
consensual engagement with the parties to the conflict.  
However, in conflicts without significant violence, Russia also cares strongly about 
consent. Unlike cases adopted under Chapter VII, these situations do not necessarily pose an 
immediate threat to world peace. In resolutions where there is no significant ongoing 
violence, Russia’s negative voting is statistically significant when cross-tabulated with state 
consent (Pr=. 032). (Figure 9) 
 
Figure 9 Association between negative Russian voting and state consent if ongoing violence=0 
Thus, the finding that a lack of ongoing violence leads Russia to place an even higher 
premium on consent seems to further corroborate the hypothesis that a lack of violence 
extends the negotiating timetable. As such, with the longer time span and no current 
ongoing violence, Russia will be even more insistent that international law demands that the 
Security Council may only approve a negotiated settlement with state consent. 
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Therefore, the consistent significance of the tested variables does lend strong 
support to H1’s hypothesis of Russia’s legal considerations. However, it appears that both 
designating a resolution under Chapter VII and failing to garner state consent both 
significantly affect Russian voting patterns. Moreover, the role of significant ongoing 
violence still remained unclear. In order to clarify each variables’ relative explanatory power, 
I conducted a probit test on Russian negative votes and assessed the impact of consent, 
Chapter VII, and ongoing violence on these votes. The probit test results reinforced the 
initial findings derived from the cross-tabulations: state consent and the inclusion of Chapter 
VII were both significant drivers behind the negative Russian votes ((P>|z|=.000) and 
(P>|z|=.044) respectively) while significant ongoing violence did not play a causal role 
(P>|z|=.889). (Figure 10) In sum, the statistical analysis of H1 strongly supports the 
hypothesis that Russian votes in the Security Council result based on its strict legal 
interpretation of UNSC jurisdiction. 
 
Figure 10: Probit analysis of state consent, Chapter VII, and Ongoing Violence on negative Russian voting 
H2: PROTECTING SOVEREIGNTY 
 The primary interest in H2 is to examine whether resolutions threatened the norms 
surrounding the state sovereignty principle. However, as explained in the methodology 
section, the strength of norms is difficult to measure on a quantitative level, I instead used 
violations of sovereignty as a proxy. By voting for the authorization of a violation of state 
sovereignty, Russia undermines the non-intervention norms. After all, by definition, every 
violation of the state sovereignty principle undermines the inviolability of the sovereignty 
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norm. Therefore, Russia should have a strong incentive to oppose violations of sovereignty 
unless viewed as completely necessary for international peace. Finally, when Russia does not 
oppose violations, one should expect Russia to justify why this resolution fits into their 
conceptualized normative framework on sovereignty. The statistical evidence below indicates 
that Russia is more likely to vote against violations of sovereignty and also takes care to 
justify its votes in cases where there were violations of sovereignty. Both pieces of evidence 
strongly support H2.  
The first statistical tests aimed to get a rough sense of whether or not violations of 
sovereignty had any associated effect on Russian voting behavior. I tested the effect by 
running a cross-tabulation of negative Russian votes and a dichotomous variable that 
captured all of the possible violations of sovereignty that I measured (excluding values 0 and 
6, which did not entail any violations of sovereignty). The resulting test was highly significant 
(Pr=.005).(Figure 11) Of the 43 negative votes examined, 38 constituted some form of a 
violation of sovereignty. Therefore, this initial scan provided strong evidence for H2. 
 
Figure 11: Association of negative Russian votes and violations of state sovereignty  
Next, tests were run in order to distinguish the independent significance of the 
different values for the violation of sovereignty variable. For clarity’s purpose, each value 
was redefined as viosovX, where X equaled the corresponding value for the violation of 
sovereignty. Of the tests run, only viosov1 (sanctions) and viosov3 (peacekeeping) were 
statistically significant at conventional levels (Pr=.000 and Pr=.041; respectively). 
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Furthermore, the viosov0 (no violation of sovereignty) and viosov2 (military intervention) 
were marginally significant (Pr=.062 and Pr=.065, respectively). Finally, Viosov4 (dictating 
state behavior), Viosov5 (international tribunals) and Viosov6 (promoting state sovereignty) 
were all not statistically significant with a chi-squared over .2.262  
The two cases of marginal significance (viosov0 and viosov2) bear further 
explanation. First, viosov0 (no violation of sovereignty) may be explained by a separate 
mechanism at work: if the resolution does not call for any type of violation of sovereignty, 
then the set of cases are less extreme. For such resolutions, Russia will oppose those 
resolutions not because of a threat to sovereignty, but, as articulated in H1, they do not 
believe that situations not posing a threat to international peace and security fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Security Council.263  
It is also surprising, however, that the viosov2 (military interventions) variable is not 
more significant. However, when looking at the numbers, the lack of significance may result 
from the low number of interventions. (Figure 12) Russia voted against viosov2 resolutions 
8.7% of the time. In comparison, viosov1 was extremely significant with negative Russian 
voting 10.1% of the time, and viosov3 was statistically significant with only 2.2% negative 
votes. Nonetheless, despite the proportion of high negative voting percentage in viosov2, 
this comes out to only 4 negative votes! Therefore, the fact that viosov2 was marginally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 Viosov 4: Pr=.311; Viosov5: Pr=.220; Viosov6: Pr=.390 
263 One might suspect that the association is statistically significant in the other direction for the value of 0. 
However, this is not the case, and the Pearson chi-squared values have the same direction as the other cases 
with violations of sovereignty (positive values). 
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significant even with such a low ‘N’ lends overall credence to H2. 
 
Figure 12: Association between negative Russian voting and military intervention  
The insignificance of dictating state actions, international tribunals, and promoting 
state sovereignty also make sense within the bounds of H2. UN resolutions that demand a 
specific state policy or institute international tribunals are not violations of sovereignty in the 
traditional sense, and therefore would not require the same normative opposition as would 
the other more blatant violations of sovereignty. Finally, because resolutions coded with a 
value of ‘6’ actually promote sovereignty, it is no surprise that Russia opposed none of those 
resolutions. While one might expect to see a significant association in the other direction 
(namely, that Russia tended to vote more positively on resolutions that promoted sovereignty), 
the lack of significance in either direction is best explained by the fact that only 19 
resolutions were classified with a value of ‘6’.264 
 One unexpected result was the insignificance of the variable measuring the mention 
of ‘sovereignty’. The expectation was that a reference to state sovereignty would make Russia 
less likely to veto the resolution. However, a reference to sovereignty was not significant as 
to whether or not the Russia would vote against the resolution (Pr=878). Nevertheless, a 
reference to state sovereignty was much more likely to be present in resolutions that violated 
state sovereignty through sanctions, peacekeeping, or intervention (Pr=.000). (Figure 13) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264 But Russia did not oppose any of the viosov6 resolutions promoting sovereignty.  
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Therefore, we may include that while the inclusion of state sovereignty did not affect 
Russian voting behavior, it does play a role in passing a resolution violating state sovereignty. 
This finding reinforces the idea that some Security Council states care strongly about the 
protecting sovereignty norms even when violating sovereignty.265  
 
Figure 13: Association between violations of sovereignty and voting justifications 
 Moreover, when a violation of sovereignty takes place, one would expect Russia to 
make some effort to justify the violation of sovereignty. After all, Russia believes that the 
state sovereignty norm should serve as the baseline for international behavior. Therefore, 
any UN authorized violation of state sovereignty should only happen under extraordinary 
circumstances threatening international peace. In these extraordinary circumstances, Russia 
should seek to justify its voting behavior so as to fit its voting pattern into the general 
normative framework supporting state sovereignty. The statistical evidence strongly supports 
this theory.  A cross-tabulation of negative Russian votes and Russian justifications, when 
only testing circumstances where violations of sovereignty took place, was highly significant 
(Pr=.000). (Figure 14) In other words, in cases where there was a violation of sovereignty, 
Russian negative votes were associated with voting justifications.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 While this finding alone does not clearly state that Russia is the state concerned with sovereignty here, 
qualitative evidence from the voting justifications discussed below further supports this view. See, for example, 
UNSC Resolution 1199. 
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Figure 14: Association between negative Russian voting and voting justification if sovereignty violation=1 
However, such a phenomenon may just be a result of Russia’s predilection for 
justifying any negative votes in general. Therefore, I ran another test, a cross tabulation of 
Russia’s tendency to justify its votes when a violation of sovereignty took place. Surprisingly, 
this test provided a result that was not statistically significant (Pr=.206). However, I 
suspected that this result was misleading. I had included within the classified dataset of 
violations of sovereignty every resolution extending a peacekeeping mission. These 
extensions were often mere formalities, and the normative justifications had already been 
established with the initial consent to the mission. For example, although Russia had felt the 
need to justify their behavior on the Security Council resolution. For example, in the case of 
substantially broadening the mandate of a peacekeeping mission in the Western Sahara, 
Russia felt the need to justify the Security Council’s activities.266 However, in the following 
twelve resolutions between 2004 to 2012, Russia did not feel the need to reinforce their 
position as the length of the peacekeeping mission was extended. Therefore, in order to 
control for these time-extension resolutions for peacekeeping missions, I ran a further test, 
which proved statistically significant (Pr=.000). In this highly significant test, I ran the same 
cross tabulation as before, but instead excluded viosov3 (peacekeeping missions) from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266 See UN Press Release on Security Council Resolution 1495. “GENNADY M. GATILOV (Russian 
Federation) said the resolution opened the way for the peace process and did not impose a final solution on the 
parties.  It was important that, at this time, the Council had demonstrated the capacity to come to a consensus 
decision on a very difficult matter.”  
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dataset. The extremely high significance of this second test supports my instinct that the 
peacekeeping formalities were affecting the data results.  
Thus, the conclusion drawn was that the norms of sovereignty did affect Russian 
voting behavior and encouraged the Russian delegation to justify violations of those norms. 
While H2 was strongly supported on a holistic level, not all violations of sovereignty evoked 
the same degree of Russian negative voting response. Russia’s tendency to oppose violations 
which involved sanctions or peacekeeping missions resulted in the two most significant 
values, which reinforces the view that Russia opposes violations to sovereignty (including the 
implementation of international sanctions) unless completely necessary. Furthermore, the 
two values of marginal significance may be explained by a separate causal mechanism and a 
low number of examined resolutions. In short: Russian leaders vote to oppose unnecessary 
violations of sovereignty and to maintain sovereignty norms.  
 H3: RUSSIAN SPHERE OF INFLUENCE 
 The next hypothesis presumed that Russia would be most strongly opposed to 
Security Council resolutions that concern Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. As a first 
cut, I conducted simple cross-tabulations between Russian negative voting and whether or 
not the topic of the resolution was a CIS state. Shockingly, the Russia’s voting behavior is 
remarkably consistent with its general voting patterns, and did not produce a significant 
result (Pr=.808). (Figure 15) However, as mentioned above, such a result may derive from 
selection effects—that the other countries respect Russia’s influence in the CIS and do not 
bring those discussions to full-fledged votes in the UN Security Council.267 One recent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 As Starr says, the U.S. has given Russia free reign in the CIS, led to undermining of those states’ sovereignty. 
Starr, Frederick. “Power Failure: American Policy in the Caspian.” The National Interest (1997): 20-31. 
Moreover, the 5 day Russian-Georgian war in 2008 serves as another example; France withdrew a UN draft 
resolution in anticipation of a Russian veto. “Russia Rejects UN Georgia Draft.” BBC News. 20 August 2008. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7571506.stm 
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example evincing this point was Kyrgyzstan’s internal conflict in 2010. While the bloody 
Kyrgyz conflict may have posed a threat to international peace and security, “on June 14, the 
U.N. Security Council discussed the unrest in Kyrgyzstan at a closed-door meeting.”268 This 
Kyrgyz conflict, however, never made its way into a Security Council resolution, and 
therefore eluded our data search. 
 
Figure 15: Association between negative Russian voting and CIS state 
 However, the presence of a second measure of activity in the Russian sphere (which 
included CIS states, their border states, and the Balkan region) allows for more insight by 
including areas that Russia considers within its sphere but where the rest of the Security 
Council feels less circumspect. The cross-tabulation between Russian negative voting and 
CISBB (+Balkans +Borders) was statistically significant (Pr=.034). Such a finding may result 
from the contested nature of these states—that Russia and the West do not agree whether 
they fall into the Eurasian sphere.269 Moreover, a further test demonstrated that Russian 
opposition to resolutions in the CISBB sphere was even more significant when by the 
resolution concerned a violation of sovereignty (Pr=.014), indicating that Russians strongly 
opposed resolutions violating sovereignty in their domestic sphere.270 Given Russian 
concerns with the sovereignty norm, this finding makes sense. After all, violations of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268 Nichol, Jim. “The April 2010 Coup in Kyrgyzstan and its Aftermath: Context and Implications for U.S. 
Interests.” Congressional Research Service. (June 2010) p. 1.  
269 McFarlane (2006) Kubicek (1999-2000), and Sarote (2010) 
270 Sovereignty was measured by realsov12345 
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sovereignty in the Russian sphere of influence are far more impactful on the sovereignty 
norms in Eastern Europe than do violations of sovereignty in other regions. For example, 
because an overwhelming number of Security Council resolutions authorizing violations of 
sovereignty target African countries,271 those violations are far less influential in affecting 
norms and setting precedents in Eastern Europe. Similarly, a violation of sovereignty in the 
Middle East might only affect normative patterns limited to the Middle Eastern region. 
When only looking at CIS states, cases with a violation of sovereignty were more likely to be 
opposed, but the findings were not statistically significant (Pr=.114). , the small sample size 
of 15 resolutions (with 2 negative votes) also played a limiting role in generating productive 
results.  
 Moreover, Russia was also very concerned with justifying its voting behavior on 
resolutions concerning its sphere of influence. Russia was far more likely to issue a statement 
justifying its vote on resolutions concerning the CISBB (Pr=.002). (Figure 16) This finding 
reiterates Russia’s concern for the normative treatment of these states’ sovereignty.  
However, Russia had less of a clear association for justifications in the CIS cases alone 
(Pr=.057). Such a finding may result from the fact that of the 60 resolutions concerning the 
CIS states, only two resolutions were ‘hard’ violations of state sovereignty (sanctions, 
military intervention, or peacekeeping). Therefore, due to the fact that these resolutions were 
less substantive, the Russians may have felt less of a need to justify their voting behavior.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 In fact, an overwhelming number of all Security Council resolutions target African states.  
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Figure 16: Association between justifications and CISBB 
 If the resolution called for intervention in the Russian sphere, Russian opposition 
was highly significant. For the CIS states, Russia opposed 2 of 3 resolutions calling for 
intervention into the CIS (Pr=.000). For CISBB, Russia opposed 8 of 100 resolutions, a 
voting pattern that was also highly significant (Pr=.002). Such evidence lends additional 
support to the existence of a distinct Russian sphere of influence where Russia is more likely 
to oppose resolutions.  
 Finally, in order to confirm that this relationship did not arise because of omitted 
variable bias, I ran a probit test with consent and Chapter VII, two factors that have already 
been established as significant. (Figure 17) Indeed, the probit test does confirm CISBB as a 
significant causal factor (P>|z|=.013).272 In sum: the available data strongly supports H3’s 
postulate that a Russian sphere of influence affects Russian voting behavior. In all, CISBB 
proved to be a better indicator than did CIS because too few of the CIS issues are even 
brought before the Security Council.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272 Nonetheless, due to the fact that CISBB is not the only significant variable, we may conclude that the other 
variables’ effects on Russian voting behavior is not caused by Russia’s perceived sphere of influence.  
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Figure 17: Probit of CISBB, State Consent, and Chapter VII on negative Russian voting 
H4: LIMITING U.S. HEGEMONIC AMBITIONS  
 If Russia’s voting is motivated by fears of U.S. hegemonic aspirations, then Russia 
will vote against resolutions which contain elements expanding U.S. intervention. The 
relevant coded factors tested for H4 were 1) the inclusion of Chapter VII 2) the 
authorization of intervention 3) a resolution with actionable policy implications 4) the 
authorization of US intervention outside of a UN-controlled force 5) whether or not 
sovereignty was referenced in the resolution 6) the presence of state consent. Due to the fact 
that resolutions introduced under Chapter VII resolution designate the discussed issue as a 
threat to international peace, Chapter VII provides a critical first step for the authorization 
of U.S. unilateral activity. If not accepted under Chapter VII, then states have less of a 
legitimate excuse for intervention.273 Furthermore, if the resolution has no direct implications 
for actionable policy, then Russia should not view the resolution as a means for U.S. 
expansion. Further, if foreign intervention or a violation of sovereignty is authorized, then 
the U.S. may have an excuse to extend its influence into the given region through the guise 
of the UN. More specifically, if the resolution gives the U.S. authorization to act without 
centralized United Nations force, then Russia has even more reason to fear ignoble 
expansionist motivations. However, if the state has given consent for the operation, then 
this may help to assuage Russian concerns. Finally, a resolution with wording that specifically 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
273 Take, for example, the case of Iraq, when the United States used resolution 1441 accepted under Chapter 
VII as a justification for their invasion of Iraq in 2003.  
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affirms a state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity may serve as a normative buffer against 
foreign intervention.274 After conducting the statistical analyses, I found that the major driver 
tested in H4 was the invocation of Chapter VII, which other hypotheses also predict to play 
a significant role.275 However, the insignificance of the primary variables of whether an 
authorization of intervention occurred and whether the resolution permitted US activity 
outside of the UN largely invalidate H4. Below, I expound upon the various cross-
tabulations and regression tests that led to this conclusion. 
For H4, focusing on Russian fears of U.S. hegemonic ambitions, I ran chi-squared 
cross-tabulationss to test the significance of authorized intervention on voting behavior. 
While about half of the resolutions were coded as interventions, only 40% of the selected 
sample resulted in negative votes, resulted in a standard error of the mean of 16% (Pr=.163), 
which is not statistically significant. (Figure 18)  
 
Figure 18: Association between negative Russian voting and authorization of intervention 
Even more importantly, a cross tabulation between negative Russian votes and the 
authorization of US activity outside of UN oversight proves insignificant (Pr=.554). This 
finding poses a strong challenge to H4. H4 would expect such examples of unregulated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 Here again, resolution 1441 on Iraq provides a good example of Russia’s attempt to buffer against U.S. 
intervention. As Russia stated in the press release on the resolution, “He said it was of fundamental importance 
that there was clear confirmation in the resolution that all members respected the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Iraq.” However, in this case, the inclusion of the reaffirmation of Iraq’s sovereignty was 
unsuccessful in maintaining Iraqi sovereignty as the United States invaded anyway.  
275 Particularly H1, H2 and H9. 
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behavior to be the motivating factor behind Russian voting, and the evidence strongly 
suggests that this is not the case. Therefore, the fact that both ‘Intervention’ and ‘US outside 
activity’ did not significantly affect voting behavior implies that the H4 hypothesis is not 
unsupported. 
I continued by testing the number of negative resolutions against whether or not 
Chapter VII had been invoked. This proved highly significant (Pr<0.001), implying that the 
invocation of Chapter VII was associated with Russian abstentions and vetoes. (Figure 19) 
Nonetheless, Chapter VII just delineates a case as a threat to international peace and security 
(and therefore justifies UNSC authorizations of force). However, this delineation does not 
directly assume that the Security Council will take any action that would allow the U.S. to 
expand its influence. When restricting the sample to only cases where the resolution was 
adopted under the binding Chapter VII, the authorization of intervention becomes 
significant (Pr=.023). This finding reinforces the lack of association of U.S. activity outside 
the United Nations, which, even with the restriction of resolutions where Chapter VII was 
invoked, still remains insignificant (Pr=.813). 
 
Figure 19: Association between negative Russian voting and Chapter VII 
Further, a chi-squared test revealed that there was a weak association between 
negative Russian votes and the existence of a specific policy implication with a chi-squared 
of about 11% (Pr=.111). However, a multivariate probit test of the variables (A specific 
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actionable policy from the resolution, authorized intervention, and the inclusion of Chapter 
VII) demonstrated that the inclusion of Chapter VII (P>|z|=.004) and the authorization of 
intervention (P>|z|=.059) were the primary causal drivers. (Figure 20)  
rusneg Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
chaptervii 0.4259076 0.1461716 2.91 0.004 0.1394166 0.7123986 
specificpo~1 0.2020554 0.1348963 1.5 0.134 -0.0623364 0.4664473 
interventi~o -0.2736022 0.1449096 -1.89 0.059 -0.5576197 0.0104153 
_cons -2.433022 0.3935302 -6.18 0 -3.204327 -1.661717 
Figure 20: Probit of Chapter VII, Specific Policy Implications, and the authorization of intervention on negative 
Russian voting 
Finally, hypothesizing that the association might hidden by the fact that Russia only 
opposes hegemonic influence in cases without consent, I tested the strength of association 
for the consent variable under the presumption that binding Chapter VII resolutions 
authorizing intervention were less likely to be accepted when the state did not consent to the 
intervention. This proved marginally significant (Pr=.071). Furthermore, when conducting a 
similar analysis, testing the authorization of intervention variable for negative Russian votes 
and controlling for Chapter VII and US activity outside of the UN, the association remains 
only marginally significant (Pr=.0652).  In sum, the statistical evidence implies that while the 
categorization of a conflict under Chapter VII does affect Russian voting behavior, Russia’s 
UNSC voting is not driven by fears of US hegemony. 
H5:  RELATIVE SECURITY VIS-À-VIS THE US 
 H5 expects that Russia will only be willing to oppose the United States in the 
Security Council when Russia feels strong enough to withstand United States disapproval. 
Therefore, one should expect high levels Russian negative votes when Russia is relatively 
strong against the United States.276 In terms of statistical methodology, for H5, I took 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
276 Paul (2005) argues that Russia does not feel the sense of urgency to oppose U.S. hegemony when it is weak 
because it does not believe that U.S. preponderance poses an existential threat to Russian sovereignty.  
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advantage of the merged spreadsheets and ran a script277 that counted the total number of 
resolutions per year, the number of negative votes in that year, and then calculated the 
percentage of negative votes in each given year. [Appendix III] Given this background setup, 
I was able to run probit regression analyses comparing the negative Russian votes (rusneg) to 
the imported measurements of Russian strength.  
I used both the military capabilities (CINC) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
variables to measure Russian state strength. The CINC data comes from the Correlates of 
War dataset, and is specifically intended to measure military strength from a number of 
variables.278 On the other hand, GDP more directly measures the strength of the economy. 
As both military capability and economic prowess are commonly cited as sources of 
international power and security, these variables are appropriate for testing H5. Moreover, 
given the collapse of the Russian economy after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has 
placed economic development as a top priority.279 Therefore, because of Russia’s stress on 
economic development as a metric of recovery, economic strength should also signal a 
feeling of Russian security. However, both the GDP and CINC variables require a different 
approach in that both are continuous variables on a spectrum rather than the discrete binary 
variables used for most of the statistical analysis. I thus run probit regressions, rather than 
the cross-tabs used elsewhere. 
If Russia feels that it can only oppose the U.S. in the Security Council when Russia is 
relatively more powerful, then we should expect to see increased voting behavior as its GDP 
increases. However, statistical testing did not find any evidence for H5.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 Courtesy of Dr. Alex Weisiger.  
278 Specifically, the CINC data is an index of military spending, total military personnel, total population, urban 
population, energy consumption, and iron/steel production. 
279 Monaghan (2003). For example, see Monaghan (2003) p.995, “Moreover, an underlying element of Russian 
policy is its growing strength and independence. High energy prices have sustained growth in the Russian 
economy and significantly reduced its reliance on foreign support.” 
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 On the other hand, the poor correlation between (P>|t|=.400) suggests that there is 
little connection between GDP and Russian voting behavior. Similarly, a regression test does 
not provide a significant relationship between Russian negative voting and the Russia’s cinc 
scores relative to the United States (P>|t|=.366). Therefore, there is little evidence to 
support H5’s hypothesis that voting behavior depends on Russian relative strength.280  
H6: CHINESE VOTING BEHAVIOR 
 After conducting the statistical work, there was no doubt of association between 
negative Russian votes and negative Chinese votes. The correlation between the two 
countries’ voting behavior was extremely significant (Pr=.000). (Figure  21)  A number of 
follow-up cross-tabulation tests ascertained that the type of negative vote cast (either a veto 
or abstention) was not always identical, but were similarly patterned enough to be extremely 
significant (all tests resulted in Pr=.000). Nonetheless, the reader should be wary about 
jumping to conclusions on the basis of these results. As with all tests of association, 
correlation does not necessarily mean causation. In this case, it is quite possible that the 
same factors driving Russian voting behavior in the Security Council are also driving Chinese 
behavior, which results in the analogous voting patterns. Moreover, Chinese votes may 
instead be following Russian voting behavior. Due to the small case sample size, the best 
way to understand the differences in voting behavior is through a qualitative analysis 
focusing on those cases where Russian and Chinese voting behavior did not match up.281 
However, from the statistical perspective, while an association between Russian and Chinese 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280 Nonetheless, this finding does not obviate Tsygankov’s finding of the impact on Russian relative strength 
on Russian foreign policy behavior in general. Rather, this merely indicates that Russian relative strength does 
not dictate voting behavior in the Security Council. The lack of correlation between negative voting behavior 
and state strength should not come as an overwhelming surprise. During 2012, Azerbaijan, one of the least 
powerful members sitting on the UNSC, led all states in the Security Council with three negative votes.  
281 Indeed, these differences are analyzed in the qualitative study. 
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voting is strongly supported by the chi-squared analyses of the data, these tests only confirm 
the plausibility of H6.  
 
Figure 21: Association between negative Russian voting and negative Chinese voting 
H7: NORMATIVE COMPROMISE 
As mentioned above in the discussion on coding methodology, the data suffered 
greatly from a failure to distinguish between failed attempts at compromises and situations in 
which no attempt at compromise took place. This situation is compounded by the fact that 
an analysis of compromises is inherently incomplete due to the presence of counterfactual 
cases that were either not introduced or involved informal diplomatic compromises before 
being introduced as a draft resolution. Lastly, any compromise that took place but was not 
alluded to the press statement afterwards would have been missed by the coding. Such a 
scenario where a state might discreetly make important technical concessions is easy to 
conceive. Therefore, any statistical findings on the ‘compromise’ variable remain highly 
suspect. Nevertheless, the compromise variable was highly significant (Pr=.000), with 18.3 
percent of all the 82 resolutions during which compromise took place resulting in a negative 
Russian vote. Unfortunately, these results also tell us little, because intuitively, the cases in 
which compromises are necessary are already a self-selected group of ‘hard cases’ where the 
Security Council members do not agree.    
H8: PRESTIGIOUS STATES 
The extremely small relevant sample size made drawing conclusive results about H8 
from the statistical data very difficult. However, the dearth of data concerning prestigious 
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countries is extremely informative about the institutional behavior of the Security Council. 
While the cross-tabulation between negative Russian voting and prestigious countries was 
statistically significant when looking at cases violating sovereignty (Pr=.019),282 the tiny 
sample size of 15 resolutions that are targeted at prestigious states does little to inform the 
research about general Russian voting behavior. Moreover, 12 of those resolutions target the 
entire international community. In conclusion, while an engagement with H8 uncovers some 
important truths, those truths are not directly relevant to the research puzzle at hand.  
  H9: RELATIONAL STATE PERSPECTIVE 
 As discussed in the methodology section, there this question was not approached 
from a quantitative perspective. Rather, this question of the normative bedrock of legitimate 
state structure, and what constitutes a valid democracy, is best pursued through a qualitative 
analysis grounded in examples. However, H9 is more of an adjunct hypothesis that 
complements a number of the other hypotheses. While H9, if supported, helps provide 
some of the background context for Russian normative approaches; it is not comprised of 
the same level of specificity desired in a primary hypothesis.  
 H10: RESPECTED POWER 
The backdrop to testing H10 was the assumption that Russia perceived respect from 
the West fell into three distinct periods during the scope of this essay’s analysis. This 
assumption is based on the scholarly writings examining Russian foreign policy presented in 
the literature review.283 The extant literature has come to a broad consensus that Russia felt 
unappreciated and less respected between 1995-2000 and between 2005-2012, and felt more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282 Using the variable ‘realsov12345’ 
283 The chief scholars mentioned in the literature review who discuss this periodization most thoroughly are 
Christian Thorun and Andrei Tsygankov.  
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respected between 2001-2004.284 Therefore, I created a new variable, ‘respect,’ which took a 
value of ‘0’ for resolutions during a time period where Russia did not feel respected (1995-
2000 and 2005-2012) and took a value of 1 for resolutions when Russia did feel respected 
(2001-2004).  
The cross-tabulation of Russian negative votes and respect were significantly 
associated (Pr=.043). (Figure 22) Such a relationship implies that during periods when Russia 
feels less respected, ones sees a higher level of negative voting in the Security Council. Such 
a result logically follows from Tsygankov’s finding that Russia is less cooperative with the 
West when it feels disrespected.285 This statistical evidence demonstrates that a disrespected 
Russia that is uncooperative with the West on general foreign policy matters is also 
uncooperative on Security Council affairs.  
 
Figure 22: Association between negative Russian voting and Respect 
Nonetheless, this ‘respect’ result may be associative rather than causal. In other 
words, the support for H10 may result as a consequence of another variable. For example, it 
could just be that the Security Council was less prone to discuss issues that Russia would 
object to.286 In order to address this concern, I ran a multivariate probit test with other 
variables that had proven significant in affecting Russian negative voting behavior, including 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284 Thorun (2009) p. 39 
285 Tsygankov (2012A) 
286 However, such a situation seems unlikely, given that the time period in question included a number of 
significant interventions and violations of state sovereignty, including the invasions of both Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  
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the presence of state consent, the inclusion of Chapter VII in the resolutions, and whether 
or not the resolution targeted the CISBB. The respect variable remained significant in the 
probit analysis (P>|z|=.05), thereby indicating that respect plays a significant causal role in 
affecting negative Russian votes. (Figure 23) 
 
Figure 23: Probit of State Consent, Chapter VII, Respect, and CISBB on negative Russian voting 
Admittedly, this hypothesis takes the causal theoretical leap assuming that a lack of 
respect leads to a non-cooperative disposition, which in turn will lead to voting opposition. 
As such, the results of the statistical analysis cannot be as confidently applied as evidence as 
for H10 as can be applied for a number of other hypotheses. Therefore, qualitative evidence 
demonstrating that a lack of respect played a role in Russian voting behavior would be 
necessary for the validation of H10.  
Nevertheless, even without the qualitative evidence, such a hypothesis provides 
three-fold value for the study of Russian voting behavior. First, H10 demonstrates the 
importance of the greater contextual trends in determining Russian voting patterns--Russia’s 
relationship to the other member states makes a difference. Second, the finding in H10 
statistically demonstrates the accuracy of the periodization in the Russian foreign policy 
literature. The statistical analysis in H10 proves that the periods outlined by Thorun and 
others have analytically useful implications.287 Finally, the statistical information suggests that 
Russia’s motivation as a status seeker may play a role. 
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Mund-104 
However, while H10 did provide some statistical support for Russia as a status 
seeker, the other hypotheses did not supply as solid support for such a theoretical approach. 
Even more significantly, the expansionist Russia approaches did not fare well in the 
statistical tests. Neither H4 nor H5 showed significant correlation, and H6 showed only 
association. On the other hand, all three of the approaches conceptualizing Russia as the 
defender of the status quo received strong statistical support, thus providing empirical 
weight to a theory of Russia as primarily motivated in the Security Council by a desire to 
uphold the status quo through maintaining international stability and protecting state 
sovereignty. 
  The chart below provides a summary of the statistical results.  
No. Hypothesis Statistical Result Conclusion288 
H1 Legal Orthodoxy Inclusion of Chapter VII increases chance 
of negative Russian vote  
Presence of State Consent increases chance 
of negative Russian vote 
Presence of significant violence does not 
increase chance of negative Russian vote 
Y 
H2 Protection of Sovereignty 
Norms 
Violations of sovereignty increases chance 
of negative Russian vote 
Presence of sovereignty violations increases 
chance of voting justification 
Sanctions violations increases chance of 
negative Russian vote 
Peacekeeping violations increases chance of 
negative Russian vote  
Y 
H3 Sphere of Influence CISBB state increases chance of negative 
Russian vote 
CISBB state when violations of sovereignty 
increases chance of negative Russia vote  
Presence of CISBB increases chance of 
voting justification 
CIS state does not increase chance of 
negative Russian vote 
Y 
H4 U.S. Hegemony US activity outside of the United Nations 
does not increase chances for negative 
Russian vote 
Intervention does not increase chance of 
negative Russian vote 
Inclusion of Chapter VII increases chance 
of negative Russian vote  
N 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 Key: Y=Yes N=No M=Marginal Yes N/A=Not applicable 
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H5 Relative Power Higher relative GDP values do not increase 
chance of negative Russian vote 
Higher relative CINC values do not increase 
chance of negative Russian vote  
N 
H6 Chinese Leadership Chinese negative vote increases chance of 
Russian negative vote (questionable 
causality) 
M 
H7 Normative Compromise Compromise increases chance of Russian 
negative vote (questionable methodology) 
M 
H8 Prestigious State Prestigious states increases chance of 
Russian negative vote (insufficient sample 
size) 
M 
H9 Democratic Legitimacy Not assessed from a quantitative standpoint N/A 
H10 Respected Power Respect decreases negative Russian votes Y 
QUALITATIVE EVIDENCE: CASES 
 This next section examines the evidence for the various hypotheses from a 
qualitative perspective. The qualitative evidence utilized was primarily derived from Russian 
statements in Security Council discussions that were subsequently included in the UN press 
releases accompanying the resolution under discussion. For each hypothesis below, I 
introduce resolutions that contained discussions relevant to the hypothesis at hand.289  I find 
that the qualitative evidence offers the strongest support for concerns of legal jurisdiction 
(H1), protecting state sovereignty norms (H2) and protecting a Russian sphere of influence 
(H3). Moreover, the resolutions most strongly discounted the influence of relative power 
(H5), normative compromise (H7), prestigious states (H8) and Chinese leadership (H6). 
Finally, the qualitative evidence found marginal support for fears of U.S. hegemony (H4), the 
protection of democratic legitimacy (H9), and Russia as a respected power (H10). In all, 
these findings strongly support the thesis that Russia takes a defensive approach to the 
Security Council, with Russia primarily motivated by a desire to minimize instability and 
promote a sovereign, state-centric system. 
H1: LEGAL ORTHODOXY 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
289 Due to this structural decision to divide the categories based on hypothesis rather than by types of press 
release statements or resolutions, the same resolution may be used more than once under different hypotheses. 
This duplication was judged to be worthwhile, as a hypothesis-based discussion structure allows for the reader 
to more easily assess the relative strengths of each hypothesis. 
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This hypothesis is quite simple—H1 expects Russia to strictly follow a legal code 
dictating Security Council activity. H1 predicts that Russia’s votes will consistently follow its 
interpretation of international law. Such a prediction found strong support in the 
quantitative analysis and the following qualitative case examples further reinforce the 
explanatory capacity for H1. Moreover, the qualitative discussion of H4 will further 
established support for H1 by demonstrating that Russian concerns of U.S. expansion stem 
more from legal concerns of the Security Council mandate rather than any fear of U.S. 
hegemony. Due to the fact that the Security Council Member States do not agree on a single 
definition of international law,290 the following paragraph serves to clarify Russia’s legal 
interpretation of legitimate Security Council behavior.  
 According to Russia’s interpretation of the UN Charter, the goal of the Security 
Council is not to eliminate world violence, but rather to maintain international stability by 
preventing and containing interstate wars and violations of state sovereignty. The way that 
the Security Council prevents these wars is through a credible threat of a Great Power 
coalition (the Security Council) intervening and forcing the aggressor to cease its violent 
behavior and return to the previous status quo. Therefore, Russia believes that the Charter 
only legally allows for Security Council intervention in cases of severe threats to international 
stability, and only then to restore that stability.  
 Specifically, Russia derives the Security Council mandate from the United Nations 
Charter, on which Russia takes a conservative interpretative stance. In order to understand 
whether Russia’s votes are motivated by compliance with the legal regulations of the UN 
Charter, one must first understand which regulations Russia attempts to follow. The 
quantitative analysis examined two legal regulatory determinants: (1) whether there was a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290 Terhalle (2011) 
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threat to international peace and security (and therefore fell within the jurisdiction of the 
Security Council) and (2) whether the Security Council had the relevant state’s consent for 
intervention (which Russia argues is necessary for all Security Council actions not 
immediately threatening international stability).291 The statistical tests run along these two 
parameters found that Russia was significantly more likely to vote in favor of resolutions that 
followed Russian legal guidelines. The qualitative analysis of voting uses the same standards 
of international legal behavior, analyzing the importance of whether the threat constitutes a 
threat to international security and whether state parties consented to intervention. 
Additionally, the qualitative analysis also examines cases reaffirming the Security Council as 
the supreme international organ for handling threats to international peace and stability.292 
Russia has a strict legal standard for cases that fall within the Security Council’s 
mandate. However, if Russia ascertains that the situation does in fact pose a threat to 
international peace and stability, it will agree that the situation at hand meets the criteria for 
the Security Council and thus agree to authorize Security Council intervention. For example, 
Russia voted in favor of Security Council resolution 1049, which established the need for a 
‘rapid and widespread response’ to ethnic violence in Burundi.293 In Burundi, an army of 
ethnic Tutsis were massacring members of the ethnic Hutu group, the two ethnic groups 
involved in the Rwandan genocide just a year earlier.294 Moreover, many of the Hutu victims 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
291 According to Russia, even a follow-up peacemaking mission would require state consent.  
292 This qualitative examination is an exhaustive exploration of the various parts of the Russian interpretation of 
the UN Charter’s legal prescriptions for the Security Council. For examples of Russia’s discussion on the legal 
necessity for constructive diplomacy, see UNSC resolution 1680 on Lebanon, UNSC resolutions 1737, 1747, 
1803 on Iran, and 1132 on Sierra Leone. For examples of Russia’s insistence upon precise legal terms, see the 
UNSC resolution on Eritrea in UNSC resolution 2043 and on Iraq in UNSC resolution 1483. 
293 UNSC Resolution 1049 
294 Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: the United Nations and Rwanda (Ithaca: Cornell University Press): 
2002; Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1996 - Burundi, 1 January 1996. 
Delaney, Bill and Reuters. “Violence Simmers Anew In Burundi.” CNN.  16 May 1996.  
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were refugees from Rwanda.295 Such a conflict had the potential to reignite violence 
throughout the Great Lakes region296 and thus threatened international stability. When 
Russia supported the resolution, Russian representative Vasily Sidorov made a point of 
emphasizing that “the situation in Burundi… posed a real threat to the region as a whole.”297 
Moreover, once Russia had established that the situation in Burundi fell under Security 
Council jurisdiction, Russia was willing to vote in favor of a subsequent resolution298 that 
allowed for the basis of international intervention.299 Due to the real threat to international 
security, Russia followed the legal protocols and agreed that the violence in Burundi required 
Security Council attention. Therefore, the case of Burundi demonstrates that Russia is willing 
to authorize violence when it considers a situation a threat to international peace. 
 Similarly, when the Security Council members agree with Russia that a case does not 
merit unilateral intervention, then Russia will support the resolution. For example, during the 
ongoing Syrian Civil War, Russia voted in favor of the Security Council Resolution 1994, 
which extended the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) that 
monitors the ceasefire lines between Israel and Syria.300 Russia has no objections to this 
observer mission, authorized to verify ceasefire compliance, an arrangement supported by 
both Israel and Syria. More significantly, the resolution intentionally avoided discussing the 
simultaneous violence occurring in Syria between Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the Syrian 
rebel forces. When justifying its support for resolution 1994, Russia made a point of 
emphasizing the fact that the current political situation in Syria did not pose a threat to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295 Delaney (1996) 
296 Specifically, in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  
297 Press Release for UN Security Council Resolution 1049. 
298 UNSC Resolution 1072 
299 Resolution 1072 was adopted under the binding Chapter VII, and “demanded that all sides cease hostilities, 
call for an immediate halt in the violence and initiate unconditional negotiations towards a comprehensive 
political settlement.” Due to the binding nature of the resolution, a failure to end all violence would be grounds 
for an international intervention. 
300 UNSC Resolution 1994 
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international peace and security. According to the UN press release for Security Council 
Resolution 1994,  “Underscoring the technical nature of the text, [the Russian representative] 
stressed that it did not address the political situation in Syria, which was not on the Council’s 
agenda.  Furthermore, events there posed no threat to international peace and security.”301 In 
other words, Russia’s willingness to support the resolution was contingent upon the decision 
not to include the political situation in Syria, which did not fall under Security Council legal 
jurisdiction, because the political infighting taking place in Syria did not pose a threat to 
international peace and security.302  
However, when the Security Council tries to take action on events that Russia does 
not believe threatens international peace and security, then Russia will not support the 
resolution because of Russia’s belief that such resolutions violate international law. Russia 
did not believe that the situation in Kosovo posed a threat to international security. 
However, in resolution 1203, the Security Council introduced the draft resolution calling for 
an immediate ceasefire under the binding Chapter VII.303 Therefore Russia could not legally 
support the resolution, which violated the Security Council mandate by extending it beyond 
threats to international peace and security. As Russia explained, 
“For reasons such as that the use of force had been reflected in a draft and Russia would not 
condone that, it would abstain in the vote on the resolution, but would continue to make a 
contribution to the solution of the Kosovo situation. The resolution also did not take into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
301 UN Press Release for UN Security Council Resolution 1994 
302 One might respond by questioning why Russia was willing to support a resolution extending the Syrian-
Israel ceasefire observer force (UNDOF) if it does not pose an immediate threat to international peace. The 
critical difference here, however, is the presence of both Syrian and Israeli consent to the presence of the 
UNDOF observer mission.  
303 UNSC resolution 1203. Therefore, unless an immediate ceasefire was implemented, the Security Council 
would have grounds for intervention.  
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account recent developments in Belgrade, and it could not be agreed that the situation in 
Kosovo presented an international danger.”304  
Russia justifies its vote on legal grounds—the draft resolution authorizes the use of force, 
but due to Russia’s belief that Kosovo did not threaten international security, Russia could 
not legally authorize military force.305 This vote contrasts sharply with Russia’s positive vote 
on resolution 1160 just seven months earlier, where Russia agreed to impose an arms 
embargo on Yugoslavia “would support that action on an understanding that there was no 
threat to international peace and security.”306Therefore, one sees that the legal designation of 
the resolution as not posing a threat to peace and security was critical to Russian voting 
behavior.307   
 Next, Russia’s interpretation of the UN Charter also places a heavy legal emphasis 
on obtaining the consent of all parties to a conflict when assisting in diplomacy and 
peacebuilding. For example, a draft resolution circulating the Security Council aimed to 
establish a United Nations Observer Force in the contested Palestinian territories.308 In 
principle, Russia agreed with the resolution. However, “the only way for the Council to take 
action to establish an observer force was with the consent of both parties.  Ensuring an 
international presence could be done only under conditions on which the two parties could 
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agree.”309 In other words, Russia’s respect for the legal mandates of the UN Charter, which 
limited observer forces to situations of mutual consent, led Russia to cast a negative vote on 
the resolution.310  
 On the other hand, when the parties to the conflict consent to Security Council 
assistance, then Russia is willing to support the resolution. In fact, for resolution 1031, 
Russia was willing to cooperate with NATO in order to help implement the Bosnian peace 
agreement.311 Resolution 1031 created the Implementation Force (IFOR), a combination of 
both NATO and Russian troops. When discussing the resolution, Russian Foreign Minister 
Sergey Lavrov “emphasized that the most important feature of the resolution was that the 
Member States were authorized to do only what the Bosnian sides agreed to and that 
included the use of force.”312 The consent of all the parties to the conflict—the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia 
and Montenegro), the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska—
established the legal basis on which a peacemaking mission could be established. Thus, one 
sees the impact of legal restrictions on influencing Russian voting behavior. 
  Finally, one finds the influence of legal restrictions on Russia’s voting behavior 
when examining the importance that Russia places on maintaining the Security Council as 
the sole arbiter on the legitimate use of force. Because the UN Charter sets a strict legal limit 
on the Security Council as the single legitimate international peacekeeping body,313 H1 would 
expect Russia to strictly uphold the Security Council’s legitimacy. Moreover, due to Russia’s 
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disproportionate influence in the Security Council,314 Russia also has further incentives for its 
strict legalist approach. In a 2011 resolution on establishing an observer mission to Syria, 
Russia supported the resolution. However, Russia’s voting justification did not address the 
observer mission directly, but rather stressed that “the resolution sent an important 
international legal signal — only the Council had the prerogative to take such a decision 
involving a regional crisis, including the Syrian crisis.”315 From Russia’s statement, one sees 
the clear focus on the legal environment—Russia is primarily concerned with clearly 
delineating the Security Council’s sole legitimacy on questions of military force.  
 Similarly, Russia demonstrates its concern for the Security Council as the legitimate 
international authority through a negative vote on Sudan sanctions. In resolution 1070, 
Russian critiques the decision to sanction Sudan.  
“The rash use of the sanctions instrument is not only destructive for the people of Sudan 
and the countries of the region, but creates a precedent which could do real damage to the 
Security Council’s authority.”316 
Once again, Russia demonstrates its concern with the Security Council’s accepted legal 
jurisdiction. While in the other resolutions, Russia sought to limit Security Council 
jurisdiction, resolution 1070 shows Russia defending the importance of the Council. Without 
this resolution, a reader might conclude that Russia’s concern with limiting the legal 
jurisdiction of the Security Council is actually a ploy to undercut the Security Council’s ability 
to impact international affairs. Therefore, this resolution plays an important role in 
demonstrating that Russia believes that the Security Council plays an important, albeit strictly 
limited, role in international affairs. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314 International Monetary Fund (2009) 
315 UNSC resolution 2043  
316 Press release for UN Security Council Resolution 1070 
Mund-113 
 However, Ian Johnstone offers a challenge to the theory that Russia genuinely votes 
along strict legal norms in the Security Council.317 Instead, Johnstone alleges that states 
merely discuss actions within a legal context to avoid discussing their actions in terms of self-
interest, which are considered less legitimate.318 While Johnstone is right to point out that 
Russia’s original legal positions advocating international stability and the state sovereignty 
principle are founded in Russia’s self-interest, the evidence demonstrates that Russia 
genuinely believes in the Security Council as a tool for maintaining international peace, and 
will not oppose resolutions that fall within the legal guidelines as Russia understands them. 
In other words, Russia’s legalist approach is consistent. For example, while the specific U.S. 
ISAF mission in Afghanistan may have not been in its self-interest, Russia’s legal 
interpretation led it to support the mission, because it follows Russia’s legal standards.319 In 
other words, while the basic legal outline supports Russian general interests, when assessing 
an individual case, Russia consults its legal interpretation, not its immediate self-interest.  
 In sum, whether focusing on threats to international stability, consent of parties 
involved, or the sole legitimate authority of the Security Council, Russia demonstrates its 
concern with a strict compliance with the legal jurisdiction of the Security Council. This 
focus on a strict legalist approach provides further evidence for H1, which predicts Russia to 
vote in the Security Council based off of a strict interpretation of the Security Council in the 
U.N. Charter. However, while the evidence provides strong support for consistent Russian 
legalist behavior with the Security Council, the following hypothesis helps explain why 
Russia takes such a strict approach on Security Council jurisdiction. 
H2: PROTECTION OF SOVEREIGNTY NORMS 
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 While H1 gives a compelling account of Russia’s commitment to precise legal 
guidelines by which Russia bases its voting behavior, H2 better contextualizes the reasons 
why Russia takes such a strict legalist stance. H2 predicts that Russia will oppose violations 
of state sovereignty norms. Specifically, H2 predicts that Russia will promote the normative 
legitimacy of state sovereignty over that of humanitarian intervention.320 Combining the 
insights of H1 and H2, one finds that Russia’s goal in the Security Council has been to 
strengthen and maintain international norms of state sovereignty and codify those norms 
into international law. From a more basic perspective, Russia tries to ensure that 
(preexisting) states remain the smallest relevant units in the international legal community.321 
While H2 received substantial support from the statistical testing, Russia’s concern for 
sovereignty norms is inherently more easily approached from a qualitative perspective. 
Moreover, given the centrality of H2 to the overall thesis, it is important to demonstrate that 
the qualitative evidence complements the quantitative analysis.  Below, I present a number 
of cases that intend to demonstrate that “ Russia has consistently rejected any dilution of 
what it sees as the Charter's defence of domestic jurisdiction.”322 In other words, Russia 
believes that the UN Charter’s sovereignty-driven worldview has been most appropriate for 
the understanding of international relations, and Russia wants it to stay that way.   
 Russia promotes state sovereignty norms in contradistinction to a more 
humanitarian-motivated, individualist-oriented West. While both agree that threats to 
international peace and security supersede state sovereignty norms, the West also believes 
that state sovereignty cannot be used to shield a country from the consequences of human 
rights violations. Russian disagrees, arguing that in such cases, state sovereignty takes priority 
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over humanitarian concerns. This disagreement over the relative strength of sovereignty 
versus humanitarian norms is reflected in a number of Security Council resolutions. For 
example, a 2007 draft resolution vetoed by Russia and China demanded that Myanmar cease 
violence in ethnic minority regions.323 As Russian representative Vitaly Churkin explained,  
“[Russia] had consistently opposed the consideration of the Myanmar issue in the Security 
Council.  Not denying that Myanmar had been facing certain problems, particularly in the 
socio-economic and humanitarian areas, the situation in that country did not pose any threat 
to international or regional peace….  “Attempts aimed at using the Security Council to 
discuss issues outside its purview are unacceptable.”324 
According to Churkin, Russia sees the attempt to condemn Myanmar’s behavior in the 
Security Council as violation of Myanmar’s sovereignty—Myanmar did not threaten 
international peace and security. While this explanation sounds reminiscent of the 
justifications analyzed under the strict legalist interpretations of threats to international peace 
and security, this draft resolution on Myanmar introduces one more critical element: 
humanitarian crises. In his justification, Churkin alludes to Myanmar’s ‘problems in the 
humanitarian areas.’ In other words, there were reasons to believe that Myanmar’s 
government was not sufficiently caring for its citizenry, particularly when judging by Western 
standards. Therefore, if Russian did not oppose the draft resolution, then Russia would be 
tacitly accepting a normative shift in the Security Council prioritizing humanitarian concerns 
over state sovereignty—moving the legal focus away from state governments and onto 
individual state citizens. Moreover, the inclusion of state sovereignty allows the reader to 
round out the conversation on legalist concerns—the reason why Russia is so engaged with a 
strict interpretation of the Security Council mandate is because the Security Council is the 
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one body legitimately empowered to override state sovereignty. While the qualitative 
conversation of H1 demonstrated that Russia genuinely supports the Security Council, state 
sovereignty considerations compel Russia to limit Security Council jurisdiction to narrowly 
focus on serious threats to international peace and stability.  
 If Myanmar were the only resolution with justificatory evidence demonstrating 
Russia’s view of the supremacy of state sovereignty norms, then the case could be dismissed 
as an outlier. However, justificatory evidence from a number of other resolutions also 
focuses on the supremacy of state sovereignty norms. For example, in resolution 1894, 
discussing civilians in armed conflict, or humanitarian law, Russia stressed that state 
sovereignty supersedes humanitarian law.325 While reiterating the importance of humanitarian 
conduct, Vitaly Churkin said the “protection of civilians was primarily the responsibilities of 
States involved in conflict, and the actions of the international community should be aimed 
at assisting national efforts.”326 In other words, state sovereignty comes first. While states 
should follow humanitarian law, and the international community should offer assist its 
assistance with the implementation of humanitarian law, the sovereign state must lead the 
effort. In order to dispel any remaining lack of clarity, Churkin continued, “The international 
community could take appropriate steps only under the auspices of the Council and in 
accordance with the United Nations Charter.”327 In short: no state can intervene on 
humanitarian grounds without Security Council authorization, and the Security Council can 
only authorize such a unilateral intervention in accordance to the UN Charter—when the 
present situation poses a threat to international stability. Therefore, in cases that do not pose 
an immediate threat to international peace and stability, Russia does not believe that the 
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Security Council may unilaterally authorize intervention, and thus requires state consent. Said 
more clearly, no one can intervene on solely humanitarian grounds328 without state consent. 
Therefore, Churkin here is diplomatically sending a very straightforward message—state 
sovereignty norms supersede humanitarian interventions.  
 Similar statements issued in resolutions even more recently were equally firm in their 
insistence of the primacy of state sovereignty norms. In a resolution condemning the use and 
targeting of children in armed conflict, Russian nearly repeated its justification from its 
conversation on civilians. “The primary role in protecting children continued to rest with 
national Governments, and support should aim at complementing their efforts,” said 
Russian representative Sergey Karev.329 Russia opposed this resolution because it attempted 
to implement sanctions on the basis of humanitarian violations. However, as explained in 
the legalist discussion on Security Council jurisdiction, Russia believes such an act of 
sanction falls outside of the Security Council’s jurisdiction. Because humanitarian crises in 
and of themselves do not pose a threat to international peace and stability, the Security 
Council cannot step in. Thereafter, the highest reigning norm is state sovereignty. Thus, only 
if the state acquiesces to humanitarian help may the international community intervene. 
(Figure 24) 
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Figure 24: Difference in normative approaches to Security Council authorization between Russia and the West 
 One more recent example where Russia promoted sovereignty norms was during a 
resolution endorsing post-conflict peacebuilding during peacekeeping missions.330 While 
Russia supported the resolution, Vitaly Churkin also took the opportunity to warn against 
the danger of giving precedence to humanitarian norms: 
“It was counterproductive and, in some cases, even dangerous, for individual States or the 
Secretariat to interpret Security Council mandates.  As important as civilian protection was, it 
must not put aside other important aspects of the mandates.  He was also concerned with 
arbitrary interpretations of international law for civilian protection.  It was unacceptable, for 
example, to use that to achieve political goals, especially as a pretext to interfere with the 
internal affairs of sovereign States.”331   
In the above statement, Churkin not only warns against the dangers of humanitarian 
interventions, but he also declares such unilateral interpretation of the Council mandate as 
illegal through the inconsistent application of international law. Therefore, in one fell swoop, 
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Churkin has both attacked the legitimacy of humanitarian norms as well as associated state 
sovereignty norms with Security Council legalism.332 
 The case of the extension of a 1996 UN observer mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) 
further illustrates the significance that Russia places on state consent in the absence of a 
threat to international peace.333 In its explanation for its support for the observer mission, 
Russia emphasizes that the mission does not violate Georgia’s sovereignty: “The Russian 
Federation had helped to draft the text before the Council. It believed that the main 
responsibility for a solution to the conflict lay with the parties themselves.”334Georgia’s 
internal upheaval did not pose a threat to international security. Therefore, while Russia was 
willing to support a Russian-led assistance mission that facilitated peace negotiations, it also 
emphasizes that the internal nature of the dispute required the sovereign Georgian 
government to solve its own conflict.  
 Furthermore, the promotion of the state sovereignty principle does not just result in 
conflict with humanitarian norms. The Russian focus on state sovereignty norms has also 
resulted in a zero tolerance policy when it comes to terrorist activities. When Russia refers to 
terrorists, it specifically refers to non-state actors. The state sovereignty system does not 
recognize the legitimacy of non-state actors, and therefore non-state terrorist groups are an 
anathema to the state system. Moreover, nearly all of these groups perpetrating politically 
motivated violence conduct their asymmetric attacks in order to change the status quo—a 
status quo that Russia very much would like to preserve. Therefore, it should come as little 
surprise that Russia should adamantly feel that “Terrorism was categorically unacceptable 
and deserved condemnation by the international community.”335 Moreover, by posing a 	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threat to the state-based sovereignty system, terrorism poses “a serious challenge to 
international peace and security.”336  
Another resolution stated more explicitly that “the world continued to face a strong 
and ruthless enemy, which threatened international security and the foundations of the 
modern world order.”337 In this case, the ‘world’ is a world of sovereign states, and the threat 
of non-state terrorism threatens to shaken the foundations of the state-sovereignty principle 
on which the international community is currently based upon.338 Due to the severity and 
asymmetry of the threat, Russia has encouraged the international community to take extreme 
steps to bar terror organizations from gaining any legitimacy, including the “inadmissibility 
of giving a podium in the mass media for the spread of terrorist views.  The right to freedom 
of speech and dissemination of information was not without limitations.”339 In resolution 
1618, Russian essentially encourages the international community to censor media in order 
to rob terrorist organizations of any potential platform for disseminating its political agenda.  
Russia has particular reasons for taking such a hard-line on terrorism—Russia faces a 
number of aspiring separatist groups operating within its own borders, including some of 
who have resorted to terror tactics.340 For example, in resolution 1333 discussing the Taliban 
in Afghanistan, Russia’s voting justification lends insight to its own terror concerns. Russia 
urged an unabashedly ‘one-sided’ text sanctioning the Taliban.341 Russia explains,  
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“They had also provided their territory for use by terrorists, including Chechnyans, Uzbeks, 
Tajiks and other extremists.  Also, the weapons that ended up with the Taliban were not 
only for their use, but to assist international terrorists.”342 
As evidenced by the Russian statement, Russia faces a number of organizations that it labels 
as ‘terrorist’ on its own soil, giving Russia added incentive to assume a stalwart hard-line 
position against terrorism. Moreover, this presence of separatist groups also incentivizes 
Russia to promote sovereignty in the first place.343 By establishing inviolable state 
sovereignty, Russia has the diplomatic leeway to clamp down on separatist groups without 
the fear of repercussion on humanitarian grounds. Moreover, Russia has demonstrated that 
it is not squeamish about brutally cracking down on opposition groups, as evidenced by 
Russia’s crackdown on Chechen separatists in 2004.344 
 In sum, a qualitative analysis of the data displays clear evidence that Russia cares 
deeply about the primacy of sovereignty norms, as H2 predicts. This dedication to 
sovereignty norms manifests itself through limiting the legal jurisdiction of the Security 
Council, attacking the humanitarian intervention normative principle, and taking a staunch 
stance against terrorism. This sovereignty explanation helps explain why Russia takes the 
strict legalist stance in H1. Moreover, H2 also explains why Russia is so opposed to some of 
the Western intervention attempts later outlined in H4; Russia does not oppose these 
attempts out of a fear of hegemony, but rather because they constitute a violation of 
sovereignty. Furthermore, sovereignty also provides a state cover for Russian human rights 
violations, and provides an international system under which potential separatist groups 
cannot find a ledge of legitimacy upon which to stand. Finally, the state sovereignty system 
allows for the maintenance of the status quo, ensuring that Russia maintains its 	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institutionalized great power status until Putin can rebuild Russian infrastructure up to its 
former Soviet glory.345 
H3: SPHERE OF INFLUENCE 
 The spheres of influence hypothesis borrows elements from both the expansionism 
in H4 as well as the sovereignty conversation discussed above in H2. H3 predicts that   
Russia feels protective of its sovereign sphere. Therefore, Russia is less inclined to see 
international meddling in its near abroad, particularly when Russia has the region under 
control. Moreover, because Russia maintains status quo stability in the CIS sphere, it will 
view international attention as unwarranted and Security Council action as illegal. 
Specifically, Russia views international intervention as introducing unrest and instability—the 
opposite of the Security Council’s mission! Therefore, one may most usefully consider H3 as 
a theoretical extension of H2, which clearly falls within a defensive Russia paradigm. 
However, Russia has also indicated its concern over NATO expansion into its sovereign 
sphere of influence, a finding consistent with H2 as well as H4. Thus, one may view H3 as a 
permutation of H2’s concern with sovereignty while also displaying H4’s concern for 
Western expansion (when specifically applying the H4 filters to Russia’s sovereign sphere). 
The qualitative analysis provides strong support for H3, a finding that agrees with the 
quantitative data. However, while Russia’s desire to protect its sovereign sphere of influence 
is doubtlessly a factor motivating Russian voting behavior, its limited applicability to explain 
the primary phenomenon suggests H3’s role as secondary explanatory mechanism. 
 While Russia does not want the Security Council intervening into Russia’s sphere of 
influence, Russia will allow the Security Council to authorize peacekeeping missions where 
Russia takes the leadership role—essentially, Russia use these mandates to reaffirm and 	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further legitimize its policing of the CIS sphere. The peacekeeping observer mission 
stationed in Tajikistan provides a good example of Russia using the Security Council to 
reinforce its sovereign policing influence. In the 1996 resolution 1089, extending the United 
Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT), Russia asserted its role as an 
“observer State” ensuring the implementation of the negotiated agreement between the Tajik 
government and opposition forces.346 From this resolution, one finds that despite the official 
concern of the entire international community, in practice, Russia establishes itself as 
primary state ensuring peace in its sovereign sphere. One sees more evidence of this 
interpretation during the following year, in resolution 1099, also extending the UNMOT 
mandate.347 In the discussion of this draft resolution, Russia pledged that “the Russian 
Federation would attempt to move the negotiating process towards true national 
reconciliation.”348 Russia’s statement clearly displays its intention to play an active role in 
policing its near abroad and reestablishing stability to the region. Finally, these resolutions 
recognized the important peacekeeping role that the Russian-led CIS peacekeeping coalition 
played in stabilizing the region. For example, in resolution 1099, the UNMOT team is 
referred to as “observers” while the CIS force are called “peace-keepers,” indicating the 
more substantive role of the CIS force.349 This emphasis on the greater weight placed on CIS 
peacekeepers is even more clearly reflected in resolution 1138, also extending the UNMOT 
mission. When discussing the UNMOT mandate, the Russian representative said, “The 
collective peacekeeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was also 
prepared to provide assistance in the implementation of the General Agreement, particularity 
in the military area.” The reference to the “the military arena” was not haphazard. Russia 	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wanted to clearly establish that only the Russian-led peacekeepers had the authorization to 
use force in Russia’s sovereign sphere. In short, the UNMOT cases demonstrate Russia’s 
perception of a Russian sphere of influence, where a sovereign Russia rules supreme. Russia 
was willing to support the UNMOT mission to Tajikistan because it helped legitimize 
Russia’s police action through the CIS. Therefore, because the UNMOT resolutions respect 
Russia’s sovereign sphere, Russia’s support on these resolutions is consistent with H3.  
 Similarly, Russia had traditionally supported the mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) 
when the mission had complemented Russian police action maintaining stability in the 
country; particularly in the breakaway province of Abkhazia.350 For example, the text of 
resolution 1187 extending the UNOMIG mandate in Georgia explicitly emphasized Russia’s 
leadership role,  
"Supporting the vigorous efforts made by the Secretary-General and his Special 
Representative with the assistance of the Russian Federation in its capacity as facilitator as 
well as of the group of Friends of the Secretary- General and of the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to prevent the resumption of hostilities and to 
give a new impetus to the negotiations within the United Nations-led peace process…”351 
The resolution texts for the observer mission in Georgia recognize Russia’s special status in 
mediating conflicts within the CIS. Russia’s concern with regional stability is reflected in its 
voting justification for the resolution:  “the use of force was counterproductive and could 
lead to an explosion in the entire Caucasus region.”352  In other words, Russia saw the 
violence in Georgia as a threat to the stability of Russia’s larger sovereign sphere, and 
therefore viewed Russian peacekeeping as its sovereign responsibility. Moreover, as 
independent research has found,  	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“[Russia decided] to use the ‘Commonwealth of Independent States’ as a cover for what was 
a series of essentially unilateral Russian peacekeeping deployments with very limited neutral 
oversight from the OSCE and in the case of Abkhazia, UNOMIG.”353 
Russia found the UNOMIG arrangement satisfactory because it provided another avenue 
for legitimizing Russia’s sphere of influence over the CIS. One Caucasus expert explained 
that the United State’s traditional failure to contest Russian sovereignty has led to an 
infringement upon the other CIS states’ sovereignty.354 However, Russia would likely 
respond by identifying the responsibility of great power states to maintain peace and stability 
within their relative spheres of influence. Specifically, Russia would point to the U.S. 
‘Monroe Doctrine’ as an exemplar of this point, and would argue that Russia’s own 
sovereign sphere follows along similar normative lines.355 Sergey Lavrov supports this 
interpretation,  
“It is exclusively within international law, without any violation of international legal norms 
and in the interests of reinforcing stability and maintaining security in the regions which are 
located close to the Russian Federation and in other regions of the world regardless of 
whether somebody likes that or not.”356  
Lavrov insists that Russia has an international legal responsibility to maintain international 
stability in its region, implying the existence of ‘regional sovereignty norm’ for great power 
states. 
Russia feels that through NATO expansion into Georgia, the United States attempts 
to undercut Russia’s sovereign sphere. Prior to the U.S.-led expansion, the situation in 
Georgia was stable—with Georgia securely under Russian influence. However, NATO’s 
attempts to push into Eastern Europe through relationships with the post-Soviet periphery 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353 Security Council Report (2012) 
354 Starr (1997) 
355 Kubichek (1999-2000) 
356 Lavrov (2007) 
Mund-126 
not only violates Russia’s sovereign sphere, it also undermines the stable power paradigm in 
the region.357 Thus, in the build-up to the short 2008 Georgia-Russia war, Russia found itself 
facing an increasingly aggressive NATO-backed Georgia willing to challenge the current 
Caucasian security paradigm and recapture its breakaway Georgian provinces. As Russia 
explained in a letter to the Security Council in explanation of Russian military force, “The 
use of force by the Russian side in self-defence will continue until the circumstances that 
brought it about cease to exist.”358 Russia justified its military behavior on legal grounds 
under Article 51 of the UN Charter giving states the right to self-defense. 
This disagreement over the NATO expansion into Russia’s sovereign sphere 
manifested itself in a 2009 draft resolution extending the mandate of the UNOMIG 
mission.359 However, unlike the earlier mandates, this stabilization mission “could be taken 
as a mandate for a new stabilization mission.”360 Unlike the earlier mandates, which allowed 
for unilateral Russian peacekeeping control, this resolution would introduce foreign 
peacekeepers into Russia’s sovereign sphere. Such a draft, Russia argued, was “clearly 
unacceptable.”361 Moreover, Russia argued that the proposed draft was   
“not in the interest of supporting stability in the trans-Caucasus, which was not to be found 
in blind adherence to the vestiges of an outdated reality.  The Russian Federation would 
continue efforts aimed at ensuring the reliable security of the new young States in the trans-
Caucasus and the security of their peoples.”362 
In other words, the draft resolution did not promote international stability, and was 
therefore illegal under the UN Charter. Given the fact that this resolution concerned 
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Russia’s sovereign sphere, Russia was opposed to external intervention. Moreover, because 
Russia’s preexisting role as the sovereign preserver of the regional status quo stability, Russia 
felt that the resolution promoted neither its own sovereign interests nor the interests of 
regional stability. Therefore, Russia felt legally justified in opposing the resolution. Thus, one 
sees Russia’s perception of a distinct Russian sphere affects Russian voting behavior, as H3 
predicts. However, one also finds that this justification for this behavior results from the 
normative incentives proposed in H2 (sovereignty norms), and the fear that NATO 
expansion (H4) is violating those norms. 
 Finally, the qualitative evidence also provides evidence that reinforces the decision to 
classify the states bordering the CIS states as also part of the Russian sovereign sphere. In 
1998, Russia supported resolution 1214, which demanded that the Taliban government in 
Afghanistan cease its support for terrorist organizations.363 Russia’s representative justified 
its support for the vote in regard to Russian security: “His country viewed that military 
escalation as a real threat to the southern border of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS). As such, all necessary measures should be undertaken to protect those 
borders.”364 In this resolution discussion, Russia clearly indicates that the developments in 
CIS Border States affect the security of the CIS states. As such, one would expect Russia’s 
voting behavior to pay special attention to the border states as well, just as the statistical 
evidence demonstrates.  
 In short, the qualitative evidence supports H3’s prediction that Russian will be more 
likely to veto resolutions concerning their sovereign sphere of influence, especially when 
those resolutions do not cede to Russia a leadership role in managing related missions. 
Russia considers outside intervention a threat to the status quo maintained by Russian 	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action. In particular, one finds the role that H2’s conception of inviolable sovereign territory 
plays in defining Russia’s legal interpretation of the Security Council mandate. Moreover, as 
H4 suggests, fears of NATO expansion into Russian sovereign space affects Russia’s voting 
within its Eastern European sphere.  
However, while H3 certainly describes phenomenon affecting Russian voting 
behavior, this explanation plays a secondary role. The fact that these votes take place in 
Eastern Europe is far less important than the fact that Russia’s sphere of influence is being 
violated, as evidenced by the observer missions in Tajikistan and Georgia. Further, less than 
35% of the negative votes cast by Russia concerned the CIS, Balkans, and CIS border states, 
and less than 5% of the negative votes concerned the CIS states themselves.365 Finally, it 
bears noting that a number of the negative resolutions, particularly in the Balkans, may be 
motivated by concerns outlined in other hypotheses. For example, Russian opposition may 
have been motivated by concerns over the Russian sphere of influence, but also may have 
been motivated by a desire to set legal precedents or protect the norms of state sovereignty 
against humanitarian intervention. Therefore, one may conclude that H3 does identify a 
significant factor in Russian voting behavior, but this factor does not play a primary causal 
role. 
H4: U.S. HEGEMONY 
 The predictions for H4 were not born out by the statistical data. While a superficial 
inspection of the qualitative evidence seems to lend support for H4, a deeper examination 
suggests that Russian voting behavior is driven by Russia’s strict legal interpretation of 
Security Council jurisdiction, and not by Russian fears of United States hegemonic 
expansion. While Russia does choose to oppose a number of resolutions involving U.S. 	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expansion, the qualitative evidence below seeks to demonstrate that fear of US hegemony 
does not serve as a driver for Russian voting behavior.366  Instead, one finds that Russia’s 
opposition to U.S. expansion is part of a greater Russian opposition to perceived normative 
changes in the Security Council’s legal jurisdiction lowering the bar for military interventions. 
Therefore, when taken in conjunction with the statistical analysis, the qualitative analysis 
does not support H4 as a primary causal factor. 
 At a basic level, the U.N. press justifications contain evidence indicating that Russia’s 
voting is motivated by fears of U.S. hegemonic ambitions. Such evidence of Russian fears of 
U.S. hegemonic ambitions comes in 1999, through a draft resolution introduced by Russia 
demanding a cessation of NATO’s use of force against the Yugoslav government.367 At the 
time, the United States-led NATO coalition was conducting airstrikes against Slobodan 
Milosevic’s regime in an attempt to compel an end to the ethnic violence in Kosovo.368 
Russia defended its introduction of the draft resolution by attacking NATO’s aggression 
against Milosevic. Further, Russia accused anyone who voted against the draft resolution as 
contributing to “the continuing military action undertaken under the pretext of preventing a 
humanitarian catastrophe.”369 The key word here is the inclusion of ‘pretext’, suggesting that 
the U.S.-led intervention was only nominally a humanitarian mission, but the implication is 
that Russia suspects less honest motives, such as U.S. expansionism. Moreover, two months 
later, through Security Council resolution 1239, Russia once again referenced its concerns 
over U.S. expansionist ambitions. After placing the blame of the ongoing Kosovo conflict 
on NATO bombing campaign, Russia criticized Security Council members, saying that 
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“narrow national interests had prevailed over Charter obligations in the case of some 
Member States.”370 In this case, Russia accuses the NATO states of using the Security 
Council to further their national interests—precisely the fear outlined in H4. However, one 
must also keep in mind that Russia’s opposition to NATO attempts to use the Security 
Council for NATO’s political interests are not automatically motivated by fears of U.S. 
hegemony, and that H4 predicts that Russia may oppose even less politically motivated 
expansions of US power in an effort to limit the United States’ relative power.  
 Nonetheless, Kosovo was not the only example of Russia’s opposition to NATO 
attempts to use the Security Council for political purposes. An examination of Security 
Council resolution 1284, authorizing a United Nations mission responsible for “monitoring 
the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq,”371reveals similar concerns of 
politicized expansionism. In this case, Russia specifically argued “that blame for the delay in 
completing the inspections programme and obtaining Iraqi compliance lay in the actions of 
the United States and the United Kingdom, which had circumvented the Council.”372 Russia 
accused the United States and the United Kingdom of blocking earlier resolution drafts in 
order “to attain their own unilateral goals.”373 While Russia had managed to make progress in 
addressing some of their concerns of Western unilateralism, it did not support the resolution 
due to the fact that the United States and United Kingdom had taken “illegal unilateral 
actions” by implementing no-fly zones and undermining the Iraqi government.374 In Iraq, it 
once again appears that Russian fears of U.S. hegemonic expansion lead to Russian 
opposition in the Security Council. However, as with the examples from Kosovo, it is worth 
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noting that the Russian statement may be ambiguously interpreted as to whether or not the 
source of the Russian objection stems from a fear of expansionism or an opposition to the 
subversion of the Security Council as an institution.  
 Moreover, the Security Council vote used as a justification for NATO invention in 
Libya is equally ambiguous. Leading up the 2011 intervention in Libya, Russia abstained on 
resolution 1973 implementing sanctions and a no-fly zone in Libya. Russia had been 
concerned by the lack of precision as to “how and by whom the measures would be 
enforced and what the limits of the engagement would be.”375 In this case, Russia cast a 
negative vote out of concern over a lack of specificity. This ambiguity could have been 
problematic because it gives United States space to take advantage of a vague mandate, but 
could also prove problematic as emblematic of a decline in Security Council legalism. One 
potential source of clarification of Russian voting comes from the unlikely source of NATO 
Secretary-General Anders Rasmussen, who states that “Russia consciously stepped aside to 
allow the UN Security Council to act.”376 While Rasmussen’s statement implies that Russia 
was not concerned about U.S. expansion, there are obvious political reasons for Rasmussen 
to paint Russia’s abstention as consent,377 and thus the case remains ambiguous.  
Either way, this concern for U.S. expansion proved well-justified, as reiterated in 
draft resolution S/2011/612 eight months later concerning Syria: “[Russia’s representative in 
the Security Council] expressed alarm that compliance with Security Council resolutions on 
the situation in Libya had been considered a model for future actions that could include the 
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).”378 This statement provides specific evidence 
for Russia’s concern for trends of NATO-led expansionism as the United States tries to 
push its hegemonic reach. Russia’s statements later in the resolution, however, beg the 
question of whether interpreting its voting as motivated by fear of U.S. hegemony is indeed 
correct. Vitaly Churkin, representing Russia at the Security Council, said, 
“it was obvious that this evening’s result was not a question of the acceptability of wording; 
it was a conflict of political approaches. The Russian Federation could not agree with the 
accusatory tone against Damascus, he said, nor the ultimatum of sanctions against peaceful 
crisis settlement.  The Russian Federation’s proposals on the non-acceptability of military 
intervention, among others, had not been taken into account.”379 
 Churkin here stresses that Russia’s opposition is grounded in the variance of political 
approaches between Russia and the United States, who “expressed outrage” over the veto.380 
Thus, the focus of Russia’s justification seems to point directly at the politicized text and the 
implicit acceptance of military intervention that Russia found destabilizing and presumably 
an attempt to change the Security Council’s jurisdiction. 
 Moreover, when the Security Council follows Charter protocols, Russia does not 
object to the resolutions, even if the goals coincide with U.S. national interests. For example, 
in resolution 1747 discussing Iranian nuclear proliferation, Russia voted in favor of imposing 
sanctions on Iran.381 Due to the fact that “the resolution’s measures were also imposed in 
accordance with Article 41 of the United Nations Charter and precluded the possibility of 
the use of force,” Russia felt comfortable that U.S. expansionist ability was severely 
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constrained.382 Still, because these resolutions do more to promote U.S. interests relative to 
Russian interests, Russia’s support behind these resolutions raises a weighty challenge against 
H4’s expansionist Russia premise.  
Additionally, according to the Russian officials, the key for Russia was not the limit 
of U.S. influence but rather, that “[the resolution] left the door open to negotiation.”383 In 
other words, Russia felt comfortable voting for the sanctions legislation because of the focus 
on constructive diplomacy, one of Russia’s staple prerequisites for legitimate Security 
Council procedure.384 However, critics might argue that while Russia nominally supports 
constructive diplomacy, there is discrepancy between Russia’s stated position and Russia’s 
actual motivations. Such a discrepancy is indeed possible, and the final two resolutions aim 
to demonstrate that Russia’s stated goal of maintaining current Security Council legal 
protocols drives Russian voting behavior.385  
 Security Council Resolution 1318—which discusses the maintenance of international 
peace and security as the world enters into a new millennium—highlights the associative 
nature of the qualitative evidence’s support for H4. On one hand, Russia explicitly states its 
concern for member states taking advantage of Chapter VII peacemaking operation in 
pursuit of their ‘self-serving interest.’386 On the other hand, Russia also emphasizes the 
importance of United Nations’ traditional role as the international guarantor for world 
stability, and stresses that “under no circumstances can the new century and the new 
millennium be a cause for a reconsideration of norms and behavior tested by time.”387 From 
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this perspective, self-serving expansionist pursuits are not motivated by concerns about 
hegemony, but rather by greater efforts to loosen the legal norms around intervention.  
Russia’s primary voting motivation concerns the maintenance of the current norms in the 
United Nations Security Council. As such, while stopping U.S. expansionism is included 
within Russia’s drive to maintain current Security Council norms of legitimate jurisdiction, 
the evidence does not clearly establish that a fear of U.S. hegemonic expansionism drives 
Russian voting behavior.  
 Finally, resolution 1776, which mandates that United Nations Member States 
contribute resources to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, 
offers the clearest case where Russian opposition was not motivated by concerns of U.S. 
expansion.388 As Russia explained before the vote, it consistently supported the U.S.-led 
ISAF and the extension of the ISAF mandate.389 Moreover, Russian supportive votes 
extending the ISAF mandate in resolutions 1386 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563 corroborate this 
claim. Therefore, this voting behavior seems to imply that Russia did not vote against the 
resolution because of fears of expansionism, but rather, as Russia claims, it could not 
support the resolution “because the new issue of maritime interception had yet to be 
clarified.”390 This focus on legal clarification therefore challenges the notion in H4 that 
Russian voting is motivated by fears of U.S. hegemony. 
In sum, the qualitative evidence signals that in a number of cases, U.S.-led military 
expansion concerns Russia. However, the evidence has not been able to definitively link U.S. 
hegemonic ambitions, or even U.S. military intervention in general, as the motivating factor for 
Russian voting behavior. According to the evidence, Russian voting behavior may just as 
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likely be inspired by concerns about reinterpreting the Security Council mandate beyond its 
original jurisdiction. If the latter motivates Russian voting behavior, then Russia’s opposition 
to NATO expansion displays an associative effect, but fear of such expansion does not play 
a causal role.391 Therefore, while the qualitative evidence supports the plausibility of H4, the 
lack of statistical support suggests that Russia’s opposition to NATO interventions is part of 
a larger effort to prevent the Security Council from overstepping its legal bounds rather than 
based on fears of hegemonic expansionism, as H4 would suggest.392 
H5: RELATIVE POWER 
 According to H5, relative power should drive Russian opposition in the Security 
Council. Such a metric is difficult to assess qualitatively through Russian voting justifications, 
as Russia is not likely to publicly state that they have been bullied into voting for a resolution 
by a vastly more powerful United States. That said, the statistical evidence did not find 
significant support for this finding, which should already predispose the reader to doubt the 
validity of H5. However, because H5 would expect Russia to avoid challenging the U.S. 
when Russia was relatively weak and core U.S. interests were at stake, examples of Russian 
negative votes in such situations challenge H5. 
 Security Council Resolution 1454 provides one such challenge. In the 2002 
resolution, Russia abstained on a vote discussing the implementation of sanctions on Iraq.393 
Already in 2002, the United States felt that Iraq posed a serious threat to U.S. national 
security interests. As U.S. President George Bush stated in his 2002 State of the Union 
address, 
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392 The one area where H4 will hold more weight is in the CIS sphere, but for reasons outlined in H3 above. 
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“States like [Iraq], and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the 
peace of the world.  By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and 
growing danger.”394 
Thus, when resolution 1454 was introduced, the U.S. considered the Iraqi threat as a vital 
national security interest. Moreover, Russia was relatively weak against the United States in 
2002.395 However, due to the fact that the resolution did not include a constructive measure 
stipulating the conditions under which the Security Council would lift the sanctions, Russia 
did not support the resolution. Therefore, it does not appear that Russia was cowed by U.S. 
superlative power.  
 Furthermore, one should also keep in mind the inherent opportunity for 
counterfactual evidence: the United States may not even introduce resolutions that it knows 
will not have any support in the Security Council. Because H5 predicts that a powerful 
United States will be able to coerce a weak Russia into supporting Security Council 
resolutions, one would certainly not expect a weak Russia to keep the U.S. from introducing 
resolutions of interest. However, in the build-up to the 2003 Iraq War, Russia did just that. 
In early 2003, Russia threatened to veto a Security Council resolution that would lead to the 
use of force against Iraq.396France shortly thereafter joined Russia’s pledge to veto, and the 
United States and United Kingdom withdrew the resolution.397 Thus, given the fact that 
Russia was relatively weak,398 this counterfactual case further challenges the hypothesis 
outlined in H5.   
H6: CHINESE LEADERSHIP 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
394 Bush, George W. “2002 State of the Union Address.” The White House Archives. 29 January 2009. 
395 Russia’s relative CINC score was 0.248992006 in 2002, the fifth lowest score out of the relative CINC 
scores generated (CINC data sample was from 1990-2007). 
396 Koinange, Jeff and Jim Bittermann. “France, Russia threaten war veto.” CNN World. 10 March 2003.  
397 Ibid. 
398 With a relative CINC score of 0.249735469, Russia was only marginally stronger versus the United States 
and was still relatively weak. 
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 H6 predicts that Russian votes are influenced by Chinese voting behavior. The 
statistical section supported this hypothesis by finding a strong associative relationship 
between Chinese and Russian voting behaviors. However, the qualitative cases strongly 
suggest that while both Russia and China vote similarly in the Security Council, both 
countries are motivated by similar variables rather than exhibiting a leader-follower 
relationship. In particular, China, like Russia, places a very high premium on the state 
sovereignty principle. This finding is unsurprising—like Russia, China also hosts a number 
of ethnic minorities who are more easily kept in check and aspirations delegitimized through 
the promotion of the state sovereignty principle.399 Thus, the qualitative evidence allows one 
to conclude that Chinese voting behavior does not drive Russian voting behavior.  
 One strong piece of evidence indicating that the Russia-China voting relationship 
was strictly epiphenomenal came from Russian voting justifications. If Russia was indeed 
influenced by Chinese voting behavior, then one would expect to see Russia reference 
China’s voting behavior when justifying their own. However, not once in all 1095 examined 
resolutions did the Russian Federation refer to the Chinese voting position when casting 
their own vote. Thus, it does not appear that Russia bases its votes off of Chinese decision-
making.400  
 Instead, it appears that China, like Russia, is strictly concerned with sovereignty 
norms. In fact, while Russia justified its voting behavior primarily in legal terms, China 
explained its own voting positions primarily based on its concern with sovereignty norms.  
For example, when justifying its veto on a 2012 draft resolution that would have authorized 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
399 For more information, see the discussion in H2 on state sovereignty. Also, see Coggins (2012) p. 451 and 
Toft (2002). Moreover, China has also been criticized on its poor human rights record as well.s 
400 Additionally, such voting behavior would be grossly inconsistent with Russia’s self-conceptualization as a 
great power, as outlined in the theoretical section. See Welch and Shevchenko (2010); 
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sanctions against the Syrian regime, China defended its veto: “The purpose was safeguarding 
the interests of the Syrian people, as well as the basic norms covering international 
relations.”401 Here, the ‘basic norms’ that China strives to protect are those norms of state 
sovereignty.  
Similarly, when defending its decision to abstain on the implementation of a no-fly 
zone against Libya in early 2011, China justified its vote on the resolution in terms of its 
commitment to state sovereignty:402 “The United Nations Charter must be respected and the 
current crisis must be ended through peaceful means.  China was always against the use of 
force when those means were not exhausted.”403 Here, China explains the practical 
implications of the state sovereignty principle on the UN Security Council: due to the fact 
that the United Nations Charter institutionalizes state sovereignty, the UN Security Council 
can only take action as a last resort.404 Again, this language sounds similar to much of the 
rhetoric employed during Russian justifications. However, the evidence seems to imply 
nothing more than similar motives. 
 Finally, Chinese and Russian voting patterns in 1998 and 1999 on the conflict in 
Kosovo demonstrate that neither state was following the other’s voting pattern. In both 
Security Council resolutions 1160 and 1199, China abstained on both resolutions, but Russia 
voted in favor of the resolutions.405 Such a result is counter-intuitive—Russia had a greater 
stake in avoiding conflict in the Balkans and was a close Yugoslav ally.406 While Russia 
justified its supportive voting on behalf of promoting peace through constructive dialogue, 	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402 UNSC resolution 1973 
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404 In fact, China goes even further to say that the only reason “It had not blocked the passage of the 
resolution, however, [was] because it attached great importance to the requests of the Arab League and the 
African Union.” Press Release for UN Security Council resolution 1973 
405 UNSC resolution 1160; UNSC resolution 1199. 
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China took a more hard-line position on state sovereignty.407 Despite the willingness of the 
international community to work towards a constructive peace, China took a principled 
stance, arguing that  
“the question of Kosovo was in essence an internal matter of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. It should be resolved properly through negotiations between both parties 
concerned on the basis of the principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”408 
 China clearly states that the case of Kosovo is an internal, sovereign question for the 
Yugoslav government, and the international community has no business involving itself in 
this sovereign matter. Moreover, China asserts that the basic principle on which Yugoslavia 
should be negotiating with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is based on the principle for 
the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. In other words, any final agreement must deny 
Kosovar separatist demands and retain the complete sovereignty of Yugoslavia. Such a 
stance goes even farther than Russia, who prioritized the pragmatic objective of maintaining 
international stability, even at the possible expense of Yugoslav sovereignty. In contrast to 
the Chinese stance, Russia “strongly believed that the basis for a settlement in Kosovo was 
the retention of the autonomous region within Serbia on the basis of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity.”409 Critically, the Russian stance recognizes that the international 
community may have a role to play in bringing about a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo 
conflict, even at the expense of Yugoslav sovereignty.  
China had a similar critique in resolution 1199, where it feels that “The draft 
resolution did not take into consideration the legitimate rights of the Federal Republic of 	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autonomous regions, see Lluch, Jaime. “The Internal Variation in Substate National Movements and the Moral 
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Yugoslavia within its sphere of sovereignty. It might reinforce the separatist and terrorist 
forces in the region and intensify the tension there.”410 China explicitly voices its concern 
that a resolution infringing upon state sovereignty will lead to increased support for state 
separatism. This declaration most clearly links Chinese support for state sovereignty and 
China’s concern for the rise of ‘state separatist and terrorist forces.’ These two votes on 
Kosovo expose a subtle but critical difference between the Chinese and Russian voting 
approaches to the Security Council. While China places an absolutist priority on the 
maintenance of sovereignty norms, Russia prioritizes international peace and stability.411  
 Therefore, a combination of the lack of reference to each other’s voting positions, a 
joint interest in preserving state sovereignty norms, and their voting differences over votes 
on Kosovo, one finds that the qualitative evidence strongly suggests that the Russian and 
Chinese leadership are not basing their votes off of one another, but rather simply share 
similar (but not identical) views about the appropriate role of the Security Council. Russia 
and China’s shared interest in maintaining the primacy of sovereignty norms explains the 
extremely high correlation between their voting patterns identified by the statistical analyses. 
Finally, Russia’s willingness to place constructive pragmatism before an uncompromising 
normative stance sets its voting apart and proves that Russia is not taking its voting cues 
from China, and, by extension, the ‘non-Western world.’ In short: the qualitative evidence 
conclusively invalidates H6.    
H7: NORMATIVE COMPROMISE 
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1333, where China abstained on votes recommending the addition of Nauru and Tuvalu to the United Nations, 
respectively.   
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 This hypothesis expects to see Russia vote with the other members of the Security 
Council when the other members are willing to respect Russia enough to compromise on 
normative questions. While the quantitative analysis found an association between attempts 
at compromise and negative Russian votes, the discussion also highlighted severe 
methodological flaws in the data collection. Therefore, the qualitative analysis gives the 
reader an opportunity to assess the strength of the hypothesis without concerns of data 
collection methodology. However, when assessing the failure of normative compromise, one 
finds an insurmountable compound problem of diplomatic rhetoric and a lack of substantive 
insight. Regardless of the reason for Russia’s opposition in a given case, Russia can simply 
say that its “country's views had not been taken duly into consideration.”412 This creates a 
tautological scenario where a Russian vote ‘no’ signals a lack of compromise, by definition. 
Therefore, this tautological problem undermines the explanatory insight for Russia’s 
justifications on compromise, and H7 fails to provide a convincing qualitative explanation 
for Russian voting behavior.  
 For example, in resolution 1305 extending the mandate of the United Nations 
Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), Russia stated that “while it was in the 
interest of the continuing peace process to pass the resolution, the Russian Federation could 
not do so because Russian amendments had not been taken on board.”413 This Bosnia case 
demonstrates the problem generated by the ‘lack of compromise’ rhetoric. Because Russia 
does not specify its metrics for compromise, Russian claims of insufficient compromise are 
completely subjective and gives little explanatory insight. Moreover, any time that Russia is 
unable to find an acceptable diplomatic agreement, Russia has incentive to characterize the 
lack of agreement on the failure of the other member states to sufficiently consider Russia’s 	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position, creating a moral hazard problem. In these cases, the failure to reach consensus 
could have been fully due to Russian intransigence, and one would have no idea based off of 
the resolution data. 
 Even more critically, such a compromised-based analysis would miss the substance 
of the voting justification entirely. For example, the assessment in H2 for resolution 2068, 
discussing the use and targeting children in conflict, suggested that Russia voting patterns 
were motivated by sovereignty concerns.414 However, if looking for Russian justifications of 
failure to reach a compromise, one would hone in on the following statement: “When 
negotiating such an instrument all views of members should be taken into account, [the 
Russian representative] said, adding that he hoped to reach a consensus text in the future.”415 
Such a focus obscures the real reasons motivating Russian voting.  
Therefore, due to the unspecified nature of the Russian justification as well as 
questions of moral hazard, Russia’s rhetoric on compromise does not allow for H7 to 
provide much explanatory leverage and provides an unsteady foundation on which to base a 
rigorous analysis. One may thus conclude that H7 does not provide a useful approach, both 
qualitatively as well as quantitatively, for this paper’s research question. Nonetheless, I 
include H7 in the discussion as for instructive purposes—that not all research approaches 
are analytically equal, and in order to reinforce the point that each hypothesis was evaluated 
not only on its content but also on its analytical leverage.  
H8: PRESTIGIOUS STATE 
The next hypothesis expects Russia to vote negatively in resolutions condemning 
prestigious states in an effort to build relationships with those states. The quantitative tests 
indicated preliminary support, but were limited by the small number of resolutions targeting 	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prestigious states. A qualitative analysis of these cases helps the reader better understand the 
relative merits of H8’s prediction. The analysis of the two cases condemning the behavior of 
prestigious states provides moderate support for this hypothesis, but the small number of 
cases demonstrates the limited utility of this hypothesis in explaining Russian voting 
decisions for the vast majority of Security Council resolutions.  
The first case condemned the nuclear proliferation efforts of India and Pakistan. In 
an ever-escalating war of threat and counter-threat, the two feuding countries have both 
striven to gain the upper edge in a decades-long dispute over the jurisdiction of Kashmir. In 
1998, both India and Pakistan violated international taboo on nuclear proliferation and 
conducted nuclear weapons tests.416 In the Security Council resolution that ensued, Russia 
joined the rest of the Security Council in their condemnation of both South Asian countries’ 
attempts to join the nuclear weapons club.417 Russia justified its vote by emphasizing the 
danger of both nuclear tests to the non-proliferation regime and “to do everything it could 
to strengthen that regime and to prevent its being undermined.”418 It is noteworthy that 
Russia chose to designate the nuclear tests as a threat to the non-proliferation regime and 
not as a threat to international peace and security. While a threat to non-proliferation would 
likely be considered a threat to international security, the fact that Russia refrained from 
doing so may have reflected a conscious decision to specifically prevent avenues for future 
Security Council action against both countries. Such an interpretation is reinforced by 
Russia’s decision to explicitly highlight that “Russia felt that the economic sanctions imposed 
on the two countries in the wake of the nuclear tests were unjustified,…noting that the 
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resolution before the Council did not contain such a provision.”419 In other words, Russia’s 
statements indicate that its support for the resolution condemning nuclear proliferation was 
on condition that the Security Council not authorize further prosecution of India or 
Pakistan. Such an effort to forestall future punitive activities would likely generate goodwill 
towards Russia in both countries, and therefore fits with H8’s expectations, even if Russia 
did not vote against the West on this particular resolution.  
The other case where a prestigious state faced censure in the Security Council 
involved Russia itself. In 2008, Russia fought a five-day war with Georgia, and faced a draft 
resolution demanding that it ‘pull back its forces.’420 However, this case does not help H8, 
because Russia’s support for itself does not imply that it would support other prestigious 
states; it just reaffirms that Russia a self-interested actor in the international community.421 
One may interpret this comment to challenge H1, which operates off of a legalist basis, and 
assumes less self-interest. However, as the H2 discussion of sovereignty illustrates, Russia’s 
strict legalist approach to the Security Council is steeped in self-interested motives. 
Moreover, Russia also defends their military action in Georgia as ‘self defense,’ authorized 
under Chapter VII, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.422 Nonetheless, that fact that 
Russia’s threat to veto a Security Council resolution on the Russian-Georgian conflict 
resulted in the resolution’s withdrawal does lend qualitative support to the explain finding 
that Security Council members do not introduce resolutions that they are confident will be 
vetoed by a permanent member.423  	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While the India-Pakistan case provides some qualitative support for H8, one cannot 
generalize here based off of a single resolution. As a whole, while H8 does not have enough 
evidence to explain Russian voting behavior within the Security Council as status seeking, it 
does convincingly demonstrate that the Security Council members address international 
crises involving prestigious states outside of traditional Security Council resolutions.   
H9: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY 
 The next hypothesis was not tested from a statistical standpoint. Evidence for H9 
would demonstrate that Russia has a different definition of democratic legitimacy than does 
the West. The qualitative evidence below does indeed demonstrate that Russia’s definition of 
a legitimate state differs from the West. However, this difference boils down to a question 
over the limits of state sovereignty, and not one of relational legitimacy. One permutation of 
the democratic legitimacy argument is that of sovereign democracy, which does have greater 
support. However, there is no practical difference in implications between the sovereign 
democracy theory and the more general protection of sovereignty norms discussed in H2. 
Therefore, H9 does not provide any new support not already established in H2. In short, as 
an independent hypothesis, H9 fails to explain anything new.  
 Russia bases its definition of state legitimacy on a relational perspective, or whether 
the state provides its people its basic goods. Most important, from the Russian perspective, 
is that the state provide order and stability to its society, and that it does not threaten the 
stability of the greater international community. As explained in H2, when a state maintains 
internal order and stability, then Russia believes that the state deserves its sovereign 
respect.424 Moreover, Russia considers attempts to violate state sovereignty on the grounds 
of promoting democracy to be illegitimate. As Lavrov writes, “The CIS space has turned 	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into a sphere for geopolitical ‘games,’ which involves such instruments as 
“democratorship.’”425 Lavrov’s critique attacks NATO and others for disrespecting state 
sovereignty on the illegitimate grounds (according to Russia) of installing liberal 
democracies.  
This Russia-Western disagreement mirrors the questions posed in H2 of whether 
state rights supersede individual rights. This dissonance seems to be exemplified by Russia’s 
veto over sanctions against Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe.426 As Zalmay Khalilzad, 
representing the United States, said, “China and Russia stand with Mugabe against the 
people of Zimbabwe.  A majority of the Council stand with the people of Zimbabwe.”427 In 
other words, China and Russia stand in support of state sovereignty (and, they argue, the UN 
Charter). The United States and its Western allies, however, believe that humanitarian rights 
and the rights of the individual take the ultimate precedence, even before the rights of 
sovereign states. Nonetheless, while this case provides evidence for the importance of state 
sovereignty, it does not provide support for relational legitimacy perspective. As Zimbabwe’s 
leader, Robert Mugabe failed to provide basic goods and services to his people, and 
completely trashed his country’s economy.428 Therefore, Mugabe should not have liberal or 
relational legitimacy, and Russia should therefore have supported the resolution. Similarly, 
Russia’s negative vote on Myanmar could not have been based on Myanmar’s relational 
legitimacy—as discussed in H2, Myanmar was failing to provide essential goods to its people 
and thus causing a humanitarian crisis.429 Therefore, in both cases, it appears that the driver 
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for Russian voting was not whether or not these were legitimate democratic states, but rather 
whether the humanitarian crises warrants a violation of state sovereignty.430  
The U.S. support for violations of sovereignty in humanitarian crises does not mean 
that the United States supports blanket violations of state sovereignty. On the other hand, 
the United States is a major advocate of the rights of sovereign states, as evidenced by U.S. 
opposition to the International Criminal Court.431 However, when it comes to humanitarian 
intervention, the United States and Russia do not see eye-to-eye.  
This disagreement has led Russia to develop the theory of sovereign democracy, as 
explained in detail in the literature review and in the theoretical background for H9. To 
recapitulate: sovereign democracy means that Russia will take its own path towards the 
development of its democratic government, based on its unique cultural heritage and its 
rights as a sovereign state.432 If a state decides to prioritize security over equality, Russia 
would argue that this remains the country’s sovereign right, and legitimate regime change can 
only come from an organic movement within that state.433 To quote Monaghan, “…Moscow 
sees things differently: as Kosachov put it, democracy does not worry Russians, but the 
‘cardinally changing balance of security’ does.”434  In other words, Russians are far less 
concerned about democratization or particular form of government than they are with 
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the United States’ peacekeeping forces liable under the International Criminal Court, which the United States 
felt was a violation of United States sovereignty.  
432 Monaghan (2006) 
433 A more in-depth discussion on this topic falls outside of the domain of this essay. 
434 Monaghan (2008)  
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whether or not that government can provide legitimacy through stability, a finding consistent 
with H2.  
For example, in Resolution 1618, Russia advocates a limitation on individual rights. 
“[The Russian representative] drew attention to the inadmissibility of giving a podium in the 
mass media for the spread of terrorist views.  The right to freedom of speech and 
dissemination of information was not without limitations.”435 In this case of non-state terror, 
Russia believes that state security should take primacy over individual rights, such as the 
rights of free speech in the media. While the Western reaction is to immediately respond 
with the sacrosanct nature of individual rights, a closer examination of United States 
legislation such as the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act shows that the United States’ Congress 
would not completely disagree with Russia’s claim that “the right to freedom…was not 
without limitations.”436  
In sum, H9 does not offer any significant insights to understanding Russian voting 
behavior. While the qualitative evidence does not find a relational legitimacy perspective, it 
does support the conclusion that Russia has differing views of legitimate sovereign 
governance than does the United States. However, such a finding is a natural result of the 
normative differences outlined in H2. Therefore, H9 may be best categorized as minimally 
informative in understanding Russian voting behavior. Nonetheless, H9 does perform the 
service of clearly demonstrating the theoretical consistency of Russia’s sovereignty 
approach—a state concerned with promoting state sovereignty norms will respect state 
legitimacy regardless of the state’s individual human rights practices. 
H10: RESPECTED POWER 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
435 Press Release for UN Security Council resolution 1618 
436 “The USA PATRIOT Act: Preserving Life and Liberty.” Department of Justice. 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm 
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Finally, H10 expects Russia to cooperate more with the West when it feels respected. 
While the statistical testing supported H10, it is more difficult to show through qualitative, 
individual resolutions that Russia feels respected. Therefore, in order to ascertain whether or 
not respect had an influence on voting behavior, I identified a particularly salient ‘hard case’ 
for H10: the Iraq War in 2003. Scholars identify 2001-2005 as a time when Russia felt 
respected by the United States.437 Furthermore, if respect for Russia does not translate into 
Security Council voting support, then H10 has little explanatory power. The qualitative 
findings suggest that variations of respect do not have significant influence in the UN 
Security Council. Thus, the qualitative evaluation is not consistent with H10’s prediction. 
If Russia’s level of respect actually impacted Russian voting patterns, then one would 
expect it to vote in favor of resolutions important to the United States when it felt respected 
by the United States. The prime example of a case that the U.S. felt was vital to its national 
interests was the case of Iraq in 2003. As explained in the qualitative analysis of H5, the U.S. 
felt that Iraq posed a threat to United States security, and placed a high premium on support 
for the resolution.438 As White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said,  
“"The president would look at this as a missed opportunity for Russia to take an important 
moral stand to defend freedom, and to prevent the risk of a massive catastrophe taking place 
as a result of Saddam Husseins' weapons of mass destruction."439 
Thus, if an increased level of respect for Russia drove Russian voting behavior, then one 
would expect Russia to support the resolution. However, as discussed above, Russia took the 
lead in informing the United States that Russia was determined to “exercise its veto right.”440 
This qualitative example shows that a respected Russia was not wiling to consider voting for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
437 Thorun (2009); Tsygankov (2012A) 
438 Koinange and Bittermann (10 March 2002) 
439 Koinange and Bittermann (10 March 2002) 
440 Koinange and Bittermann (10 March 2002) 
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a resolution that the United States considered fundamentally important. As such, in cases 
where the United States does not respect Russia, one has all the more reason to expect 
Russia to avoid voting along with U.S. interests. 
Therefore, the salient case of Iraq during a time when Russia was respected and the 
United States strongly desired Russian support challenges H10. Russia still supports a vast 
majority of votes when it feels disrespected, and still votes against resolutions when it feels 
respected. Moreover, H10 gives us little insight into the specific cases—when looking at 
individual resolutions, H10 gives no insight by which one may determine the likelihood of 
Russian opposition on a given vote in a given year. Therefore, due to the fact that the salient 
case of Iraq fails to complement the statistical findings and the fact that H10 has a limited 
practical applicability to differentiate between specific resolutions, H10 does not offer a 
strong explanation of Russian voting behavior.   
 The qualitative results provided strong support for the thesis argument proposing a 
conservative-minded Russia intent on preserving its current international influence. All three 
of the ‘defensive realist’ hypotheses enjoyed strong support from the case analysis. In 
particular, the qualitative piece has established the connection between Russia’s desire to 
maintain the international status quo and the ways that a strictly defined legal mandate and 
the promotion of the state sovereignty principle helps defend the current balance of power. 
Furthermore, the sphere of influence (H3) remained the only other hypothesis that received 
consistent support in both resolutions. However, as discussed in the qualitative piece above, 
while H3 is a relevant motivating factor, its relevance stems from a permutation of H2. For 
the three hypotheses falling under the offensive realist approach (H4, H5, and H6), only H4 
received some empirical support. However, a thorough examination of the hypothesis 
revealed that the voting was motivated by the desire to defend current sovereignty norms 
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(H2) and protect a narrow legal UNSC mandate (H1) and was less motivated by a desire to 
challenge U.S. hegemony (H4). Finally, while the primary status seeker hypothesis, H10, 
found support in the statistical section, a qualitative case study demonstrated that the 
hypothesis’ explanatory power for individual cases was non-existent.   
The chart below provides a summary of the qualitative results. 
No. Hypothesis Qualitative Findings Conclusion441 
H1 Legal Orthodoxy Russia interprets Security Council 
jurisdiction in a strictly limited fashion 
 Genuine Russian priority in maintaining 
peace and stability 
Struggles to explain why Russia takes a 
legally orthodox stance 
Y 
H2 Protection of Sovereignty 
Norms 
Russia maintains state sovereignty norms 
through strict legalism 
Russia maintains status quo through 
sovereignty norms 
Russia protects itself from separatism and 
terrorism through state sovereignty 
Y 
H3 Sphere of Influence Russia views external intervention a threat to 
regional stability 
Russia has a sovereign sphere of influence 
and opposes NATO expansionism 
Secondary causal role to protection of 
sovereignty norms 
Y 
H4 U.S. Hegemony Russian opposition aimed at limiting 
Security Council legal jurisdiction, not 
fears of U.S. hegemony 
Russia fears U.S. expansion within sovereign 
sphere  
M 
H5 Relative Power Substantive evidence that Russia is willing to 
challenge the United States in the Security 
Council even when Russia is weak  
N 
H6 Chinese Leadership No references to Chinese voting in 
justifications 
Both motivated by protecting sovereignty 
Russia more willing to make pragmatic 
choices of stability over compromise  
N 
H7 Normative Compromise Justifications fail to specify specific 
motivations 
Insuperable moral hazard concerns 
N 
H8 Prestigious State Prestige fails to explain general voting 
behavior 
Evidence that prestigious states not 
considered in Security Council 
N 
H9 Democratic Legitimacy Supports sovereignty hypothesis 
Does not support the influence of relational 
legitimacy 
N 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
441 Key: Y=Yes N=No M=Marginal Yes N/A=Not applicable 
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Fails to provide novel information 
H10 Respected Power Case of Iraq does not lend support for 
Russian cooperation when given respect 
Offers little insight into voting motivations 
for individual resolutions 
 
N 
CONCLUSION 
 In conclusion, this essay finds that Russian voting in the Security Council is 
motivated by Russia’s desire to protect its preexisting interests. Russia protects these 
interests by opposing changes to the current status quo. In particular, this entails a reluctance 
to authorize the destabilizing use of international force unless the threats to peace and 
security are sufficiently severe and there are no other viable alternatives. Russia believes that 
the UN Charter has codified the narrow Russian definition on the use of force into 
international law. Russia also opposes changes to the status quo through its insistence upon 
state sovereignty, which precludes the recognition of non-state actors and also protects states 
from critiques of their governance practices by promoting states’ rights over individual 
rights. Due to the presence of state separatists and its questionable human rights record, 
Russia’s advancement of the state sovereignty principle advances its own interests in both of 
these areas. This concern with state sovereignty has also led Russia to promote a normative 
concept of Russia’s own domestic sovereign democracy, which grants Russia democratic 
legitimacy even if its “democratic development” does not mirror the traditional Western 
model. Moreover, Russia extends this theory of sovereignty to include the CIS states, which 
it considers to fall under its sovereign sphere of influence. Thus, Russia opposes outside 
incursions into its sphere of influence both because it views such activities as a violation of 
its sovereign space and also because such interventions threaten the regional stability Russia 
maintains in the post-Soviet space.  
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 Each of these theoretical elements receives support from the quantitative and 
qualitative data. From the quantitative side, the statistical significance of labeling a resolution 
as ‘a threat to international security’ under Chapter VII provided strong support for the 
existence of Russian legal consistency. Moreover, the statistical significance of Russian 
opposition to cases where there were violations of sovereignty (particularly without consent) 
also provided critical evidence for a concern with violations of state sovereignty. In a similar 
vein, Russia’s consistent justificatory defense of its voting decisions in situations with 
violations of sovereignty also provided vital evidence that Russia was not only concerned 
with the practical result of the resolution in question, but also with material implications. 
Similarly, Russia’s statistically significant tendency to vote against resolutions concerning the 
CIS demonstrated strong empirical support for the existence of a sovereign sphere. Further, 
a wide array of qualitative resolutions provided evidence for this theory of a defensive 
Russia. Some important cases were those that demonstrated Russia’s willingness to authorize 
force when they felt there was a genuine threat to international peace and security (like in 
Burundi)442 as well as cases such as Myanmar, which demonstrated Russia’s prioritization of 
state sovereignty over humanitarian intervention.443    
On the other hand, the evidence is inconsistent with the rival theoretical approaches. 
Contrary to H4 and the school of thought that sees Russia as an expansionist power, the 
authorization of intervention did not impact Russian negative voting behavior. Moreover, 
the failure to find any empirical evidence that relative power affects Russia’s voting behavior 
is inconsistent with the expansionist school. While the status seeker theory had statistical 
support in that Russia was more likely to vote positively on resolutions in the period 
categorized by Russian experts as respected, this added prestige did not help the U.S. win 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
442 UNSC Security Council 1049  
443 UNSC Draft Resolution S/2000/14 
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Russian support on Iraq, where the U.S. had the most interests at stake. Such a finding 
strongly suggested that Russia’s primary motivation could not be based on a search for 
prestige.     
 This study also identifies a number of interesting questions for future research. One 
avenue for future research would be the relationship between Russia’s voting in the Security 
Council and the views of Russia’s domestic populace. While a substantial literature has 
developed examining the impact of domestic audience costs on foreign policy decision-
making,444 one might also consider examining whether foreign policy decision-making in the 
Security Council impacts Russian domestic attitudes. Public opinion surveys conducted 
within Russia have assessed Russian popular opinion on normative principles in the Security 
Council., and a further comparison of these two perspectives may provide valuable 
revelations in light of the findings outlined in this paper.445  
 Another avenue for future research would be to further explore the relationship 
between Russia and the states within its sovereign sphere of influence. This paper has 
established that Russia considers these CIS states to have a special historic relationship to 
Russia, and Russia takes a protective sovereign stance of the CIS in the international arena. 
Moreover, this paper found that the West disputes Russia’s sphere of sovereignty, and 
encourages the CIS states to pursue a foreign policy independent from Russian interests. 
Thus, an area for future research would be to examine how different CIS states’ foreign 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
444 For more on audience cost literature, see Fearon, James. “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation 
of International Disputes”. American Political Science Review, 88.3 (September 1994); Tomz, Michael. “Domestic 
Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach” International Organization 61, no. 4. (Fall 
2007): 821–40, Trager, R. F. and Vavreck, L. “The Political Costs of Crisis Bargaining: Presidential Rhetoric 
and the Role of Party.” American Journal of Political Science, 55 (2011): 526–545; Weeks, Jessica L., Strongmen and 
Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict (December 15, 2011); and Baum 
(2004) 
445 See for example, Council on Foreign Relations. Public Opinion on Global Issues Chapter 1: World Opinion 
on General Principles of World Order (December 16, 2011). 
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policies have developed since the fall of the Soviet Union, and whether Georgia’s rejection 
of Russia’s heavy hand is an exception or the norm.  
 Moreover, these findings have specific implications for the success of the United 
States’ diplomatic tactics at the Security Council. First, Russia’s legalist approach offers 
distinct opportunities for engagement and compromise in the Security Council. According to 
this paper’s findings, diplomatic advances should not focus on Russia’s benefit or self-
interest when discussing potential draft resolutions. In other words, if the United States 
wants to push for the authorization of an intervention in Syria, the U.S. will make little 
progress in reassuring Russian security interests. Rather, the United States should emphasize 
the compatibility of Russian legal principles. In the case of Syria, the United States might 
emphasize the threat to international security. For example, the United States could try to 
convince Russia that the conflict in Syria threatened regional stability through the refugee 
spillover into Iraq and Turkey that was quickly expanding the scope of the conflict. Such an 
appeal to legal norms based on the UN Charter would be much more likely to receive 
Russian support than if the U.S. relied on humanitarian arguments. Therefore, while the 
humanitarian rhetoric may help legitimize military action for domestic Western audiences,446 
that same rhetoric may delegitimize the intervention from the Russian perspective.  
 Second, this paper emphasizes the lack of normative consensus on international law. 
Currently, the differing normative priorities between sovereignty and humanitarian 
intervention have led to conflict amongst the Security Council members. This conflict will 
continue to grow as ‘state-first’ countries like China continue to rise in influence and exert 
more diplomatic leverage in the Security Council negotiations. Thus, this essay also identifies 
the need for codification of current international law. Else, one should expect a continual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
446 Although as Baum (2004) notes, domestic audiences may be extremely fickle. 
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trend for the state sovereignty principle based on a strict interpretation of the UN Charter to 
reign supreme over the concerns of individual citizen rights.  
Finally, the findings in this essay have wider implications for understanding Russian 
foreign policy motivations. The research conclusion takes a definitive stance on Russia’s 
foreign policy outlook. Contrary to the portrayal of Russia as an aggressive expansionist, the 
empirical study of Russian Security Council voting shows Russia in a principled, defensive 
light. If one extrapolates Russia’s motivations in the Security Council to its general foreign 
policy motivations, then one finds a strictly conservative Russia ambitiously seeking to 
protect its current resources and influence. Thus, one should not interpret Russia’s overtures 
towards rising non-Western powers as a reversion to Soviet-era expansionism, but rather as 
an attempt to strategically align itself to protect what it already has. As such, Russian foreign 
policy does not seek to change the balance of power in ways inimical to American interests. 
Therefore, one would be misguided to suggest that the U.S.-Russian relationship must be 
inherently combative.447 
On the other hand, one sees increasing strategic opportunities for cooperation 
between the United States and Russia. As the United States becomes increasingly focused on 
maintaining its own relative influence in the world, both Russia and the United States will 
share a defensive realist world perspective.448 Thus, with both states focusing on protecting 
their international influence, the United States and Russia have shared interests in retaining 
the status quo. Moreover, both the United States and Russia share a core conviction that the 
basis for international relations should be the state system, and that individual states bear the 
primary responsibility for the governance of their individual citizenry. For the United States, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
447 Along the lines of Jervis (1978), this defensive realist approach would see the possibility of overcoming the 
security dilemma as challenging but not impossible. 
448 Datta, Monte Narayan. “The Decline of America’s Soft Power in the United Nations.” International Studies 
Perspectives 10 (2009): 265–284. 
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this commitment to state sovereignty is manifested by its strong resistance to International 
Criminal Court’s jurisdiction over United States citizens.  The United States believes that it 
has primary jurisdiction over its own citizenry, and therefore will not defer that “sovereign 
right” to any other decision-making body. Similarly, Russia takes an approach of “sovereign 
democracy” to its own governance, arguing that no other body has the authority to dictate 
Russian policy towards its domestic citizens within sovereign Russia, and to a lesser extent, 
to those in Russia’s immediate sphere. However, the United States believes that states can 
‘forfeit’ that sovereign right if the government human rights violations are sufficiently severe. 
The evidence suggests that Russia does not share these sentiments. Thus, while 
disagreements do challenge U.S.-Russian cooperation, both countries have shared objectives 
and would mutually benefit from trust and cooperation based on jointly recognized shared 
interests.  
Nonetheless, cooperation with Russia comes at a cost. A robust relationship requires 
the U.S. to recognize Russia’s interests as a sovereign equal.449 Moreover, it requires the U.S. 
to accept Russia’s unilateral sovereign influence over the CIS states. Lastly, and most 
importantly, Russia requires that the United States accept the inviolable supremacy of the 
state sovereignty norm in the international system, even outweighing humanitarian concerns. 
Thus, while cooperation with Russia is indeed achievable, and possibly even in the U.S. 
strategic interest, only the U.S. can decide whether this great power alliance comes at too 
high a price. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
449 A note on sovereignty: both Russia and the United States have extraordinarily similar views of state 
sovereignty. Both states view that their domestic government should supersede any international government’s 
determination of national legitimacy. For the United States, this conviction to state sovereignty is manifested by 
its strong resistance to International Criminal Court with jurisdiction over United States citizens.449 The United 
States believes that it has primary jurisdiction over its own government, and therefore will not defer that 
“sovereign right” to any other decision-making body. Similarly, Russia takes an approach of “sovereign 
democracy” to its own governance, arguing that no other body has the authority to dictate Russian policy 
within sovereign Russia, and to a lesser extent, in Russia’s immediate sphere. 
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APPENDIX: 
 
Appendix I: Security Council activity per year 
 
February 2013 Monthly Forecasts.” Security Council Report. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/  
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Appendix II: Sample Coding-List of Vetoes and Abstentions 
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Appendix III: Percentage of Russian negative votes per year over total number of votes per year 
 +--------------------------------------+
      |   yr   rusneg~r   totinyr   totneg~r |
      |--------------------------------------|
   1. | 1995   .0454545        66          3 |
   2. | 1996   .1034483        58          6 |
   3. | 1997   .0350877        57          2 |
   4. | 1998   .0273973        73          2 |
   5. | 1999   .0746269        67          5 |
      |--------------------------------------|
   6. | 2000   .0392157        51          2 |
   7. | 2001          0        54          0 |
   8. | 2002   .0142857        70          1 |
   9. | 2003          0        69          0 |
  10. | 2004   .0483871        62          3 |
      |--------------------------------------|
  11. | 2005   .0140845        71          1 |
  12. | 2006   .0337079        89          3 |
  13. | 2007   .0877193        57          5 |
  14. | 2008   .0151515        66          1 |
  15. | 2009   .0204082        49          1 |
      |--------------------------------------|
  16. | 2010   .0169492        59          1 |
  17. | 2011   .0441176        68          3 |
  18. | 2012   .0727273        55          4 |
      +--------------------------------------+
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